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The  problem of induction—the problem of how one can justify an 
inference from observations of some things of a type to a generalization about all 
(or most) things of the type—is one of the most important in logic and 
epistemology. In addition, one of the enduring problems of Aristotle scholarship 
is whether he dealt with the  problem of induction, and if so, how. This problem is 
important in connection with Posterior Analytics B.19, where Aristotle seems to 
provide an account, a piece of genetic epistemology, of how the principles of 
demonstration are acquired. The account seems to describe an inductive process. 
In my dissertation, I argue that Aristotle does have to face that problem of 
induction in the genetic account of APo. B.19, and has a putative solution to it. I 
argue that the putative solution to the problem is based on his doctrine of natural 
kinds.  
 I argue first that Aristotle in fact recognizes induction that consists of 
reasoning from particular propositions to a universal proposition. I then evaluate 
various readings of the genetic account of APo. B.19. I argue, in particular, that 
there is strong textual evidence against the claim that Aristotle thinks that 
principles of demonstration are secured by nous as intuition, so that nous is the 
solution to, or a way to avoid, the problem of induction.  
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 What then is Aristotle’s putative solution to the  problem of induction? I 
argue, in essence, that for Aristotle the solution is a matter of retaining enough 
percepts of particulars in the subject kind of the conclusion (and maybe some 
outside of that kind) in memory for the universal form of the subject kind to 
become salient and clear in the rational soul. Thus, having the comprehension 
(nous) that all normal horses are quadrupeds is a matter of retaining enough 
percepts of horses, each having four legs, for the universal form of horse to “make 
a stand” (in Aristotle’s words) in the mind of the inducer. In this way, the inducer 
comprehends that the four-legged-ness is part of that form, i.e. that it “belongs to” 
the form horse, i.e. that all normal horses are quadrupeds.  
 This gives us a picture of Aristotle as being aware of this problem of 
induction. But, because of his metaphysical commitment to natural kinds with 
universal forms that can be grasped through perception and abstraction, he, unlike 
Hume, does not think it is a major or unsolvable problem. 
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   Introduction 
  
The traditional “problem of induction,” the problem of how one can justify 
a generalization that extends beyond the set of particular cases on which it is 
based, is one of the oldest in the history of logic and epistemology. It is at least as 
old as Sextus Empiricus’ work, Outlines of Scepticism. Further, how one should 
interpret the obscure last chapter, B.19, of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics is a 
subject of much controversy. The chapter seeks to answer the question of how we 
come to know the principles or starting points (archai) of “demonstration” 
(apodeixis)—a certain kind of sound syllogistic (i.e., three-termed) deduction that 
is the main subject of the Posterior Analytics.  
According to Aristotle, the principles of demonstration include the 
ultimate premises of demonstration. And, according to common interpretations of 
the “genetic account”
1
 of APo. B.19, we come to know these ultimate premises by 
induction based on sense perception. Given that the function of these ultimate 
premises is to securely ground demonstrated knowledge (epistêmê), there are  two 
crucial questions about the genetic account: (1) In the genetic account, is Aristotle 
                                                 
1
 The “genetic account” of APo. B.19 is the part of that chapter (from 100a35-b5) that evidently 
seeks to answer the question, asked near the beginning of the chapter (at 99b17-8), of how we 
come to know the principles (archai) of demonstration. In using the label, I do not mean to 
suggest that I read the account as a psychologically (as  against epistemologically) genetic account 
of how we come to know the principles. The label is only intended to indicate that the account is 
one that describes the generation of certain cognitive states from certain prior cognitive states. In 
fact, as my reading will indicate, I view the account as epistemologically genetic, not just 
psychologically genetic. In using the label, I am following practice of several commentators, 
including D.W. Hamlyn, Greg Bayer, Deborah Modrak, and Robert Bolton.    
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aware of the problem of induction? (2) What, if anything, is his attempted 
solution to the problem? In my view, Aristotle is aware in the genetic account of 
the problem of induction and attempts to solve the problem. In this work, I seek to 
defend the thesis that Aristotle’s attempted solution, in the genetic account of 
APo. B.19, to the problem of induction is based, in a certain way, on his doctrine 
of natural kinds. In my view, Aristotle considers particular forms to instantiate 
universal forms. Aristotle’s attempted solution to the problem of induction, on my 
reading of the genetic account, consists in grasping a universal form through 
sense perceptions of particular forms.    
This work is organized as follows. In Ch. 1, I define a certain sense of 
“induction” that I consider relevant to the “problem of induction” that I think 
Aristotle faced. I also define the “problem of induction” that I have in mind. 
Then, I provide evidence that Aristotle does recognize induction in the sense I 
define.  
Beginning with Ch. 2, I criticize certain readings of the genetic account of 
APo. B.19 that conflict with my own and which are complex enough to merit 
special attention. In Ch. 2, I criticize D.W. Hamlyn’s reading of the genetic 
account. In particular, there are two crucial positions of Hamlyn that I criticize. 
The first is that, according to the genetic account, the sense perception of one 
particular is sufficient to grasp the universal instantiating it. In my view, the 
genetic account does not claim this, but claims that the sense perceptions of many 
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particulars of a kind are needed to grasp the universal that they instantiate. The 
second is that the process described by the genetic account is not intended be a 
description of the induction (epagôgê) mentioned in APo. B.19. In my view, the 
genetic account is intended to describe the induction mentioned in that chapter. 
For part of my support for this view, I provide evidence that the genetic account 
of APo. B.19 is not about only the acquisition of concepts, but also of certain 
definitional truths connected with the concepts.   
In Ch. 3, I criticize readings of the genetic account by Melbourne Evans 
and Orna Harari, insofar as the readings conflict with my own. Like Hamlyn, they 
think that according to the genetic account the sense perception of a single 
particular is enough to grasp the universal it instantiates. I criticize the arguments 
of each that this is what the genetic account claims. Further, like other 
commentators, both Evans and Harari think that “nous” in APo. B.19 is intended 
to be intuition that allows one to grasp the universal. As a consequence of this 
view, neither think that Aristotle deals with the problem of induction in the 
genetic account. I criticize the arguments of both that nous in APo. B.19 is 
intended to be intuition that allows one to grasp the universal.  
Having cleared away certain readings of the genetic account that conflict 
with my own, in Ch. 4, I present my own reading and provide some initial 
evidence for it. Before I provide my reading, I provide strong evidence that 
Aristotle upheld the existence of both particular and universal forms and that he 
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considers particular forms to instantiate universal forms. Then I turn to my 
reading. On my reading of the genetic account, sense perception, not just of one, 
but of many particulars of a kind are needed to grasp the kind. The particular 
forms perceived are retained in memory and form an experience (empeiria). At 
first, the experience is undifferentiated in the sense that the form shared by all the 
particulars comprising it is not differentiated from other forms in one’s mind. At 
some point, the form shared by all the particulars is differentiated from other 
forms in one’s mind. This is the grasp of the universal. Connected with this is the 
grasp of certain definitional truths connected with the universal. These truths are 
ultimate premises of demonstration. This gives us a picture of the induction 
described by the genetic account as a process of discovery and justification. 
Finally, nous, on this reading, is not intuition that allows one to grasp the 
universal.  
Next, in Ch. 5, I defend my reading of the genetic account. By this point, I 
have already defended, in Ch. 2, 3, and 4, the crucial thesis, that according to the 
genetic account the sense perception of, not just one, but many particulars of a 
kind, is needed to grasp the kind. In Ch. 5, I defend my view that an experience 
formed from sense perceptions has, as its object, not one, but many particulars. I 
also defend my view that the “undifferentiated items” (adiaphora) mentioned in 
the account are experiences whose forms have not been differentiated from other 
forms in one’s mind. Further, I defend my view that the induction described by 
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the account has a justificatory role, not just one of generalizing. Finally, I defend 
my view that nous in APo. B.19 is not intended to be intuition that allows one to 
grasp the universal, and which thereby solves or allows one to avoid the problem 
of induction.   
Next, in Ch. 6, I consider two conceptions of Aristotelian induction that 
are not based on readings of the genetic account but which conflict with my 
reading of that account. The first conception is William Whewell’s. I criticize his 
view that, as a consequence of not considering induction to be rationally justified, 
Aristotle regarded inductive truths as perceived truths and not reasoned truths. I 
present strong evidence that Aristotle did regard inductive truths as reasoned 
truths. The second conception is John McCaskey’s. I argue against two of 
McCaskey’s theses. I argue against his thesis that all inductions for Aristotle 
involve predicating a distinctive property of a subject kind, indicating that the 
evidence does not support this claim. And, I argue against McCaskey’s thesis that 
any induction for Aristotle that is not a kind of deduction does not involve any 
problem of induction.  
Finally, having defended my reading of the genetic account of APo. B.19, 
in Ch. 7, I explicitly identify the implications, of my reading of that account, with 
regard to the question of whether, in the account, Aristotle is aware of the 
problem of induction and what (if anything) is his attempted solution to the 
problem. I then consider and answer certain objections to my view of what 
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Chapter 1: Aristotle’s Recognition of the Concept of Induction 
 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will seek to define a certain sense of “induction,” state 
what I mean by the “problem of induction” (i.e., which “problem of induction” I 
have in mind), and provide strong evidence that Aristotle does recognize 
“induction” in my defined sense.  
In Section II, I will define the sense of “induction” that I have in mind. In 
Section III, I will define what I mean by the “problem of induction.” In Sections 
IV and V, I will identify and name certain theses about reasoning (roughly, about 
induction and deduction) that I think Aristotle held, and provide evidence that he 
held these. In Section VI, I will provide evidence that Aristotle held a sense-based 
epistemology as context for understanding the following section. In Section VII, I 
will provide some direct textual evidence that Aristotle recognized “induction” in 
the sense I define in Section I (though not that he necessarily recognized only that 
sense of induction). In Section VIII, I will answer an objection, based on a 
reading of APr. B.23, that Aristotle considers all induction to be “perfect 
induction” (which is not the sense of “induction” I define in Section I). Finally, in 





II. Induction as Reasoning from the Particular to the General 
For supporting my thesis that Aristotle evidently had a certain implicit, 
attempted solution to the problem of induction, I use “induction” in a certain 
specific sense. After I state what I mean by “the problem of induction,” I will 
provide evidence that this is a sense that is subsumed by his term “epagôgê” 
(which he describes as reasoning from the particular to the universal and contrasts 
with “sullogismos,” typically translated as “deduction”
1
).  
The sense I have in mind is that of (i) reasoning from propositions (the 
premises) that are more particular to a proposition (the conclusion) that is more 
universal, (ii) in cases where the premises all predicate a certain property of 
particular instances or species of the subject of the conclusion and the conclusion 
predicates the same property of its subject, and (iii) where one does not have such 
premises in regard to all of the particular instances or species.
2
 An example will 
indicate the sort of reasoning I have in mind: inferring that all animals are mortal 
from such premises as: all humans are mortal; all dogs are mortal; all chickens are 
                                                 
1
 When I provide evidence that Aristotle recognized “induction” in the sense I define, I will discus 
in more detail what he means by this description, and provide evidence that he held this 
description and contrasted epagôgê with sullogismos.   
 
2
  The Oxford English Dictionary quoted in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives 
the following as a statement of one of the definitions of “induction”: “7. Logic a. The process of 
inferring a general law or principle from the observation of particular instances (opposed to 
DEDUCTION, q.v.).” (John Vickers, "The Problem of Induction," The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, forthcoming URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/induction-problem/>. Italics, boldface, and 
caps are in the original.) This indicates that the conception of induction as reasoning from 
particular facts to a universal generalization, while incorrect according to the contemporary view 




mortal; and other such premises that one might have. Each of the premises claims 
that animals of a given species are mortal, and one does not have such premises in 
regard to all species of animals. I will discuss the numbered parts of my definition 
in more detail below.     
In Condition i in my definition, note that I describe the process of 
“induction” as reasoning from propositions to a proposition. This is to distinguish 
what I mean by “induction” from “reasoning” from object items (such as human, 
horse, chicken, etc.) to an object item (such as animal). A process of “thought” 
such as “human, horse, chicken; therefore animal” is not what I mean by 
“induction” in the sense that I am defining it.  
As with deduction, in induction, the propositions from which one reasons 
are premises, and the proposition to which one reasons is the conclusion.
3
 
By “more particular premise,” in this sort of reasoning, I mean one whose 
quantified subject is narrower than the quantified subject of the conclusion. For 
example, the premise “this emerald [referring to an individual emerald] is green” 
is “more particular” than the conclusion “all emeralds are green,” which is “more 
universal” than the premise. The premise “all horses are mortal” is “more 
                                                 
3
 By stating that “induction” in the sense I am defining has premises and a conclusion, I do not 
mean to suggest that it is necessarily an articulated argument. “Induction” in the sense I am 
defining subsumes induction as a process of discovering a general putative truth through the sense 
perception of instances (also known as “ampliative induction”). In such a case, the premises will 
likely be only implicit (rather than articulated), and the conclusion may also be implicit as well.   
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particular” than the conclusion “all animals are mortal,” which is “more 
universal” than the premise.  
To be clear, by “more particular premise,” I am not referring to types of 
statements discussed in On Interpretation, if they are interpreted, as they are by 
some commentators, as being intended instances of “indefinite” statements. 
Examples of such statements are “man is white,” and “emerald is green.” These 
are statements without a quantifier (whether “all,” “some” or other quantifier) and 
do not refer to a particular thing (whether an ultimate particular or a particular 
species of some genus). They may accordingly be considered “indefinite” 
propositions.
4, 5
   
                                                 
4
 J.L. Ackrill in Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione, trans. and ed. J.L. Ackrill, et. al. 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1968), 17b37-18a17 and 19b19ff  translates such 
statements as “a man is white” or “a man is just,” though there are no indefinite articles in these 
statements in the OCT Greek texts. (Unless otherwise noted, any further reference to a translation 
of Categories or On Interpretation and any further reference to a work by Ackrill will be to this 
work.) Further, Ackrill translates “kath’ hekasta” at DI, 17b40 in the usual way, i.e. as 
“particular.” This suggests that Aristotle gives “man is white” and “man is not white” (at 18a5-6, 
trans. mine) and “man is just” and “man is not just” (at 19b20-1, 19b27-9, trans. mine) as 
examples of “particular” statements. This is the reason for my clarification in the above paragraph. 
Ackrill, in his commentary, refers to these statements like “man is just,” apparently correctly, as 
“indefinite” statements (Ackrill, 129).  
 
5
  All of my references to Greek texts of Aristotle’s works will be to the following editions of 
Oxford Classical Texts: Aristotle, Analytica Priora et Posteriora, ed. W.D. Ross (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1964); Aristotle, Ars Rhetorica, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1959); Aristotle, Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione, ed. L. Minio-Pauluello 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1949); Aristotle, De Anima, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1963); Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ed. I. Bywater  (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1894); Aristotle, Metaphysica, ed. W. Jaeger (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1957); Aristotle, Physica, ed. W.D. Ross (New York, NY: (Oxford University 
Press, 1950); and Aristotle, Topica et Sophistici Elenchi, ed. W.D. Ross (New York, NY: Oxford 




Further, by “more particular premise,” I am not referring to the types of 
statements, often called “particular,” discussed in the Prior Analytics, which are 
quantified by “some.” An example of such a statement is “some emeralds are 
green.” As Robin Smith remarks, it is traditional in Aristotle translation and 
commentary to refer to such statements as “particular.” “Particular” in such cases 
is a translation of a Greek phrase (“kath’ hekaston”) that is more literally 
translated “of the part” (just as “universal” used to refer to statements with a 
universal quantifier is a translation of a Greek word (“katholou”) more literally 
translated “of the whole.”)
 6
 But if statements quantified with “some” are 
“particular,” they are “particular” in a different sense than the sense I use in 
“more particular premise.” 
Observe that I stated that the premises are more particular, and that the 
conclusion is more universal. This means that the premises are particular in 
relation to the conclusion, and that the conclusion is universal in relation to each 
of the premises. This means that the premises do not have to be about ultimate 
particulars. Thus, consider this series of premises: “all humans are mortal,” “all 
dogs are mortal,” etc. I do not have such premises in regard to every sort of 
animal. I draw the conclusion that all animals are mortal. The immediate subjects 
of my premises are not ultimate particulars, but species (consisting of 
                                                 
6
  See Aristotle, Prior Analytics, trans. Robin Smith (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 
1989), XVII-XVIII. Unless otherwise noted, any further reference to a translation of the Prior 




individuals). Nevertheless, these subjects are particular in relation to the universal 
conclusion, which is not about some particular species of animal,
7
 but all animals.  
Nevertheless, an “induction” in the sense I am defining can be from premises that 
are particular in the ultimate sense (but which are also particular in relation to the 
conclusion). The following is an example: Socrates was mortal; Pericles was 
mortal; Alcibiades was mortal; therefore, all humans are mortal.   
Condition ii of my definition states that each of the premises must 
predicate a certain property of an instance or species of the subject kind of the 
conclusion, and that the conclusion must predicate the same property of its 
subject. For an illustration of this requirement, consider again my sample 
induction from animals of various species being mortal to the conclusion that all 
animals are mortal. The subject kind is given by the conclusion; in this case, it is 
animals. Though, the ultimate members of the subject kind are individual animals, 
more ‘immediate’ members of the subject kind are various species of animals: 
humans, dogs, chickens, etc. The premises each predicate a certain property—
mortality—of a species of the subject kind. The conclusion—that all animals are 
mortal—predicates the same property of the subject kind. Consider a different 
example: this dolphin is a mammal; this (other) dolphin is a mammal; this (other) 
                                                 
7
  For my use of “species” and “genus” throughout this work, I do not necessarily mean “species” 
or “genus”  in the sense used in contemporary biological taxonomy, but merely in Aristotle’s more 
general sense of a sort or class (the species) within a wider, sort or class (the genus) that is part of 




dolphin is a mammal; etc.; therefore, all dolphins are mammals. The subject kind, 
in this case, is dolphin. The premises all predicate a certain property—that of 
being a mammal-—of members (i.e., particular dolphins) of the subject kind. The 
conclusion—that all dolphins are mammals—predicates the same property of the 
entire subject kind.  
Condition iii of my definition states that one does not have premises about 
all members of the subject kind. Consider again my sample induction from 
animals of various species being mortal to the conclusion that all animals are 
mortal. For this to be an “induction” in the sense I am defining, we must assume 
that we do not have premises about all the animal species. We may have premises 
about many animal species—such as humans, dogs, chickens, and other species—
but not all animal species. Consider another example: this emerald is green; this 
(other) emerald is green; this (other) emerald is green [followed by other such 
premises]; therefore, all emeralds are green. For this to be an “induction” in the 
sense I am defining, we may have such premises in regard to thousands of 
individual emeralds, but not in regard to all emeralds. In other words, for this to 
be an “induction” in the sense I am defining, this cannot be what is called a 
“perfect induction.”   
Let me now modify the sense of “induction” I have defined so far in a 
certain way, a way that allows it to include arguments where the conclusion is not 
universally quantified, but quantified with “most.” In connection with this, 
14 
 
inductions of the sort that reach a conclusion whose quantified subject is broader 
than that of the premises, but whose quantifier is “most” (rather than “all” or 
“every” or other universal quantifiers), satisfy Condition i. An example of an 
induction of this sort would be: Socrates reasons; Alcibiades reasons; so, most 
humans reason. The subjects of the premises (Socrates and Alcibiades) are more 
particular than the quantified subject of the conclusion, “most humans.” Another 
example would be: all cats have hair; all dogs have hair; all horses have hair; so, 
most mammals have hair. The quantified subjects of the premises—all cats, all 




Condition ii—that the premises each predicate a certain property of an 
instance or species of the subject kind of the conclusion and that the conclusion 
                                                 
8
  My concern in this work, again, is: what, if anything, did Aristotle hold as the solution to the 
problem of induction in his genetic account of coming to know principles of demonstration in 
APo. B.19? The reason I mention here inductions with conclusions quantified with “most” is that 
Aristotle mentions in APo. B.12 at 96a8ff  that the predication in some principles holds only “for 
the most part” (APo., 96a18).  (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. and ed. Jonathan Barnes (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002).  Unless otherwise noted, any further reference to a 
translation of the Posterior Analytics or to a work by Barnes (2002) will be to this work.) 
Similarly, in Met. E.2, Aristotle says that “all science [epistêmê] is either of that which is always 
or of that which is for the most part” (Met., 1027a20-1). (Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. W.D. Ross 
in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 1552-728. Unless otherwise noted, any further reference to a 
translation of the Metaphysics will be to this work.) How such remarks should be interpreted is 
controversial, but one way to interpret them is to take them as implying, in part, that some 
principles of demonstration have a quantifier of “most” rather than a universal quantifier. Hence, I 





predicates this same property of its subject kind—remains the same for inductions 
whose conclusions are quantified with “most.”  
Condition iii, however, for inductions with a conclusion quantified with 
“most” is different than it is for those with a conclusion with a universal 
quantifier. Condition iii for the former is that one has premises for less than most 
instances or species of the subject kind of the conclusion. Consider my induction 
above that most humans reason. I give two premises, each of an individual 
human. Clearly, this satisfies Condition iii for inductions with conclusions 
quantified with “most.” Consider also my induction above that most mammals 
have hair. My premises are of three species of mammals. If we assume Aristotle’s 
doctrine of natural kinds, there seem to be more than six such species of 
mammals. Thus, given Aristotle’s doctrine of natural kinds, this induction also 
appears to satisfy Condition iii for inductions with conclusions quantified with 
“most.”  
Let me now restate my definition of the sense of “induction” I have in 
mind, taking into account my modification. “Induction” in the sense I am defining 
is: (i) reasoning from propositions (the premises) that are more particular to a 
proposition (the conclusion) that is more universal, (ii) in cases where the 
premises all predicate a certain property of particular instances or species of the 
subject of the conclusion and the conclusion predicates the same property of its 
subject, and (iii) where one does not have such premises in regard to all of the 
16 
 
particular instances or species in case the conclusion is universally quantified, or 
one has premises for less than most of the particular instances or species in case 
the conclusion is quantified with “most.”    
In summary, my special sense of “induction” is the sense of what could be 
called “imperfect inductive generalization” (as against “perfect induction” and 
other senses in which “induction” may be used).  A “perfect induction” is one in 
which one enumerates all of the particular instances or species that the conclusion 
subsumes.
9
 The following is an example: Mercury has an elliptical orbit; Venus 
has an elliptical orbit; Mars has an elliptical orbit; Jupiter has an elliptical orbit; 
Saturn has an elliptical orbit; these are all the planets that exist
10
; so all the planets 
have an elliptical orbit. An “imperfect inductive generalization” is an inductive 
generalization in which one does enumerates less than all the particulars 
subsumed by the conclusion, in case the conclusion is universally quantified, or 
less than most in case the conclusion is quantified with “most.” Examples of this 
are my sample inductions that all emeralds are green, that all animals are mortal, 
that most humans reason, and that most mammals have hair, given above. 
                                                 
9
  In an inductive generalization where one is seeking to reach a conclusion quantified with 
“most,” a perfect inductive generalization is one in which one enumerates at least most of the 
relevant particulars, and knows when one has done so. 
   
10
  I am adding this premise in this example because, presumably, one is not justified in treating a 
“perfect induction” as “perfect” unless one knows that it is perfect, i.e. that the other premises 
enumerate all instances or species of the subject kind of the conclusion.  
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In defining the sense of “induction” I have in mind, I do not mean to imply that 
Aristotle recognizes only this sense of induction. But, as we will see later in this 
chapter, there is strong evidence that Aristotle does recognize this sense, and, as 
my next section makes clear, this is the sense that is relevant to the “problem of 
induction” I have in mind 
 
III. The Problem of Induction 
The “problem of induction” I have in mind in connection with Aristotle is 
the primarily problem of how, given an “induction” in the sense I defined in the 
last section, one can justify the inference to the conclusion. It is a problem 
because many such “inductions” that are made (such as an induction that all round 
objects can roll on a flat surface given normal terrestrial conditions, or the 
induction that most horses have four legs) seem as though they are legitimate for 
reaching conclusions that are certainly true. Yet unlike in a valid deduction, the 
negation of the conclusion in such inductions is consistent with the conjunction of 
all of the premises. The salient source of this problem is that fact that an 
“induction” in the sense I have defined satisfies Condition iii. That is, the salient 
source of the problem is that fact that the induction does not consist of premises 
of all the instances or species of the subject kind of the conclusion (in case the 
conclusion is universally quantified) or consists of premises of less than most of 
the instances or species of the subject kind of the conclusion (in case the 
18 
 
conclusion is quantified with “most”). Put differently, the salient source of this 
problem is that fact that an “induction” in the sense I have defined is an imperfect 
inductive generalization.  
It may be observed that the “problem of induction” I have just defined is, 
more or less, the “traditional” problem of induction. It is nothing new. In fact, it 
seems that the author of this problem in the history of philosophy was Sextus 
Empiricus (or one of the earlier Pyrrhonian Skeptics
11
). In his Outlines of 
Scepticism, Sextus writes:  
It is easy, I think, to reject the method of induction. For since by way of 
it they want to make universals convincing by way of particulars, they 
will do this by either surveying all the particulars or some of them. But 
if some, the induction will be infirm, it being possible that some of the 
particulars omitted in the induction should be contrary to the universal; 
and if all, they will labor at an impossible task, since the particulars are 





   It seems that the only difference between the problem of induction that I 
have described myself above and that identified in this quote by Sextus is that I 
intend to include in the problem inductions with conclusions quantified with 
                                                 
11
  I make this qualification because it is unclear whether in Outlines of Scepticism, where Sextus 
seems to explicitly present the problem, he is posing a problem which he is the first to explicitly 
identify and present or whether he is merely reporting a problem explicitly identified by one or 
more of the earlier Pyrrhonian Skeptics.  
 
12
  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, trans. Annas, Julia and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 123. The use of the terms “particulars” and universals” 
may raise the question about whether Sextus has in mind particular and universal objects or 
propositions. But what the passage proceeds to say (especially the clause, “it being possible that 
some of the particulars omitted in the induction should be contrary to the universal”) suggests that 




“most,” whereas Sextus seems to include inductions only with universally 
quantified conclusions.
13
 But the problem of induction I have identified seems to 
be essentially the same problem that Sextus writes about above.  
 More recently, the traditional problem of induction has been associated 
with David Hume.  Hume, however, typically poses the problem as one of 
establishing with certainty the connection between an antecedent cause and a 
successive effect.
14
 This involves putting the problem in temporal terms, i.e. in 
terms of past and future phenomena. An instance of the problem as Hume might 
express it might be as follows. Even if one has seen, numerous times, one billiard 
ball move each time it had been struck by another, how can one be certain that 
upon seeing in the future a billiard ball struck by another that it will move?
15
 
Hume posing the problem in such a temporal manner is apparently a consequence 
                                                 
13
  Perhaps another difference is that part of what this quote suggests is the impossibility of 
surveying (i.e., obtaining true premises of) all the particulars (such as particular emeralds) 
subsumed by a universal (such as emerald). But this suggestion does not contradict the statement 
of the problem of induction as I present it myself above. In my statement of the problem, I merely 
leave open the question of why one has not surveyed all (or most) of the particulars. However, as 
we will see in the proceeding sections, there is strong evidence that Aristotle considered it 
impossible to survey all (or even most of) the specimens of many species, in part because the 
number of specimens is potentially infinite. And, as will be indicated in a later chapter, this is part 
of the evidence that Aristotle was aware of this problem of induction in his account of coming to 
know principles of demonstration in APo. B.19.    
 
14
 See David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles 
of Morals, eds. Nidditch, P.H. and L.A. Selby-Bigge (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 26-32. (Any further reference to Hume will be to this work.) Further, Hume does not use 
the term “induction” to refer to such reasoning, but typically refers to it as “causal reasoning” or 
“reasoning about cause and effect.”  
 
15




of several of the basics of his epistemology. These include his skepticism about 
the existence of a material world (or any world) independent of phenomena 
experienced. The only certainties at the start of cognition are the existence of 
various sense “impressions,” which, as time passes, are constantly replaced by 
other sense impressions.
16
 Again, Hume’s posing the problem of induction in 
temporal terms is apparently a consequence of such an epistemological 
foundation. For on such an epistemological foundation, the only basic items of 
reference are a succession of sense impressions.
17, 18
 
 I do not pose the traditional problem of induction the way Hume does 
because the Humean epistemological foundation that I describe above is very 
evidently not shared by Aristotle. Aristotle does not ever seem to doubt the 
existence of a world independent of sense perception. Aristotle, in other words, 
seems to think it is obvious that the world perceived by the senses is real and 
                                                 
16
  When Hume begins offering his substantive arguments in the Enquiry, he seems to assume that 
the existence of a world independent of a perceiver cannot be taken for granted, but must be 
inferred (Hume, 17-32). Hume calls sense perceptions and other of “our more lively perceptions,” 
such as will or feelings of desire, love, hate, etc., “impressions” (Hume, 18). He calls the “less 
lively perceptions,” i.e., phenomena such as memory images and conceptual ideas that he thinks 
are “copies” of impressions, “ideas” or “thoughts” (Hume, 18).   
 
17
  Thus, when Hume writes of “seeing” or “observing” motion in a billiard ball when he presents 
his example involving billiard balls (Hume, 29-31), we should take him to mean “having the 
impression of motion in a billiard ball.”   
 
18
  It may be objected that Hume’s point is really not to raise the traditional problem of induction 
again, but to cast skeptical doubt onto attempted solutions of the problem. (For example, Hume 
considers and criticizes the attempt to solve the problem by applying geometry (Hume, 31-2).) 
This might be true, but Hume apparently does raise the problem again, presenting it in a different 




exists regardless of whether a subject perceives it. When we add to this Aristotle’s 
position (which he seems to take as obvious) that the world is naturally organized 
into kinds, into universals immanent in material particulars, and that we can have 
knowledge of these kinds, it is hardly surprising that he formulates a categorical 
(as against, for example, a hypothetical) logic. As a result, it is more natural to 
think of the traditional problem of induction, as it might be relevant to Aristotle, 
in categorical terms (which is how I have defined it above) rather than temporal 
terms (as Hume typically poses the problem).
19
   
 Accordingly, throughout this work, when I mention “the problem of 
induction,” I am using the phrase in the sense that I have defined above.
20
 
                                                 
19
  I do not mean here that Aristotle would never pose the traditional problem of induction (or an 
instance of it) the way Hume does. I mean only that because Aristotle does not share the basics of 
Hume’s epistemology (as I have described them above), and in particular because he seems to take 
the existence of natural kinds and our ability to know them as obvious, it is more natural to think 
of the traditional problem of induction, as it might be relevant to Aristotle, in categorical terms.  
 
20
  Thus, it is clear that by “problem of induction,” throughout this work, I am not referring to 
Nelson Goodman’s new “Riddle of Induction.” According to Goodman, if we define a concept 
such as “grue,” for example, which refers to green up to a certain time t, but to blue after t, it 
seems difficult or impossible to develop a rule that would justify an inference to the conclusion 
that all emeralds are grue from past observations of emeralds always being grue. Having observed 
countless emeralds before t each being green (and grue), we would consider it legitimate to 
conclude that all emeralds after t would be green. But we would not consider it legitimate to 
conclude that all emeralds after t would be grue. It seems that the sort of formal rule of inference 
that could be used to justify the first inference (which would be acceptable to us) could also be 
used to try to justify the second (which would be unacceptable to us). (See Nelson Goodman, 
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 2
nd
 ed. (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), especially 
pp. 59-83.) It does not seem as though Aristotle would consider this a problem since he apparently 
would consider green and blue (for example) to be two different natural kinds, as a result of 
having two different universal forms, and would not consider “grue” to be a veridical concept (i.e., 
one that reflects a natural kind) which is what must comprise principles that are ultimate premises 
of demonstration.  One may, of course, object that Aristotle’s doctrine of natural kinds is not 
viable, and so, upon realizing this, he must deal with Goodman’s problem. This might be true, but 
in any case, Goodman’s riddle as it pertains to Aristotle is a subject outside the scope of this work, 
22 
 
IV. The Difference Thesis About Epagôgê and Sullogismos  
There is evidence that, at least sometimes, Aristotle uses “epagôgê” (the 
Greek term usually translated as “induction” in Aristotle’s works) to refer to 
induction in the sense I defined in Section I.    
To see that Aristotle recognizes “induction” in the sense that I have 
defined, it is helpful to bear in mind a view he evidently holds in regard to the 
difference between epagôgê and sullogismos. I call this the Difference Thesis. 
Further, since Aristotle sometimes mentions two distinctions in the same passage, 
I have divided the Difference Thesis into two sub-theses, the Direction Thesis and 
the Necessity Thesis. The Direction Thesis is that epagôgê and sullogismos are 
distinguished by the fact that epagôgê consists of moving logically from the 
particular to the universal while sullogismos consists of moving logically from the 
universal to a conclusion that is equally universal or more particular.
21, 22
 The 
Necessity Thesis is that epagôgê and sullogismos are distinguished also by the 
                                                                                                                                     
which is on whether and how Aristotle deals with the traditional problem of induction, as I have 
defined it, in his account of coming to know principles in APo. B.19. 
 
21
 “Logically” in this context should be understood in contradistinction to “chronologically.” Thus, 
the Difference Thesis does not make any claim about whether one mentally considers a particular 
or universal first in time, but whether a more particular or universal (term or proposition) is the 
basis of the inference that one is making.   
 
22
  Stated in this way, this sub-thesis leaves unanswered the question of whether Aristotle is 
referring by “the particular” and “the universal” to terms or propositions or both. We will see later 
that Aristotle must be referring to propositions or both terms and propositions, but cannot be 
referring just to terms. The evidence that he holds the Direction Thesis in regard to deduction, in 
particular, strongly suggests that this thesis is about propositions. It also leaves unanswered the 
question of whether Aristotle is using “particular” and “universal” in an absolute or relational 




fact that in a sullogismos, by its essence, the conclusion follows of necessity (“ex 




I will first provide strong textual evidence that Aristotle holds these theses. 
As I will argue later, if Aristotle does, this provides some evidence that he at least 
sometimes recognizes epagôgê as imperfect inductive generalization. I will then 
cite passages from Aristotle’s works that evidently contain examples of epagôgê 
as imperfect inductive generalization.  
 
V. Evidence that Aristotle Holds the Difference Thesis 
What is the evidence that Aristotle held the Difference Thesis? One piece 
of evidence that he held the Direction Thesis (one part of the Difference Thesis) is 
a passage early in Posterior Analytics: 
…they [both syllogistic and epagogic arguments] affect their teaching 
through what we already know, the former assuming items which we 
are assumed to grasp, the latter proving something universal by way of 
the fact that the particular cases are plain. (APo., 71a5-9) 
 
This passage provides evidence that he held part of the Direction Thesis, namely 
that epagôgê consists of moving from the particular to the universal. Another 
piece of evidence for the same point is found in Topics: 
                                                 
23
  This, however, does not rule out Aristotle thinking that in some epagôgai, namely those which 
are perfect inductions (as some have interpreted the example of the epagôgê in APr. B.23 to be), 
the conclusion does follow from necessity from the premises. APr. B.23 will be discussed in the 
last section of this chapter.  
24 
 
…we need to distinguish how many kinds of dialectical argument 
[logôn] there are. One kind is induction [epagôgê], another is deduction 
[sullogismos]. Now, what a deduction is was explained earlier. [The 
reference, presumably, is to Top. I, 100a25-7.] Induction, however, is 
proceeding from particulars up to a universal. (Top. I, 105a10-4, italics 
in original)
24
     
 
There is more evidence a little later in Topics. As one of the steps of a 
dialectical discourse, Aristotle recommends finding similarities among cases.
25
 In 
connection with this, he writes: 
The study of what is similar is useful for inductive arguments [tous 
epaktikous logous], for deductions [sullogismous] from an assumption, 
and for giving definitions. It is useful for inductive arguments because 
it is by induction [epagôgê] from particular premises about similar 
things that we claim a right to induce [epagein] the universal: for it is 
not easy to induce if we do not know the similar things. (Top. I, 108b7-
12, trans. mine)   
 
It seems that the most straightforward reading of the part of the second sentence 
before the clause is: similarity is useful for inductive arguments, because it is 
from similar particular facts that we claim a right to induce a universal 
conclusion. The passage states that “it is by induction [epagôgê] from particular 
premises about similar things that we claim a right to induce [epagein] the 
                                                 
24
   Aristotle, Topics Books I and VIII, ed. and trans. Robin Smith (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997). (Unless otherwise noted, any further reference to Topics I and VIII will be to this 
work.) In regard to the bracketed sentence, it is reasonable to think that Aristotle is referring to the 
passage from Top. I, 100a25-7. It is reasonable because that prior passage from the Topics is the 
only Topics passage prior to this one that contains a description or definition of sullogismos. 
 
25
 In Topics I.17, Aristotle recommends finding similarities between things in different genera 
(and, evidently, his examples of such things are eye, soul, sea, and air) and between things in the 
same genus (and, evidently, his examples of such things are a human, a horse, and a dog). See 




universal…” (Emphasis is added.) Note the italicized word: we induce from 
particular premises, the passage states. This, it seems, indicates only a view of 
epagôgê as logically moving from the more particular to the more universal. It 
seems irreconcilable with a view of epagôgê as logically moving from the 
universal to the more particular, or to the equally universal. Thus, it seems, we 
have further evidence that Aristotle held the first part of the Direction Thesis.  
A passage providing evidence to support the entirety of the Direction 
Thesis can be found in Nicomachean Ethics:  
Now induction [epagôgê] is of first principles and of the universal and 




In connection with the passages on epagôgê just quoted above, I think it is clear 
that the claim that epagôgê is “of the universal” [tou katholou] should be 
understood to mean that we induce (i.e., epagomen) universals (rather than the 
more general claim that epagôgê involves universals).  What brings this out is the 
contrast with sullogismos—that sullogismos “proceeds from universals.”
27
  
                                                 
26
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, rev. J.O. Urmson in Aristotle, The Complete 
Works of Aristotle Vol. II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 
1729-867.  Unless otherwise noted, any further reference to a translation of the Nicomachean 
Ethics will be to this work.  
 
27
  I do not spend much space providing evidence that Aristotle held the second part of the 
Direction Thesis (i.e. that deduction consists of moving logically from the universal) because my 
main concern in this chapter is to provide evidence that he recognizes induction in the sense I 
defined in Section I. For this task, that Aristotle held the first part of the Direction Thesis is much 
more significant than his holding the second part. However, there is much additional evidence that 
he held the second part readily available in Robin Smith’s commentary in his translation of the 
Prior Analytics. Smith provides a table of all of the valid deductive forms that Aristotle explicitly 
recognizes (and all of these are three-term syllogistic forms). All of them contain at least one 
26 
 
For the Necessity Thesis, there is explicit textual evidence that Aristotle 
held that in a sullogismos, the conclusion follows of necessity from the “things 
laid down” (i.e., the premises). The evidence that he held that in epagôgê, the 
conclusion does not necessarily follow of necessity from the premises is only 
implicit. It is implicit in the fact that the necessity mentioned seems to be part of 
what Aristotle considers to be the definition or the “what it is”—and hence 
distinctive characteristic in his view
28
—of “sullogismos.” 
One piece of evidence that Aristotle held the Necessity Thesis is found in 
Prior Analytics:  
…a deduction [sullogismos] is an argument [logos] in which certain 
things being supposed, something different from the suppositions 
results of necessity through these things being so. (APr., 24b18-20, 
emphasis added, trans. mine)  
 
                                                                                                                                     
universal premise that is as universal as or more universal than the conclusion (Smith (1989), 230-
5).    
 
28
  The main evidence that Aristotle takes the necessity of a conclusion following from premises to 
be part of the “what it is” of a deduction (sullogismos) is found in two places: Prior Analytics A.1 
and Topics A.1. In both of those chapters, Aristotle says that we must say what a deduction is (see 
APr. 24a12-3 and Top. I, 100a21-4), and then proceeds to claim that what a deduction is, is an 
argument in which a conclusion follows of necessity from things laid down. See APr. 24b18-20 
and Top. I, 100a25-7. Both of these passages will be discussed in more detail shortly. Regarding 
evidence that Aristotle held that the “what it is” of a thing is distinctive to that thing, the most 
explicit evidence is in Top. I.4. There, Aristotle considers the concept of a unique property (or 
peculiarity) of a thing, and states that one type of a unique property is a definition, which 
designates the ‘what it is’ of the thing, and the other type may simply be called ‘unique property’ 
after the wider class. (Top. I, 101b11-25) At the beginning of Ch. I.5, he states again that the 
definition of a thing signifies its ‘what-it-is-to-be.’ Other parts of the corpus, such as APo. A.4, 
and Met. Z, that mention the ‘what it is’ or ‘what it is to be’ seem to be perfectly consistent with 
its being a distinctive feature of a thing. Indeed, it would be bizarre if Aristotle did not consider 




We should notice that he is stating the “what it is” of sullogismos and thereby 
defining (and not merely offering a description of) sullogismos.
29
 A similar 
passage can be found in Topics:  
A deduction [sullogismos]…is an argument [logos] in which certain 
things being supposed, something different from the suppositions 
results of necessity through them. (Top. I, 100a25-7, 1
st
 italics in 
original; 2
nd




Now observe that Aristotle in several places contrasts sullogismos and epagôgê, 
and in none of those places does he state that the conclusion of an epagôgê 
follows of necessity from things supposed or laid down (i.e. from the premises). 
One such place is the passage at APo., 71a5-9, quoted above. Another such place 
is a passage from Topics quoted above, which is worth quoting again: 
…we need to distinguish how many kinds of dialectical argument 
[logôn] there are. One kind is induction [epagôgê], another is deduction 
[sullogismos]. Now, what a deduction is was explained earlier. 
Induction, however, is proceeding from particulars up to a universal. 
(Top. I, 105a10-4) 
 
Note that in this passage, Aristotle contrasts sullogismos and epagôgê. Further, in 
stating what epagôgê is, he does not (as with sullogismos earlier) claim that in 
epagôgê, the conclusion follows of necessity from the premises.    
                                                 
29
  Prior to that passage, Aristotle states, “…we must first determine…what a deduction 
[sullogismos] is…” (APr., 24a12-3) Then, in the passage, he states what a sullogismos is.  
 
30
  Again, before this passage, Aristotle states, “First, then, we must state what a deduction 




We should note another passage contrasting epagôgê and sullogismos, found in 
the Rhetoric:  
With regard to persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof: just as 
in dialectic there is induction [epagôgê] on the one hand and deduction 
[sullogismos] or apparent deduction on the other, so it is in rhetoric. 
The example [paradeigma] is an induction, the enthymeme 
[enthumêma] is a deduction, and the apparent enthymeme is an 
apparent deduction; for I call a rhetorical deduction an enthymeme, and 




This passage does not contain any explicit evidence that Aristotle considers the 
conclusion of a sullogismos to follow of necessity. But like the passages at APo., 
71a5-9 and Top. I, 105a10-4, referred to above, it contrasts epagôgê and 
sullogismos, and does not state or imply that in an epagôgê, the conclusion 
follows of necessity from the premises. 
Consider again the explicit evidence that Aristotle considers the 
conclusion in a sullogismos to follow of necessity from the premises. In 
connection with that evidence, the lack of evidence that he considers the 
conclusion in an epagôgê to necessarily follow of necessity from the premises, 
combined with the passages above that contrast epagôgê and sullogismos, 
                                                 
31
 Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. II, 
ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 2152-169. Unless otherwise 
noted, all further references to a translation of the Rhetoric will be to this translation. Roberts or 





strongly suggests that he does not consider the conclusion in an epagôgê to 
necessarily follow of necessity from the premises.
32
   
Finally, in connection with the above evidence that Aristotle held the 
Necessity Thesis, we should consider another passage from Topics that seems like 
corroborating evidence. This passage is shortly after the passage of 105a10-4, 
quoted above: 
Induction [epagôgê] is more persuasive, clearer, more intelligible in the 
way perception is, and commonly used by the public; deduction 
[sullogismos] is more coercive and more effective with those skilled in 
contradicting. (Top. I, 105a16-9)  
 
In connection with the evidence above that Aristotle held the Necessity Thesis, 
we can make sense of the clause about deduction (sullogismos) in a certain way. It 
makes sense if it is understood as saying that an interlocutor, who is skilled in 
identifying contradictions in his opponent when engaging in dialectic, will find 
sullogismos useful. Why? Because the nature of sullogismos is such (as we see 
Aristotle indicating in the quotes prior to the one above) that if one’s opponent 
accepts the premises, he or she must, to avoid contradicting them, accept the 
                                                 
32
  The point of this is not to argue from silence that Aristotle did not consider the conclusion of a 
good epagôgê to be necessitated by its premises, but that this is consistent with his taking such 
necessity to be a distinctive, indeed part of the defining, characteristic of sullogismos. Such a 
position, in connection with his contrasting epagôgê and sullogismos, implies that such necessity 




conclusion. Observe that this is, in the quote above, a description of sullogismos 




VI. Aristotle’s Evident Sense-Based Epistemology 
It is thus very evident that Aristotle held the Difference Thesis. The 
evident fact that he held the Direction Thesis with regard to epagôgê combined 
with the evident fact that he held the Necessity Thesis with regard to epagôgê 
strongly suggests that he recognized some epagôgê—reasoning from the more 
particular to the more universal—where the lack of necessity in the inference is 
due to it being an imperfect inductive generalization. For in a perfect induction, 
the inference is indeed necessary. In Section VII below, I will cite some direct 
textual evidence strongly suggesting that Aristotle does indeed take epagôgê, at 
least sometimes, to be imperfect inductive generalization.  
It is useful, however, to establish a certain context for understanding the 
textual evidence of the next section. This context is that Aristotle held an 
epistemology that is sense-based. That is, for the process of acquiring 
knowledge,
34
 Aristotle evidently considered sense perception to be the foundation 
and starting point. Having this context will, in particular, be useful for 
understanding the quotations in the next section that seem to provide inductive 
                                                 
33
  See fn. 32. 
 
34
  “Knowledge” here should be construed in the general sense, as against a specific kind of 
knowledge, such as epistêmê or technê.  
31 
 
generalizations from species (rather than from ultimate particulars). For, with this 
context in mind, there is a strong suggestion that such inductive generalizations 
from species are intended to be founded, at bottom on narrower inductive 
generalization, each about an infimae species, and that these, in turn, are founded 
on sense perception.  
In this section, I will provide textual evidence to support the claim that 
Aristotle upholds a sense-based epistemology. Part of the evidence will be 
evidence that he rejects the doctrine that we have innate knowledge.  
Let us consider, first, the textual evidence that Aristotle rejected the doctrine that 
we have innate knowledge.  
Evidence that Aristotle held the view of the mind as a “blank slate”—that 
it does not come with any knowledge at birth—can be found in On the Soul:  
It is necessary then, since everything is (potentially) thought of, for 
thought to be unmixed, as Anaxagoras says, in order to rule, and this is 
to say, in order to know; for it is not hindered or obstructed by an 
appearance alien to it, within it: it follows that its nature is nothing 
other than this: a certain capacity. (DA, 429a18-21, trans. mine) 
 
This passage suggests that we are not born with innate knowledge or beliefs. For 
in that case, it seems that the faculty he is discussing—to noein (“thought” or 
“intellect,” in contrast with sense perception)—would not have a nature that is 
nothing other than a certain capacity. In that case, it seems that part of its nature 




Further evidence that Aristotle does not consider humans to have any 
innate knowledge can be found in APo. B.19, which is evidently about how one 
acquires the “primitives” or “immediates” needed for a demonstration.
35
 In regard 
to whether the states of knowledge of these immediates are derived from prior 
knowledge, or “possessed” (presumably at birth), he writes: 
It is absurd to suppose that we possess such states; for then we should 
possess pieces of knowledge more exact than demonstration without its 
being noticed. (APo., 99b28-30) 
 
In On the Soul, we find more evidence of Aristotle’s rejection of the 
doctrine that we have innate knowledge, and some positive evidence of his sense-
based epistemology. He begins Ch. III.8 with a discussion of how the intellect is 
potentially any object it can know, as perception is potentially any object that can 
be perceived. He then says, “This is also the reason why if one perceived nothing 
one would learn and understand [xuneiê] nothing…” (DA, 432a6-7)
36
 While its 
connection to the claim that perception is potentially any object that can be 
perceived may be unclear, what this quote clearly suggests is that the acquisition 
of knowledge by the intellect depends on sense perception. This in turn also 
                                                 
35
  One interpretation of what the primitives and immediates are, is that they are the principles 
(archai) that are ultimate premises of demonstration, and are primitive and immediate since they 
are two terms positively related to each other without any terms between them (if they had terms 
between them, they would have to be deductively demonstrated through those intermediate terms, 
in which case they would not be principles).  
 
36
  Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (Penguins Books: London, 




implies that one cannot have knowledge before one is capable of sense 
perception, i.e. that knowledge cannot be innate.   
Something similar is suggested by APo. A.18, namely, that 
understanding—epistêmê—cannot be obtained without sense perception: 
It is clear too that if some perception is wanting, some understanding 
[epistêmê] must also be wanting—understanding which it is impossible 
to get if we learn either by induction [epagôgêi] or by demonstration, if 
demonstration depends on universals and induction on particulars, if it 
is impossible to study universals except through induction…and if it is 
impossible to make an induction without having perception (for 
particulars are grasped by perception). It is not possible to get 
understanding of these items—neither from universals without 
induction nor through induction without perception. (APo., 81a37-b9) 
 
We can make sense of what this passage is claiming if we take “these items” in 
the last sentence to refer to items, suggested at the beginning, of which one lacks 
understanding (epistêmê), and if we take “particulars” and “universals” to include, 
in their reference, particular and universal propositions respectively. With this in 
mind, it appears that the last sentence asserts the antecedent of the conditionals in 
the prior sentence, the antecedents that demonstration depends on induction and 
that induction depends on sense perception. As such, the passage claims sense 
perception as a necessary foundation of all knowledge in the sense of epistêmê. 
 This suggestion is confirmed in APo. B.19. Recall the quote above from 
that chapter at 99b28-30. Its argues that the principles of demonstration (i.e. the 
principles behind epistêmê) are not innate. Aristotle later indicates that the states 
of knowledge of the principles come about through sense perception: 
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…the states in question neither inhere in us in a determinate form nor 
come about from other states which are more cognitive; rather, they 
come about from perception… (APo., 100a10-2)  
 
Indeed, the end of the genetic account in APo., B.19 indicates that 
“primitives” (“prôta”) are acquired through sense perception: 
Thus it is plain that we must get to know the primitives by induction 





Finally, consider the following passages from the Metaphysics that 
indicate that science (epistêmê) and art (technê) come from sense perception: 
By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation [aisthêsin], 
and from sensation, memory is produced in some of them, though not 
in others. …The animals other than man live by appearances and 
memories, but the human race also lives by art and reasonings 
[logismois]. And from memory experience [empeiria] is produced in 
men; for many memories of the same thing finally produce the capacity 
for a single experience. …science and art come to men through 




VII. Further Evidence That Aristotle Recognizes Imperfect Induction 
Bearing in mind Aristotle’s evident sense-based epistemology, we can 
now turn to considering some more direct textual evidence that Aristotle 
considers some epagôgê to be imperfect inductive generalization.  
                                                 
37
  Aristotle makes this statement earlier in APo. B.19 when establishing the topic of the chapter: 
“I have said earlier that you cannot understand anything through a demonstration unless you know 
the primitive immediate principles” (APo., 99b20-3). This suggests that “primitives” in the quote 





An example of epagôgê as imperfect inductive generalization can be found in 
Topics: 
Now, what a deduction [sullogismos] is was explained earlier. [See the 
quotation from Topics 100a25-7 above.] Induction [epagôgê], however, 
is proceeding from particulars up to a universal. For instance, if the 
pilot who has knowledge is the best pilot, and so with a charioteer, then 
generally the person who has knowledge about anything is the best. 
(Top. I, 105a12-9) 
 
To make sense of the example of epagôgê offered, it seems that it should be read 
as follows: if a pilot with knowledge of piloting is the best pilot and a charioteer 
with knowledge of driving chariots is the best charioteer, then any craftsperson 
who has knowledge in some craft is the best at performing that craft. It is hardly 
plausible that pilots and charioteers were the only types of craftspersons that 
Aristotle believed existed. Yet the conclusion—a universal conclusion apparently 
about craftspersons—is drawn from only two premises—one about pilots and one 
about charioteers.
38
 I would thus conclude that this is evidently an example of 
epagôgê as imperfect inductive generalization.   
One may object as follows. Aristotle names only two types of crafts 
persons (pilots and charioteers), and then apparently draws a conclusion about all 
craftspersons. He must have been aware that such would be a bad induction, a 
blatant hasty generalization. So, in this example of epagôgê, he must be 
                                                 
38
  One may, it seems, try to read the argument in another way. But it seems that one’s reading (to 
be consistent with the text) must involve two premises that are particular in relation to the 
universal conclusion, and a conclusion whose subject term refers to a kind that is wider then the 
particular species mentioned in the premises. As a result, the reading, it seems, would have to be 
an imperfect inductive generalization.  
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mentioning pilots and charioteers alone as shorthand for mentioning many more 
sorts of crafts persons. Indeed, it may be shorthand for mentioning all the sorts of 
craftspersons he thought existed and were possible, thus making this example a 
shorthand for a perfect enumerative induction.   
I think that two considerations make this objection a bad one. The first, as 
I have argued above, is that Aristotle seems to hold the Necessity Thesis. He 
seems to believe that in a sullogismos, the conclusion always follows of necessity 
from the premises, whereas he apparently does not believe that such is always the 
case in an epagôgê. In other words (contemporary words), a sullogismos for 
Aristotle must, by definition, be valid. But, evidently, in an epagôgê, for Aristotle 
the conclusion need not follow of necessity from the premises. If so, then, 
apparently, an epagôgê need not even be a good induction for it to still be an 
epagôgê. In other words, an argument need not be a good epagôgê in order for it 
to be “proceeding from particulars up to a universal” (his description, in the 
quotation, of epagôgê in contrast to sullogismos). And observe that the argument 
in the quote above is given as an example only of epagôgê, not necessarily of 
good epagôgê. Thus, objecting that one should not take the epagôgê in the 
passage above as an imperfect inductive generalization because taking it as such 
would make it a bad epagôgê is not a good objection.  
Second, if Aristotle intended the argument in the quotation to be shorthand 
for a perfect induction, we should expect to see some indication of that in the 
37 
 
quotation. An indication would, for example, be a clause qualifying the list of the 
premises, like “…and these two are the only sorts of crafts persons…” or “…and 
these are all the sorts of crafts persons…” or “Assume that pilots and charioteers 
are the only crafts persons.” However, there is no such indication in the quotation.  
Two further examples of epagôgê as imperfect inductive generalization 
may be found in Rhetoric B.23. As Aristotle indicates at the beginning of this 
chapter, it discusses commonplace probative arguments.
39
 He discusses various 
sorts of such commonplace arguments, and then turns to those based on epagôgê. 
He considers, as epagôgê, what appears to be an induction that all women 
everywhere can correctly settle the facts about their children:  
Another line is based upon induction [ex epagôgês]. Thus from the case 
of the woman Peparethus it might be argued that women everywhere 
can correctly settle the facts about their children. Another example of 
this occurred at Athens in the case between the orator and his son 
Mantias, when the boy’s mother revealed the true facts: and yet another 
at Thebes, in the case between Ismenias  and Stilbon, when Dodonis 
proved that it was Ismenias who was the father of her son Thetteliscus, 





The structure of the presentation of the argument suggested in this passage seems 
to be as follows. First, a particular premise, and the (apparently universal) 
                                                 
39
 See Rhet., 1397a6-7, 20-3. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle apparently considers a “probative 
argument” (“deiktikos”) to be one that seeks to prove a claim. It is distinguished from raising an 
objection (“enstasin enenkôn”), (Rhet., 1403a25-6).   
 
40
  Aristotle does not give details about his reference to “the woman of Peparethus.” Judging from 
this and from his other examples of women in this passage, she was likely a woman who was 
known by Aristotle’s audience as one who had judged certain facts about her child (or children) 
correctly.  As such, Aristotle’s reference in this passage to her would be one of the particular 
premises he names as part of his apparent example of inducing a universal conclusion.   
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conclusion is presented. Then, reference is made to two additional particular 
cases, which could serve as two additional particular premises in support of the 
conclusion.  
It seems that the conclusion of the suggested argument should be taken as 
a universal statement—as “all women who are mothers, everywhere, can correctly 
settle facts about their children,” or at least as having “most” for a quantifier—as 
“most women who are mothers, everywhere, can correctly settle facts about their 
children.” For if we take the conclusion as being quantified with “some”—as 
“some women everywhere can correctly settle facts about their children”—it 
would seem to be too close to being a truism for a rhetorician to have to explicitly 
argue.  
And yet we should observe that this argument, which is of the 
commonplace and probative sort according to Aristotle, apparently reasons to the 
more universal conclusion from only three particular premises. Yet Aristotle 
could not plausibly have believed that the cases referred to by these three 
premises are all of the particular cases subsumed by the conclusion that all 
women everywhere can correctly settle facts about their children.
41
 Thus, this 
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  And, in the case that Aristotle thinks the conclusion is quantified with “most,” he could not 
plausibly have believed that the cases referred to by these three premises are at least most of the 
particular cases subsumed by the conclusion that most women everywhere can correctly settle 




argument is evidently another example of epagôgê as imperfect inductive 
generalization.   
The following passage, from the same chapter, apparently offers another 
example of epagôgê as imperfect inductive generalization: 
Another instance is the argument of Alcidimas: ‘Everyone honours the 
wise. Thus the Parians have honoured Archilochus, in spite of his bitter 
tongue; the Chians Homer, though he was not their countryman; the 
Mytilenaeans Sappho, though she was a woman; the Lacedaemonians 
actually made Chilon a member of the their senate, though they are the 
least literary of men; the inhabitants of Lampsacus gave public burial to 





Since this passage is from a larger passage discussing epagogic commonplace 
arguments (as indicated by the quote above this one), it is reasonable to take the 
argument offered as intended as an epagôgê. (Also, it has the structure one would 
expect of an epagôgê, given the Direction Thesis.)  
The argument offers five particular premises and a universal conclusion. 
Yet it is hardly plausible to think that Aristotle or Alcidimas believed that the 
inhabitants of the five states mentioned in the premises are all the people 
subsumed by the conclusion that everyone honors the wise. (For example, what 
                                                 
42
  The word “thus” in this passage—a translation of the Greek word “goun”—may make it appear 
that the references to the Parians, Chians, etc. are deductions from the universal claim that 
everyone honors the wise. Yet the context makes clear that this argument is intended to be an 
example of epagôgê (induction). For the phrase “[a]nother instance” means another instance of 
epagôgê, since this quoted passage is a continuation of the quoted passage at 1398a32-b4, and that 
passage introduces probative arguments that are epagogic. Further, “thus” is perhaps not the best 
translation of “goun,” which more literally means “at least.” See Liddell-Scott, 168. (An 
Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, eds. Liddell, H.G., Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002).  Any further reference to Liddell-Scott will be to this work.)  
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about the Thebans? What about the Stagirans and other Macedonians?) Thus, the 
argument in this passage is evidently another example of epagôgê as an imperfect 
inductive generalization.  
In addition to these passages, which evidently provide examples of 
epagôgê as imperfect inductive generalization, another sort of passage is 
noteworthy. This is the passage of the sort that evidently provides an example of 
epagôgê as perfect enumerative induction, which arguably tacitly presupposes and 
rests on one or more imperfect inductive generalization.  
An example of such a passage can be found in the Eudemian Ethics II:  
…excellence is the best state or condition or faculty of all things that 
have a use and work. This is clear by induction [ek tês epagôgês]; for in 
all cases we lay this down: e.g. a garment has an excellence, for it has a 
work and use, and the best state of the garment is its excellence. 
Similarly a vessel, house, or anything else has an excellence; therefore 




The clause “for in all cases, we lay this down” (italics added) strongly suggests 
that what follows is supposed to be a perfect induction. What are the more 
particular premises? One is about garments, another is about vessels, and another 
is about houses. And a premise about “anything else” is added.  Given Aristotle’s 
condition stated just earlier that things that have a use and a work have an 
excellence, it seems that the last premise is best read as being about “anything 
else that has a use and a work.” Aristotle seems to take all of these premises 
                                                 
43
  Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, trans. J. Solomon in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle 
Vol. II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1922-81. Unless 
otherwise noted, any further reference to a translation of Eudemian Ethics will be to this work.  
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together to produce the perfect induction that all excellence is the state (or 
condition or faculty) of something that has a use and a work. However, for 
Aristotle, coming to know these premises (and know their truth), as against 
merely assuming them, it seems, would require imperfect inductions. For 
example, it seems that one would have to induce that all excellence for houses is 
the best state or condition for a house. But it would be impossible to survey all 
houses that may be excellent that existed, exist presently, and will ever be built, 
so it would have to be an imperfect induction. The same, it seems, would hold for 
other artifacts, such as vessels. And, given that Aristotle holds the Direction and 
Necessity Theses, it is reasonable to think that he would consider such processes 
of imperfect inductive generalization as instances of epagôgê.  
Another example in Aristotle’s works of an epagôgê that appears to be, at 
bottom, an imperfect induction is in On the Heavens I.7: 
…a place in which a thing rests or to which it moves unnaturally, must 





According to Aristotle, a thing’s natural motion or rest is motion or rest that it 
undergoes which comes from its own nature. Unnatural motion or rest is that 
which is a deviation from a thing’s natural motion or rest, and (apparently) comes 
from the force exerted on it by another body. For example, the natural motion of 
                                                 
44
  Aristotle, On the Heavens, trans. J.L. Stock in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 




fire for Aristotle is upwards; it is unnatural for fire to be in motion downwards, 
i.e. toward the center the earth.
45
  
The passage above provides more evidence that Aristotle recognizes 
epagôgê, at least sometimes, as imperfect inductive generalization. The 
conclusion—that “a place in which a thing rests or to which it moves unnaturally, 
must be the natural place for some other body” seems to be a universal 
conclusion, despite the fact that it is not explicitly quantified. It would require an 
unnatural reading of the passage to take Aristotle to tacitly hold the conclusion to 
be quantified with “some” (or even “most”) rather than “any.” For in such a case 
we would expect him to say that epagôgê reveals that the conclusion does not 
hold for some other places. And yet it is implausible to take Aristotle to believe 
that we induce the conclusion from observations of all such places, for the 
number of such places in the universe (even given Aristotle’s view of the universe 
as finite in size) would be virtually countless, much more than any person could 
be expected to perceive in the course of an entire lifetime.
46
  
                                                 
45
  See On the Heavens I.8. See also Physics 205b24-31 where Aristotle mentions the “natural 
locomotion”—upwards for the light, towards the center of the earth for the heavy—of bodies, in 
the context of arguing against the possibility of an infinite sensible body. (Aristotle, Physics, trans. 
Gaye, R.K. and R. P. Hardie in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. I, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 315-446. Unless otherwise noted, any further 
reference to a translation of the Physics will be to this work.) See also Physics 230b11-17 where 
Aristotle claims fire has a natural motion upwards and an unnatural motion downwards, and vice 
versa for earth. See also, generally, all of Physics IV where Aristotle discusses ‘place’ in 
connection with natural motion and rest.   
 
46
 In Physics IV.4, Aristotle presents his argument that the place of a thing is “the innermost 
motionless boundary of what contains it” (Phys., 212a20-1).  For a small stone on the ground, its 
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One may object that Aristotle could be taking the induction of the 
conclusion to proceed from a complete premise set about kinds of places—with 
premises like “the ground has all the places to which things move unnaturally and 
is the natural place for other bodies,” “the air has all the places to which things 
move unnaturally and is a natural place for other bodies,” etc. One should observe 
that such general premises are by nature universal. To justify such a premise, we 
need to base it on an “incomplete” set premises, each about an ultimate particular. 
Or, at the very least, behind the narrowest universal generalizations leading to the 
conclusion in the block quote above, we need an “incomplete” set of premises, 
each about an ultimate particular. And it is reasonable to think that the processes 
of reasoning to these narrowest generalizations—processes which are imperfect 
inductive generalizations—would, for Aristotle, be processes of epagôgê. For 
Aristotle holds the Direction Thesis. This, in regard to epagôgê, is that epagôgê 
consists in reasoning from particular premises to a universal conclusion.
47
 
  I will now offer a more general argument that Aristotle considers at least 
some epagôgai to be imperfect inductive generalizations. The universal truths 
reached by epagôgê cannot all be by epagôgê as perfect induction, but at least 
                                                                                                                                     
“place” would be the boundary of the containing body—the ground and the air—touching (“in 
contact with”) the stone’s surface. Given such a view of place, it should be obvious that there are 
virtually countless (arguably, a potentially infinite number of) places in the world.  
 
47
  In the passage above is evidence, Aristotle appears to reason from more particular premises to a 
more universal conclusion, since it seems that the premises are not directly about ultimate 
particulars.  Hence, the passage is evidence that when Aristotle writes that epagôgê consists in 
proceeding from the particular to the universal, he means: from the more particular to the more 
universal. This is what the Direction Thesis should be understood as claiming.   
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some (indeed, it seems, a significant number) must be by epagôgê as imperfect 
inductive generalization. For not all (indeed, it seems very few) natural species 
that Aristotle seems to recognize could seem to be the subject of universal truths 
reached through perfect induction, i.e. through a survey of all members of the 
species. For Aristotle evidently considers species of earthly living things, such as 
horses, to have a potentially infinite number of specimens.
48, 49
 This, in turn, 
strongly suggests that for Aristotle many species of man-made objects, such as 
houses, would have a potentially infinite, or at least a potentially very large, 
number of specimens. For if there are potentially infinite number of humans, there 
is a strong suggestion that the number of individual human artifacts—especially 
                                                 
48
  Aristotle’s view of infinity, as expressed in Physics III.6, is that it is a potentiality and never an 
actuality. A magnitude can have a potentially infinite number of parts, which is to say that it can 
be divided into smaller and smaller parts indefinitely, without end.  But at any point in the 
dividing, the actual number of parts will be finite. Similarly, a quantity of beings can be 
potentially infinite, which is to say that it can be indefinitely added to, without end. But at any 
point in the adding, the actual number of beings will be finite. Thus, to say that for Aristotle there 
may be infinitely many horses would be to say that horses (through reproduction) may be added 
indefinitely, without end.  
 
49
  One piece of evidence that Aristotle considers the human species to have a potentially infinite 
number of specimens is found in the Physics: “The infinite exhibits itself in different ways—in 
time, in generations of men, and in the division of magnitudes” (Phys., 206a25-7). Stronger 
evidence that Aristotle considers the number of specimens of a species of earthly living things to 
be potentially infinite is found at GA, 731b33-a1: “…that which comes into being is eternal in the 
only way possible. Now it is impossible for it to be eternal as an individual…but it is possible for 
it as a species. This is why there is always a class of men and animals and plants.” (Aristotle, 
Generation of Animals, trans. A. Platt in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. I, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1111-218.) This should be 
understood in connection with the claim of Categories at 2a34-b6 that without “primary 
substances” (individual objects such as individual horses or individual houses), nothing else—and, 
in particular no species or genus—would exist. As such, the statement from Generation of 
Animals implies that the number of specimens of species of plants and animals is potentially 




those used for survival (e.g., individual axes, individual houses)—is also 
potentially infinite.
50
   
Further, Aristotle clearly did not think that a mind could traverse infinitely 
many items. Consider APo. A.3. In considering the alternative of an infinite chain 
of demonstrations (in contrast to circular demonstrations, etc.), Aristotle says, 
“…it is impossible to survey infinitely many items” (APo., 72b11). Surely, such a 
statement would apply to an induction from infinitely many particular facts. 
Though he is specifically discussing a chain of demonstrations, there is no reason 
to think that “apeira”—the infinite series or “infinitely many items”—would 
apply only to a sequence of demonstrations. If for Aristotle, it is impossible for 
the mind to survey infinitely many demonstrations, then there is no reason for us 
to think that he believed that the mind can survey infinitely many particular facts 
before making an inductive generalization.
51
  
Accordingly, it appears that for Aristotle, knowledge about any species 
with a potentially infinite number of members would have to rely (at bottom) on 
imperfect inductive generalization. Since, he calls reasoning from particular facts 
to a universal claim “epagôgê,” he would consider such imperfect inductive 
                                                 
50
  Even if Aristotle would not have considered any type of man-made object (such as houses) to 
be a natural kind but an artificial one, the same analysis would apply. Apparently, there would 
potentially be an infinite number of houses (for example), and the mind could not possibly 
complete a survey of an infinite number of them.    
 
51
  On the basis of common sense, it seems that Aristotle is correct; it seems absurd to think that a 
human mind could actually complete a survey of an infinite number of things. 
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generalizations as constituting at least one type of epagôgê.  For example, what 
appears to be intended as a perfect induction in Prior Analytics B.23 that all long-
lived things are bile-less, would seem to rest on epagôgê in regard to the species: 
from observations of particular horses, we conclude that all horses are long-lived 
and bile-less; from observations of particular humans, we conclude that all 
humans are long-lived and bile-less, etc. But Aristotle must have been convinced 
that there are potentially infinitely many horses. If he considered all epagôgê to be 
perfect enumerative induction, we would have to, it seems, ascribe to him the 
claim that to know that all horses are bile-less and long-lived, we would have 
survey infinitely many horses (which would take an eternity). It is implausible to 
ascribe the latter alternative to him. Ascribing the former alternative to him is not 
only implausible, but, as we have seen, Aristotle thinks it is impossible for the 
mind to survey infinitely many items. Surely then, for Aristotle, arriving at the 
knowledge that all horses are bile-less and long-lived would require that we 
survey multiple (perhaps many), but not an infinite number of horses, not all the 
horses that ever lived, live now, and will live.
52
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  Thomas V. Upton makes the general point I am making here in Thomas V. Upton, “Infinity and 
Perfect Induction in Aristotle,” Proceedings of the Catholic Philosophic Association, Vol. 55 




  That is, for Aristotle, reaching that knowledge would seem to require an 
epagôgê which is an imperfect inductive generalization.
53
 And similarly, 
knowledge about other species with a potentially infinite number of members, 
such as (presumably) axes and rabbits, would seem to require, at some point, 
epagôgê as imperfect inductive generalization from a subset of the particular 
specimens in question.  
My last point in connection with this general argument concerns my claim 
from Section I that for Aristotle, the conclusions of some inductive 
generalizations might be quantified with “most” rather than with a universal 
quantifier. We should note that where such inductive generalizations are about 
species with a potentially infinite number of specimens, it would be implausible 
to think that Aristotle would require most of the specimens to be surveyed before 
the generalization is made.
54
 Even in cases where Aristotle might seek to reach an 
inductive generalization, quantified with “most,” about a species with a 
                                                 
53
  In connection with the evidence I have so far given that Aristotle must at least sometimes 
consider epagôgê to be imperfect inductive generalization, consider the following. Taking 
Aristotle to consider epagôgê to always be perfect induction would be uncharitable. For then all of 
what he considers to be demonstrations would inherently beg the question. For the conclusion of 
such a putative demonstration would have to be part of one of the premises of the epagôgê used to 
reach the one of the first premises of the putative demonstration. Thus, consider this argument, 
offered as a demonstration in APo., 78b9-11: all of what is spherical waxes in this way; the moon 
is spherical; so, the moon are waxes in this way. If epagôgê is always perfect induction, the claim 
that the moon is spherical and waxes in this way would have to be one of the premises in the 




 Indeed, if the number of specimens in a given species is potentially infinite, it seems impossible 
ever to survey “most” of the specimens, since, at any point in the survey, potentially there will, in 




potentially infinite number of specimens, it is plausible only to take him as 
requiring that a number of specimens less than that of most of the specimens be 
surveyed. That is, it is plausible only to take him as requiring an imperfect 
inductive generalization.  
Despite all of the above evidence that Aristotle does sometimes recognize 
epagôgê as imperfect inductive generalization, a certain chapter in Prior Analytics 
might raise some doubts on this issue. There is a remark in APr. B.23 that 
suggests that for Aristotle epagôgê is always perfect enumerative induction. I will 
consider next whether we should take that to mean that Aristotle was indeed 
committed to the position that epagôgê is always perfect induction.  
 
VIII. “Epagôgê” in Prior Analytics B.23  
As I have already mentioned, Aristotle in Prior Analytics B.23 presents 
what he calls an “epagôgê” (and which he apparently takes to be synonymous 
with “sullogismos ex epagôgês”—“deduction from induction”
55
) that seems to be 
a perfect enumerative induction (that all long-lived things are bile-less). Aristotle 
makes the following assumptions. Let A, standing for the property long-lived, 
belong to the whole of C, standing for particular species of long-lived things. Let 
                                                 
55
   The Greek in APr. B.23 at 68b15 is “Epagôgê men oun …kai ho ex epagôgês sullogismos…” 
Smith translates this as “Induction, then—that is, a deduction from induction—…” (Prior 
Analytics, 68b15), suggesting that “epagôgê” here is considered by Aristotle to be synonymous 
with “sullogismos ex epagôgês.” This reading has been contested by some commentators. I will 
consider two of these commentators in Ch. 6.     
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B, standing for bile-less, belong to every C (a belonging of which we would know 
by an enumeration of each C). Let B and C convert, so that bile-less belongs to all 
and only long-lived things. Aristotle concludes from these that it is necessary that 
A belongs to B (that all of what is bile-less is long-lived). After laying out the 
above assumptions, to explain his drawing the conclusion that it is necessary that 
A belongs to B, Aristotle writes: 
…for it has been proved earlier [at APr., 68a16-22] that if two terms 
belong to the same thing and the extreme converts with one of them, 
then the other one of the predicates will also belong to the term that 
converts with it. (But one must understand C as composed of every one 
of the particulars: for induction [epagôgê] is through them all.), (APr., 
68b25-9, emphasis added)  
 
This passage, and in particular, its italicized ending, suggests that the way one is 
to know that B (bile-less) belongs to all C, i.e. to all particular species of long-
lived things, is to perform a complete enumeration of all particular species of 
long-lived things (i.e. of each C), and recognize of each that it is bile-less (i.e. is a 
subject of B). Thus, Aristotle’s example of a “sullogismos ex epagôgês” is 
apparently a perfect induction.  
With Aristotle apparently using “sullogismos ex epagôgês” above that 
passage as a synonym for “epagôgê,” that passage, and the italicized part in 
particular, suggests that he regards epagôgê (all epagôgê) as perfect induction.  
 Near the end of Prior Analytics B.24 (the very next chapter), Aristotle makes a 
remark that seems to corroborate this. He contrasts epagôgê with paradeigma:  
50 
 
…[example, i.e. paradeigma] differs from induction [tês epagôgês] in 
that induction  proves the extreme to belong to the middle term from all 
the individuals…while example…does not prove from them all. (APr., 
69a16-9, emphasis added)  
 
The italicized part, in particular, seems to corroborate the view that Aristotle 
regarded all epagôgê as perfect induction.  
Obviously, the suggestion that Aristotle regarded all epagôgê as perfect 
induction contradicts what I have argued in Sections V and VII above, that 
Aristotle regarded at least some epagôgê as imperfect inductive generalization. 
How should we resolve this dilemma? Did Aristotle regard all epagôgê as perfect 
induction or not? 
One may try to offer any of three different answers to this question. (1) 
Aristotle consistently held that all epagôgê is prefect induction (in accordance 
with the suggestion of Prior Analytics B.23). (2) Aristotle, in some works (such as 
Prior Analytics) held that epagôgê is perfect induction, but in other works held 
that some epagôgê in imperfect induction, apparently modifying his position or 
changing his mind. (3) The reading of Prior Analytics B.23 suggested above is 
incorrect; in that chapter, Aristotle does not regard all epagôgê as perfect 
induction.
56
 Option (1) does not appear to be viable, given all of the evidence I 
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  Some commentators have taken this position. I will discuss certain of them in Ch. 3 and Ch. 4. 
As will be seen, my interest in discussing them is that, in one form or another, they claim that 
Aristotle did not think epagôgê could establish the certain truth of a principle or that he considers 




have offered in Sections V and VII above that Aristotle did consider some 
epagôgê to be imperfect inductive generalization.  
This leaves us with Option (2) and Option (3). It may be difficult to decide 
between them. But what is significant to my thesis in this work is that either of 
those two options is consistent with my position that Aristotle did deal with a 
problem of induction.
57
 If we assume the “developmentalist” view of Option (2), 
then Aristotle modified (or changed his mind outright about), some time after (or 
before) writing Prior Analytics B.23, his view of whether all epagôgê is perfect 
induction. If so, then my position seems consistent with Aristotle’s view of 
whether all epagôgê is perfect induction, at least (evidently) for the greater part of 
his career. If we assume Option (3), that reading Prior Analytics B.23 as 
regarding all epagôgê as perfect induction is wrong, then our assumption, as such, 
does not contradict my position Aristotle dealt with a  problem of induction.    
 
IX. Conclusion 
Aristotle regards epagôgê as a species of reasoning that consists of 
moving from the particular to the universal. Further, in contrast to sullogismos, 
Aristotle apparently does not consider the conclusion following of necessity to be 
essential to epagôgê. The two theses (the Direction Thesis and the Necessity 
                                                 
57
  My position is that Aristotle dealt with the problem of induction. I think it is fairly obvious that 
if Aristotle held, throughout his career, that all induction is perfect induction, then he was 




Thesis respectively) suggest that Aristotle does regard some epagôgê as imperfect 
inductive generalization. Additionally, some direct textual evidence shows that he 
does regard some epagôgê to be imperfect inductive generalization.
58
 This is 
further shown by the fact that Aristotle regarded the number of specimens of 
some species (namely, those of earthly living things) to be potentially infinite. 
This combined with the fact that Aristotle did not think that the mind can traverse 
an infinite series implies that epagôgai that are generalizations about such species 
would, at bottom, be imperfect inductive generalizations.  
 APr. B.23 is sometimes read as claiming that Aristotle considered all 
epagôgê to be perfect induction. But the view that Aristotle consistently and 
throughout all his works holds this view of epagôgê is untenable, given the 
enormous amount of evidence to the contrary. It is more reasonable to adopt the 
position that APr. B. 23 does not claim that all epagôgê is perfect induction, or 




 The evident fact that Aristotle considers some epagôgê to be imperfect 
inductive generalization will help support my reading of the genetic account of 
                                                 
58
  Aristotle’s regarding some epagôgê as imperfect inductive generalization implies that he 
considered some epagôgê as moving from propositions to a proposition (as against from objects 
to a universal term).  
 
59
  Aristotle’s examples of epagôgê that consist of moving from premises about species (as against 
ultimate particulars) to a more universal conclusion—including the example in APr. B.23—
strongly suggest that in his description of  epagôgê as reasoning from the particular to the 
universal, he means from the more particular to the more universal.   
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APo. B.19.  But before I offer and defend my reading of the genetic account, I 
will criticize certain readings of it that are uncommon and opposed to my own in 
certain fundamental respects. 
54 
 
Chapter 2: A Response to Hamlyn 
 
I. Introduction 
 Up to this point, I have provided strong evidence that Aristotle does 
consider some epagôgai to be imperfect inductive generalizations. Before I turn to 
the task of providing and defending my reading of the genetic account of APo. 
B.19, where I indicate that the epagôgê mentioned in that chapter (usually) 
involves an imperfect inductive generalization, I will consider and criticize certain 
readings of the genetic account that conflict with my own and which merit 
treatment prior to the presentation of my reading of the genetic account. In this 




 My reason for considering Hamlyn in a separate chapter before I present 
and defend my reading of the genetic account is as follows. After presenting much 
of his genetic account in APo. B.19 of how we come to know the principles of 
demonstration, Aristotle makes the following statement: 
[A] 
 
It is clear then that we must recognize the first (principles) by induction 
(epagoge); for sense perception introduces the universal in this way. 
(APo., 100b3-5, trans. Hamlyn in Hamlyn, 171) 
 
                                                 
1
  “Aristotelian Epagoge,” Phronêsis Vol. 21 (1976), 167-84. Any further reference to a work by 
Hamlyn will be to this article.    
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Most commentators take the epagôgê mentioned in Passage A to refer to the 
process described just prior to Passage A, at APo., 100a35-b3. This process 
appears to be one of grasping universals from sense perception.
2
 This common 
reading is an important part of the basis of many commentators for taking the 
epagôgê mentioned in this passage as a process of discovery consisting of 
generalizing from observed instances (i.e., as what Hamlyn calls “ampliative 
induction” (Hamlyn, 168)). As will be seen in Ch. 4, I agree with that common 
reading, and I agree that the epagôgê mentioned in this passage is ampliative 
induction. Further, as will be seen in Ch. 4, my position that the epagôgê is 
ampliative induction is part of my integrated reading of the genetic account 
according to which such ampliative induction is often imperfect inductive 
generalization. Hamlyn, however, takes the epagôgê mentioned in this passage as 
a dialectical argument (rather than as ampliative induction) employed in a 
teacher-student context. So, clearly, Hamlyn’s reading of the genetic account 
conflicts with my own. Before presenting my own reading of the genetic account 
in Ch. 4, it is helpful to “clear away” certain uncommon readings of that account, 
including that of Hamlyn. Since Hamlyn presents a complex set of items of 
                                                 
2
  Commentators disagree whether the grasp is merely of universal concepts or also of universal 
propositions, but many consider it to be also of universal propositions. Examples of commentators 
who agree with this common reading are Barnes in Barnes (2002), 259-67 and Robert Bolton in 
Bolton, 5-11. (The work is: Robert Bolton, “Aristotle’s Method in Natural Science: Physics I” in 
Lindsay Judson, ed., Aristotle’s Physics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1-29. 





evidence in support of his position, it is helpful to devote a chapter to Hamlyn’s 
position.   
 
II. Hamlyn’s Position and Supporting Evidence 
 Hamlyn’s position, again, is that the epagôgê mentioned in APo. B.19 at 
100b4 is not a process of discovery. It is a dialectical argument employed in a 
teacher-student context. The genetic account prior to100b4, Hamlyn thinks, 
describes a process in which a student acquires perceptual experience, and from 
this, a universal concept. Hamlyn thinks that the epagôgê mentioned at 100b4 
presupposes that the student has undergone such a process. Why? Because for the 
teacher to employ an epagôgê to get the student to see the truth of a principle, the 
student must be capable of recognizing the particulars as particulars subsumed by 
the universal concept (Hamlyn, 182). If, for example, a teacher seeks to use an 
epagogic dialectical argument to get a student to see the truth of the principle that 
all men reason, the student must already have acquired the concept man from 
sense experience, and be capable of recognizing particular men (such as Callias 
and Socrates) as men. 
 Once a student has the required perceptual experience and concepts, a 
teacher, together with the student, will employ epagôgê as an application of a 
general principle to particular cases in the student’s experience. Assuming the 
teacher seeks to get the student to see the truth of the principle, for example, that 
57 
 
all men reason, such a dialectical process would presumably proceed as follows.
3
 
The teacher would ask the student if Callias is a man and if he reasons. If the 
student sees the truth of affirmative responses, the student would respond 
affirmatively to both questions. The teacher would then ask the student if Socrates 
is a man and if he reasons. Again, if the student sees the truth of affirmative 
responses, the student would again respond affirmatively to both questions. In 
each question-and-answer round in which the student responds affirmatively, the 
general principle has been applied to a particular case. After a series of such 
questions and affirmative responses, the student will be brought to “see” the truth 
of the principle (in this case the principle that all men reason), (Hamlyn, 181-4).
4
  
 Turning now to the evidence that Hamlyn offers for his position, it seems 
that there are four main items of evidence. Hamlyn offers additional, 
corroborating evidence which is relevant mainly to the third and fourth main item 
of evidence.
5
 In connection with this corroborating evidence, Hamlyn offers 
readings of three passages to make them consistent with the view that epagôgê for 
Aristotle is dialectical argument.  
                                                 
3
  I say “presumably” here because Hamlyn does not give a concrete example of the process, but 
describes a process for which the example I give appears to be appropriate.  
 
4
  Hamlyn takes “see” in this context to mean to be directly aware of, which includes, but is not 
limited to, literal sight. This direct insight is what he thinks nous (or “comprehension” in Barnes’ 
translation), discussed at APo., 100b5-17,  is intended to be (Hamlyn, 171).   
 
5




The first of the main pieces of evidence is based on Hamlyn’s claim that 
the genetic account in APo. B.19 before the passage mentioning of epagôgê at 
100b4
6
 is not a plausible account of how we obtain knowledge of principles 
(archai), (Hamlyn, 179-80). In particular, the claim (at 100b5-17), connected with 
the genetic account, that one knows the principles by nous (often translated as 
“intuition”) would scarcely satisfy the skeptic (Hamlyn, 172, 181). Thus, it is 
implausible to take the account as a prescription for the justification of knowledge 
claims of principles (Hamlyn, 181). Hence, taking the account as a description of 
the epagôgê mentioned at 100b4, so that the epagôgê is a process of inductive 
discovery and justification, is not plausible (Hamlyn, 181-2). It is more plausible 
to take it as intending “to provide a framework of genetic epistemology in terms 
of which epagoge [as a dialectical argument] can be given a sense” (Hamlyn, 
182). A learner of principles must have the relevant perceptual experience and 
concepts stored in memory before a teacher can provide an epagôgê (as a 
dialectical argument) to get the learner to see the meaning and truth of a principle. 
The genetic account prior to100b4 should be taken merely as an account of how 
we acquire such perceptual experience and concepts, of the capacities and states 
                                                 
6
  Hamlyn’s claim in Hamlyn, 171-2 and 181-2 that “epagôgêi” at APo., 100b4 should not be 
taken as referring “back” to the genetic account, suggests that Hamlyn thinks the genetic account 
ends before the sentence containing “epagôgêi,” i.e., that he thinks it ends at 100b3.    
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we as humans must have if we are to learn the truth of a principle from a teacher 
using epagôgê (as a dialectical argument), (Hamlyn, 182-4).
7
  
Related to that is the second main piece of evidence. It consists of a 
reading of part of the genetic account. Here is a quote of the relevant part of APo. 
B.19, the part that begins with a restatement of the part of the genetic account just 
prior to it:  
[B] 
 
Let us say again what we have just said but not said clearly. When one 
of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, there is a 
primitive universal in the soul; for although the particular is perceived, 
the perception is of the universal,--e.g. of man, not of Callias the man. 
Next, a stand is made among these items, until something partless and 
universal makes a stand. E.g. such-and-such an animal makes a stand, 
until animal does; and with animal a stand is made in the same way. 
Thus it is plain that we must get to know the primitives by induction 
[epagôgêi]; for this is the way in which perception instills the universal. 






Consider this clause in the passage: “…for although the particular is perceived, 
the perception is of the universal,—e.g. of man, not of Callias the man.” Hamlyn 
                                                 
7
  As neither the single statement in APo., B.19 (beginning at 100b3) explicitly mentioning 
epagôgê, nor any other part of B.19, explains how a teacher should employ epagôgê to get a 
student to see the truth of a principle, Hamlyn thinks that this is explained elsewhere in Aristotle’s 
works (especially the Topics, which explicitly deals with dialectic), (Hamlyn, 168-9). This helps 
Hamlyn to complete his case that the genetic account before 100b4, and indeed the entirety of 
APo., B.19, is about something other than the justification of knowledge claims.  
 
8
  “[T]he particular is perceived” replaces Barnes’ “you perceive particulars,” and “the perception 
is of the universal” replaces Barnes’ “perception is of universals.” Further “universal” in the last 








reads this as saying that a particular must be perceived as something, as a member 
of a kind. Callias, for example, must be perceived as a man. Hence, the sense 
perception of a particular is enough to implant the universal (or one of the 
universals) it instantiates into the perceiver’s mind (Hamlyn, 181). This, Hamlyn 
thinks, rules out the epagôgê mentioned at 100b4 from being a process of 
discovery. For, on that view of the epagôgê, it would be a process of discovering 
a universal truth (or concept) from perceptual experience. But, Hamlyn argues, on 
Aristotle’s own account, one grasps a universal by the sense perception of a 
particular instance of it before going through an epagôgê as a process of 
discovery based on sense perception (Hamlyn, 181). Thus, “in this way” (or “this 
is the way in which” in Barnes’ translation) at 100b5 must be taken as referring 
back to the genetic account prior to100b4, rather than to “epagôgêi” at 100b4.  
The genetic account prior to100b4, in other words, cannot be taken as a 
description of the epagôgê mentioned at 100b4—which disqualifies the genetic 
account prior to100b4 as evidence that the epagôgê is a process of discovery 
(Hamlyn, 181).    
 The third of the fourth main pieces of evidence offered by Hamlyn that 
“epagôgê” in APo. B.19 is a dialectical argument is the fact that Aristotle credits 
Socrates for discovering epagôgê (Hamlyn, 168).
10
 Aristotle cannot, Hamlyn 
thinks, have in mind a process of abstracting a generalization from particular 
                                                 
10
  Hamlyn’s reference to Aristotle is to Met., 1078b28.  
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cases (i.e. a process of “ampliative induction”). For that is not what Socrates does 
when employing epagôgê (Hamlyn, 168). What Socrates does when employing an 
epagôgê, and what Aristotle must mean by “egagoge,” is give a dialectical 
argument that consists of citing particular cases of a general principle to get an 
interlocutor to see the truth of the principle (Hamlyn, 168).  
 The fourth main piece of evidence offered by Hamlyn is that APo. B.19 
seems to refer back to A.1, and A.1 indicates that both deductive and inductive 
(epagogic) arguments are parts of a teaching and learning context (Hamlyn, 178). 
APo. A.1, opens with the claim that all teaching and learning “of an intellectual 
kind” depend on pre-existing knowledge (APo., 71a1-2). It claims that arguments, 
both deductive and epagogic, also affect their teaching on the basis of pre-existing 
knowledge (APo., 71a5-11). APo. B.19 seems to ask how we can have knowledge 
of principles if we do not “possess them” (i.e. if they are not innate), except from 
pre-existing knowledge (APo., 99b28-9). This seems to reiterate the idea just 
mentioned from A.1 that all intellectual teaching and learning is based on pre-
existing knowledge. This suggests that demonstration for Aristotle is part of a 
teaching and learning context. Moreover, it suggests that what Aristotle regards as 
somehow the base of demonstration, namely epagôgê, is part of a teaching and 
learning (teacher-student) context (Hamlyn, 173). It is difficult to conceive of 
ampliative induction—induction as discovery of a general truth from observations 
of particular instances—as being part of such a context. But it is not difficult to 
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conceive of a dialectical argument, in which particular cases are cited to persuade 
an interlocutor of the truth of a general principle, as being part of such a context. 
Hence, the apparent reference in APo. B.19 back to A.1, and the indication in A.1 
that both deductive and epagogic arguments are part of a teaching and learning 
context suggests that the epagôgê mentioned in APo. B.19 is a dialectical 
argument and not ampliative induction.  
 In connection with the last two main pieces of evidence, Hamlyn offers an 
important piece of corroborating evidence, and in addition gives us a reading of 
three passages in Aristotle’s works that makes them consistent with his position. 
The piece of corroborating evidence is that both the Prior and Posterior Analytics 
refer to Plato’s Meno. Hamlyn takes the Meno to involve epagôgê as a dialectical 
argument consisting of the application of a general principle to one or more cases.  
 The reference in the Prior Analytics is in Ch. B.21 at 67a21-2 where 
Aristotle mentions the argument in the Meno that “learning is being reminded” 
(APr., 67a21-2). Immediately afterwards, Aristotle turns to criticize this position, 
i.e., the doctrine of recollection in the Meno. Hamlyn translates the critical 
passage:  
It never happens that we know the particular previously, but we get 
knowledge of the instances (tên tôn kata meros epistêmên) along with 
epagôgê, recognizing them as it were. For we know some things 
immediately, e.g., when we see that it is a triangle, that its angles are 
equal to two right angles. And similarly in the other cases. (APr., 




Hamlyn takes this passage to use “epagôgê” to refer to the application of a 
general principle—that a triangle has angles equal to two right angles—to a 
particular triangle (Hamlyn, 170). And he considers it unsurprising, since he 
thinks Socrates in the Meno employs epagôgê as an application general principle 
to a particular case (Hamlyn, 171). Hamlyn’s point with regard to this passage 
(and the following passage, from APo. A.1, that pertains to the Meno) is that if 
epagôgê is a process of inductive discovery, it can hardly consist of applying a 
general principle to cases—but if epagôgê as a dialectical argument, it can. 
Hence, there is the suggestion here that the epagôgê mentioned in APo. B.19 is 
intended to be a dialectical argument, and not ampliative induction (Hamlyn, 169-
70).  
 Hamlyn also notes that Aristotle explicitly refers to the problem in Meno 
in APo. A.1 at 71a29-30. Just before his explicit mention of the Meno, Aristotle 
asks: 
If you did not know that there was such-and-such a thing simpliciter, 
how could you have known that it had two right angles simpliciter? 
(APo., 71a26-8)  
 
Apparently given his examples after this passage, Aristotle has the following 
question in mind (which he apparently takes as the same as or variation of the 
problem in the Meno
11
). If you know that all things of a certain kind have a 
                                                 
11
  The problem of the Meno, put in the form of a dilemma, can be expressed as follows. In 
seeking the knowledge X, either one does not know X, in which case one does not know what one 
is looking for (so that acquiring the knowledge is impossible), or one already knows X, in which 
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certain predicate, simpliciter, and if you have not recognized a given particular of 
that kind as being of that kind, then how can you know simpliciter that the 
predicate belongs to that particular? Aristotle’s answer, evidently, is that you 
cannot know it simpliciter, but only generally. According to Hamlyn’s reading of 
this passage, Aristotle gives two examples of this answer. The first is that one 
may know that all triangles have angles equal to two triangles. But if one does not 
know of this (i.e. a particular triangle) as a triangle, one does not know simpliciter 
but only generally that it has angles equal to two right angles (Hamlyn, 173-4).
12
  
 The second example is that one may know that all “pairs” (apparently, a 
“pair” here is a sum of an integer and itself) are even. But if one does not know of 
a particular “pair” as a “pair,” one does not know simpliciter but only generally 
that it is even (Hamlyn, 174).
13
 
 One comes to know simpliciter of this (i.e., a particular triangle) that it is a 
triangle  with angles equal to two right angles by applying to it the general 
principle about triangles. Similarly, one comes to know simpliciter of this (i.e. a 
particular “pair”) that it is a “pair” that is even by applying to it the general 
principle about “pairs.” As with what Hamlyn thinks Socrates does in the Meno, 
                                                                                                                                     
case one does not need to seek that knowledge. The dilemma implies that either knowledge cannot 
be acquired or that it need not be acquired. See Plato, Meno, esp. 80d3-87c8.    
 
12
  The reference to the Posterior Analytics is to 71a27-30, 71b1-6.  
 
13




Hamlyn considers Aristotle here to use “epagôgê” as an application of a general 
principle to a particular case.
14
 Hamlyn considers it “unfortunate” that Aristotle 
here confines his attention to “one kind of learning situation—that in which the 
learner, given a knowledge of a general principle, learns that a particular is an 
instance of it…” (Hamlyn, 173-5) Not all learning situations for Aristotle are of 
this kind (Hamlyn, 174).
15
   
 Recall the connection that APo. B.19 seems to have with A.1. Recall also 
the question from (or based on) the Meno that Aristotle seems to raise and try to 
answer in A.1. According to Hamlyn, Aristotle seems to have the problem of the 
Meno in mind in APo. B.19, which (given that Meno involves epagôgê as a 
dialectical argument) suggests, again, that the epagôgê mentioned in B.19 is a 
dialectical argument (Hamlyn, 174).
16
  
 In connection with the above corroborating evidence, Hamlyn reads three 
passages in a way that makes them consistent with the view that epagôgê for 
                                                 
14
  Apparently, part of Hamlyn’s evidence for this is that APo. A.1 states: “Before you are led to 
[epachthênai] the conclusion, i.e. before you are given a deduction, you should perhaps be said to 
understand it in one way, but in another way not” (APo., 71a25-7). “Epachthênai” is a derivative 
of the root of “epagôgê,” and “epagôgê” literally means “a leading to.”    
  
15
  Since, according to Hamlyn, the function of the epagôgê in APo. B.19 is to get a student to see 
the truth of a principle of demonstration, Hamlyn is apparently making this statement to negate the 
suggestion that the epagôgê in APo. B.19 is one that instead has a function by which “the learner, 




  The reference to the Posterior Analytics is to 99b27-35, where, with regard to knowledge of the 
principles, Aristotle seems to consider and reject the claim of the Meno that states of knowledge 
are innate and then considers the alternative that the states of knowledge of the principles are 
based on prior knowledge.  
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Aristotle (and in particular the epagôgê mentioned in APo. B.19) is a dialectical 
argument.   
 The first of these passages is at APo., 81b5ff. Aristotle says there that one 
cannot have epistêmê of particulars, 
…for neither can one get to them from universals (sc. universal 
propositions) without epagoge, nor can one get to them through 
epagoge without sense-perception. (APo., 81b6-9, trans. Hamlyn in 
Hamlyn, 169-70) 
 
Hamlyn acknowledges that this passage may be taken to suggest that Aristotle has 
epagôgê as ampliative induction in mind (Hamlyn, 169-70). But, Hamlyn 
continues, “the passage does not say that one gets the knowledge of universals as 
the result of a process which starts with the facts of sense perception” (Hamlyn, 
170, emphasis in original). According to Hamlyn, the passage says that “the 
application of general principles to particular cases presupposes epagôgê and that 
the application of epagôgê itself presupposes sense perception” (Hamlyn, 170). 
And epagôgê as a dialectical argument, but not as a process of discovery, can 
involve the application of general principles to particular cases (Hamlyn, 170).  
 The second passage is found in APo. A.13 and pertains to reaching the 
“truth” that all of what is non-twinkling is near. Hamlyn writes of this passage:  
Post. An. 78a34 says that the truth that that which does not twinkle is 
near must be taken, in the context of the argument given by way of 
example, to be grasped ‘through  induction or through sense 




Hamlyn adds that “[w]hether the ‘or’ is an ‘i.e.’ or whether it expresses a genuine 
alternative,”
 17
 the passage cannot be taken as guaranteeing that epagôgê is 
ampliative induction (Hamlyn, 169). For even if epagôgê is a dialectical 
argument, it can surely still make use of facts of sense perception (Hamlyn, 169).   
 The third passage is in the Nicomachean Ethics at 1139b28. The passage 
says (or suggests) that epagôgê is the archê (principle, starting point, or origin) of 
to katholou (usually translated as “the universal”), while sullogismos (including 
apodeixis, i.e. demonstration) is ek tou katholou (typically rendered “from the 
universal”). Hamlyn says that there is no necessary suggestion in passages such as 




 In what follows, I will consider and respond to Hamlyn’s first main item 
of evidence in Section III and his second main item of evidence in Section IV. 
Then, in Section V, I will consider and respond to Hamlyn’s third and fourth main 
items of evidence as well as the corroborating evidence he offers in connection 
with these two main items. I will also criticize his interpretations, in connection 
with this corroborating evidence, of the three passages he reads in a way that 
                                                 
17
  The Greek particle “ê,” which occurs at APo., 78a35, can be translated as, among other things, 
“or” (to express a “genuine alternative”) or as “i.e.” Hamlyn, in the block quote above, translates it 
as “or.”    
 
18
  Presumably, Hamlyn considers the passage at Top. I, 105a13-6 as one like the one at EN, 
1139b28ff. The Topics passage also suggests that epagôgê consists in proceeding from particular 




makes them consistent with the claim that epagôgê for Aristotle is a dialectical 
argument. Finally, in Section VI, I will present my conclusion.   
In responding to Hamlyn, my aim is to criticize his view of the epagôgê 
mentioned in APo. B.19 as a dialectical argument. It is not yet my aim to present 
my full case that the genetic account is a description of the epagôgê mentioned at 
100b4 (which would strongly suggest that the epagôgê is a process of inductive 
discovery and justification, the more common reading). However, at the end of 
my criticism of Hamlyn here, we should see that there is more evidence for my 
position than against it.
19
 
    
III. The Discovery and Justification of Principles 
 The first main item of evidence for Hamlyn’s position, again, is that the 
genetic account in APo. B.19 prior to100b4 is a poor account of what could justify 
a principle, that it would “scarcely satisfy the sceptic” (Hamlyn, 172). So, Hamlyn 
thinks, it is preferable to take the genetic account prior to100b4 as intended as a 
account of the capacities and states needed by a student for a teacher to employ 
epagôgê (as a dialectical argument) to help the student grasp a principle. It is 
implausible to take the account before 100b4 as a description of the epagôgê 
mentioned at 100b4, since that would strongly suggest that the account prior 
                                                 
19
  I will present and defend a more detailed reading of the genetic account in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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to100b4 is of how we discover and justify principles, making it an implausible 
account that would not satisfy the skeptic (Hamlyn, 181-4).    
 Both T. Engberg-Pedersen (Engberg-Pedersen, 315)
 20
 and Greg Bayer 
(Bayer, 112)
21
 object to this argument. The unstated assumption that Aristotle 
needs to be concerned, in the genetic account, about refuting skepticism to be 
concerned about the justification of knowledge claims is hardly warranted. 
Hamlyn writes that before providing his genetic account, Aristotle asks: “’How do 
the first principles become known and what is the knowing state?’” (Hamlyn, 
181)
22
 Hamlyn adds that Aristotle did not ask: “’How is it possible for them to be 
known?’” (Hamlyn, 181) But as Bayer remarks: 
…in asking how we come to know the principles, Aristotle is here also 
implying the question: How is the knowledge of principles made 
possible? (Bayer, 112, emphasis is in the original) 
 
Bayer is saying that the second question is an obvious implication of the first, and 
this seems to be correct. For it seems to be impossible to answer the question of 
how we come to know the principles without answering the question of how 
knowledge of the principles is possible for us. While Hamlyn seems to be right in 
claiming that Aristotle is not concerned in the genetic account with refuting 
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  T. Engberg-Pedersen, “More on Aristotelian Epagoge,” Phronesis, v.24 (1979), 301-19. Unless 
otherwise noted, any further reference to a work by Engberg-Pedersen will be to this work.  
 
21
  Greg Bayer, “Coming to Know Principles in Posterior Analytics II 19,” Apeiron, Vol. 30, No. 2 
(June, 1997), 109-42. Unless otherwise noted, any further reference to a work by Bayer will be to 
this work.  
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skepticism, it does not follow from this that Aristotle is not concerned in the with 
the justification of knowledge claims. As Bayer writes: 
…one unconcerned with skepticism is still apt to worry about the 
legitimacy of the principles, which are supposed to be ‘truer’ and ‘more 
exact’ than the sciences themselves and the source of one’s 
‘unshakable’ convictions (APo. I 2 72b3-4). (Bayer, 112, fn. 8).
23
 
     
Further, as Bayer observes (Bayer, 112), Aristotle’s suggestion at APo., 99b28-30 
that the grasp of the principles (like epistêmê) must rest on pre-existing 
knowledge further suggests that Aristotle has in mind the question of what 
supports (i.e. justifies) the principles. 
 That Aristotle can hardly be seen to satisfy the skeptic is hardly sufficient 
to negate the strong suggestion of the above evidence that he is concerned in APo. 
B.19 with our coming to know (and hence the justification of) principles. In 
regard to the claim that the genetic account will never fully explain how we come 
to know principles, Engberg-Pedersen says: “This is surely correct, but it is not 
clear that Aristotle claims that much for his genetic account” (Engberg-Pedersen, 
315). As Engberg-Pedersen observes, Aristotle adds the important remark: “…the 
soul is such that it is capable of undergoing this” (APo., 100a13-4, trans. Engberg-
                                                 
23
  Bayer’s reference to APo. A.2 is apparently to this clause: “…anyone who understands [ton 
epistamenon] anything simpliciter must be incapable of being persuaded to change his mind” 
(APo., 72b4-5). This clause is the major piece of evidence for Bayer’s claim that understanding 
(epistêmê) for Aristotle consists of “unshakable” convictions. The major pieces of evidence that 
Aristotle considers the principles of demonstration to be “truer” and “more exact” than what is 
demonstrated can be found in B.19. Aristotle holds that the state of knowledge of principles is 
nous (APo., 100b5-16). He holds that nous is “truer” (alêthesteron) (APo., 100b9-11) and “more 
exact” (akribesteron) (APo., 100b7-9) than epistêmê. Aristotle thus implies that the principles of 




Pedersen in Engberg-Pedersen, 315). “This” refers, evidently, to being aware of 
“primitive universals” that somehow are (or are some) principles. This quote 
indeed suggests that Aristotle is not concerned here with answering skeptics. But 
it also suggests that the claim that the genetic account will never fully explain how 
principles come to be known is not relevant as a piece of evidence that the genetic 
account is not concerned with the justification of knowledge claims. For, as the 
quote indicates, Aristotle evidently does not intend the account to offer such a full 
explanation. But, as the evidence above cited by Bayer indicates, the partial 
explanation indicates that Aristotle, is, in some way, concerned with the 
justification of the principles.  
 
IV. How “Perception Introduces the Universal”  
 This leads us to Hamlyn’s second main item of evidence. Consider 
Passage B (quoted in Section II above) again:  
[B] 
 
[a] Let us say again what we have just said but not said clearly. [b] 
When one of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the soul; for although the particular is 
perceived, the perception is of the universal,--e.g. of man, not of Callias 
the man. [c] Next, a stand is made among these items, until something 
partless and universal makes a stand. E.g. such-and-such an animal 
makes a stand, until animal does; and with animal a stand is made in 
the same way. [d] Thus it is plain that we must get to know the 
primitives by induction [epagôgêi]; for this is the way in which 





On Hamlyn’s reading of this passage (and in particular, statement Bb), we have to 
perceive a particular, as something, as a member of a kind. We, for example, have 
to perceive Callias as a man. Hence, perceiving Callias is enough to grasp the 
universal man (Hamlyn, 181). Given this reading, Hamlyn argues that even if we 
take induction as a process of acquiring knowledge of a universal truth from sense 
experience of particulars, Passage B claims something that conflicts with the 
claim that the senses implant a universal through induction. It claims that a 
universal is implanted directly from the sense perception of (presumably) a single 
particular. Hence, Hamlyn argues, “in this way” (or “this is the way in which,” in 
Barnes’ translation above) must be referring, not to “induction” (“epagôgêi”) at 
100b4, but to the genetic account prior to100b4. (This leaves Hamlyn free to 
argue that the epagôgê mentioned at 100b4 is a dialectical argument—see Section 
V below.)  
 In response to this, we should first reconsider my response above to 
Hamlyn’s citing of his first main item of evidence. Aristotle does seem to be 
concerned in some way in the genetic account with the justification of principles. 
If so, one may not claim that, since epagôgê is a kind of attempt at justification, 
“in this way” at APo., 100b5 must, to avoid the implication that the genetic 
account is concerned with justification, refer back to the genetic account prior 
to100b4 rather than to “epagôgêi” at 100b4. 
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Further, we should consider a crucial part of Passage B, and consider 
whether Aristotle thinks that the sense perception of a single particular is enough 
to implant a universal that the particular instantiates into the mind of the 
perceiver.  Here is the crucial part of Passage B that suggests that sense 
perception of a single particular is a direct means of grasping a universal: 
[C] 
 
[a] When one of the undifferentiated items makes a stand, there is a 
primitive universal in the soul; [b] for although [c] the particular [to 
kath’ hekaston] is perceived, [d] the perception is of the universal [tou 





The first problem with Hamlyn’s reading of this passage is that the text of the 
passage does not seem to support the reading. For if Passage C says that one gets 
the universal through a process that is like perceptual recognition—by having to 
perceive Callias, for example, as a man—then it seems accurate to say that, in the 
act of acquiring the universal man, one’s perception is (for example) of Callias 
the man. Yet this is precisely what Passage C rules out: “…perception is…of 
man, not Callias the man.” 
 To determine how to read Passage C correctly, it is useful to consider 
Aristotle’s views on what is and is not an object of sense perception. The 
grammar of Passage C suggests that Aristotle considers particulars to be the 
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 “[T]he particular is perceived” replaces Barnes’ “you perceive particulars,” and “the perception 
is of the universal” replaces Barnes’ “perception is of universals.” This is done to make the 




objects of sense perception. To see this, consider the translation of this crucial 
part of the passage, Cb-d:  “for although the particular is perceived, perception is 
of the universal…” The Greek for this part is as follows: “kai gar aisthanetai men 
to kath’ hekaston, hê d’ aisthêsis tou katholou estin…” (APo., 100a16-b1) Note 
that the “men-de” construction (rendered by Barnes with “although”) indicates a 
contrast between the “men” clause (Cc) and the “de” clause (Cd).  
Moreover, it seems that the translation of “tou katholou” as “of the 
universal” is correct. For a genitive that does not indicate a temporal clause (as 
this one does not) is almost always translated with “of.”  
 Further, in the translation of the “men” clause as “the particular is 
perceived,” “the particular,” as the passive grammatical subject of the verb “is 
perceived,” denotes the object of the act denoted by that verb.  I think that this is a 
good translation because there is a strong piece of textual evidence that Aristotle 
considers particulars to be the objects of sense perception. The piece of textual 











[a] …actually perceiving is spoken of in the same way as 
contemplation [tôi theorein]. [b] Yet there is a difference between them 
in that those things that are productive of actual perception are external, 
the visible and the audible and in the same way all the other sense-
objects [aisthêtôn]. And the reason for this is that [c] perception 
[aisthêsis] in activity is of particular things [tôn kath’ hekaston], [d] 
knowledge [epistêmê] of universals [tôn katholou], which are in a way 
in the soul itself. [e] Thus it is for a man to think [noêsai], whenever he 
will, but not so for him to perceive, because for that the presence of a 
sense-object is necessary. [f] And this applies in the same way even to 
our knowledge of the sense-objects, and for the same reason, namely 
that [g] the sense-objects are among the particular and external things. 
(DA, 417b19-28)  
 
At first, it may seem that Passage D is not good evidence that Aristotle regards 
particulars to be the objects of sense perception, since statement Dc about actual 




  There is, however, strong evidence in Passage D that Aristotle regards 
particulars to be the objects of perception. For statement De says that sense 
perception requires the presence of a sense-object (aisthêton), presumably within 
the range of sense perception.  
Indeed, Passage D provides strong evidence that for Aristotle only 
particulars are the objects of sense perception. For statement Dg says that the 
                                                 
25
  Again, the Greek for “the particular is perceived” (statement Cc) is: “aisthanetai…to kath’ 
hekaston” (APo., 100a17). The Greek for “the perception is of the universal” (statement Cd), 
again, is: “hê d’ aisthêsis tou katholou estin” (APo., 100a17-b1). The Greek for “perception in 
activity is of particular things” (statement) Dc is: “tôn kath’ hekaston hê kat’ energeian aisthêsis” 




sense-objects are (among) the particular, external things. And this statement tells 
us of a part of one of three distinctions between the objects of sense perception 
and those of epistêmê. First, the objects of the activity of sense perception are 
particulars (presumably, such as Callias the man), whereas those of the exercise of 
epistêmê are universals (presumably, such as man). Second, the objects of the 
activity of sense perception are external to the soul and must be present (meaning, 
presumably, within perceivable range) for a person to be able to actively perceive. 
The objects of the exercise of epistêmê, however, are “in a way” within the soul. 
It seems that according to Passage C, these objects are universal concepts or ideas 
(such as the concept or idea of man) and, as such, are in the mind.
26
  Such 
concepts or ideas (or at least the veridical ones), for Aristotle, would be mental 
grasps of universal kinds in nature.
 27
 Third, because such concepts or ideas are 
                                                 
26
  One might want to insist here that the objects of epistêmê are universal true propositions, not 
concepts, since epistêmê (given its technical definition in the Posterior Analytics) consists of 
conclusions (which are propositions) of demonstrations. One should, however, bear in mind two 
considerations. First, even if epistêmê is taken in that technical sense, it does not mean that the 
“objects of epistêmê” in Passage C are necessarily propositions. For “objects of epistêmê” is a 
rather vague expression (even if “epistêmê” is taken in the technical sense), and it is conceivable 
that Aristotle could consider universals such as man (which, as things “in the soul” would be 
concepts or ideas) to be objects of epistêmê. For a conclusion of a demonstration must consist of 
one or more universal concepts. And the genetic account in APo. B.19, which gives man and 
animal as examples of universals, suggests that Aristotle considers universal concepts as important 
to nous (and, as a consequence, to epistêmê, which is supposed to be based on nous).   Second, 
even if we grant that the “objects of epistêmê” in Passage C are universal propositions, Passage C 
would still indicate that sense perception is not sufficient to grasp universal concepts. For, again, 
universal propositions that would be the objects of epistêmê would consist of one or more 
universal concepts. And it is implausible to think that Aristotle would think that epistemonikoi 
propositions are “in a way in the soul,” but that universal concepts that make up these propositions 
are completely external to the soul as sensible objects are.       
 
27
  One might object here that since Passage D is about epistêmê and Passage  C is fairly clearly 
about nous, Passage D is discussing different universal objects (those of epistêmê) than Passage C 
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“in the soul,” the person who possesses them can think when he or she wishes; 
unlike actual sense perception, actual thinking is not dependent on the presence of 
external objects.
28
 Such distinctions strengthen the suggestion that only particular, 
external things are the objects of perception.  
Given that Aristotle thinks that only particulars are the objects of sense-
perception,
 29
 it is clear that in statement Cc, the particular is the object of sense 
perception. It is thus also evident that the clause implies that sense perception is 




                                                                                                                                     
(which is on those of nous). (See APo., 100b5-17 where Aristotle says that the state of having 
principles is nous, and contrasts nous with epistêmê (among other states).) However, even if one 
takes “epistêmê” in Passage D in the technical sense of the Posterior Analytics (i.e., as the 
cognitive product of an explanatory demonstration),  one should bear in mind that the principles of 
demonstration include (or are the same as) the ultimate premises of demonstration. As each such 
ultimate premise would be a two term proposition, and it is from these that the conclusions that 
constitute epistêmê are deductively derived, the universal terms of epistêmê are also the universal 
terms of nous.  
  
28
  It may, however, be the case that Aristotle thinks that actual thinking (at least when it is not 
entirely introspective) depends on the existence, if not the presence, of external objects which are 
natural kinds.   
 
29
  It seems that “sense-object” in Passage C should cover both particular qualities that are each 
apprehended by a certain sense organ and substances (as particular matter-form composites) that 
are apprehended by the “common sense.” For since qualities must be “present in” substance 
particulars (as per the Categories), if particular sense qualities must be present for a person to 
perceive, then particular (matter-form) substances that can be sensed must also be present.   
 
30
 This is further supported by the fact that APo. B.19 at 99b35-100a10 indicates that all animals 
have sense perception but not all animals have faculties beyond sense perception. If particulars are 
the objects of sense perception, and some animals have only sense perception as a cognitive 
faculty, then the suggestion is that sense perception is all that is needed to perceive particulars. See 
also Passage E from On the Soul below, which makes the similar claim that all animals have sense 




By contrast, in the translation of the “de” clause (statement Cd) as “the 
perception is of the universal,” it is rather clear “the universal” is not intended to 
denote the object of perception.
31
 If particulars for Aristotle are the only objects of 
sense perception and we bear in mind that there is a contrast intended between the 
“men” and “de” statements (statements Cc and Cd respectively), “the universal” 
in statement Cd, for the clause from Cb-d to make sense, cannot denote the object 
of sense perception. What exactly statement Cd amounts to, I will discuss in 
Chapter 4. For now, I simply maintain that in statement Cd, the universal is not 
the object of perception (i.e. that “tou katholou” in that clause in not intended to 
be in the genitive of object).
32
  
But given that Aristotle does not think that universals are objects of sense 
perception, does Passage C still not suggest that the sense perception of a single 
particular is enough to implant a universal in the soul? That is, does it still not 
suggest that sense perception introduces the universal without any ampliative 
induction?  
Given my criticisms so far of Hamlyn’s first and second main items of 
evidence, I do not think we have good grounds to read Passage C in such a way. 
                                                 
31
  Put differently, it seems clear that “tou katholou” in the clause is not intended to be in the 
genitive of object.  
 
32
  However, given all the evidence that Aristotle considers only particulars to be the objects of 
perception, “tôn” from “tôn kath’ hekaston” from statement Dc (see fn. 25) should be considered 
to be in the genitive of object.  In a similar statement in APo. A.18 (“…perception is of the 
particulars…” (APo., 81b6,  trans. mine), where the Greek is: “tôn… kath’ hekaston hê 




Hamlyn, and others who read Passage C in Hamlyn’s way,
33
 may be reading 
statement Cd that “the perception is of the universal” in a particular way. They 
may think the statement can be re-worded as: “One perceives the universal of the 
particular.”  (An instantiation of this statement would be: “One perceives man of 
Callias.”) However, apart from the question of whether this is accurate as just a 
re-wording of the statement from Passage C (which is doubtful), there are two 
problems with reading the statement in this way. The first is that, according to this 
alleged re-wording, one perceives the universal (for example, man). And, as I 
provide evidence for, Aristotle does not think that universals are objects of sense 
perception. In Passage C itself, Aristotle says that the particular is perceived. 
Second, in connection with that evidence provided, the accurate statement to 
ascribe to Aristotle would be something like one of the following: (1) “One thinks 
(noêi) the universal of the particular.” (2) “One predicates (katêgorêi) the 
universal of the particular.” (3) “One knows (gnôrizei) the universal of the 
particular.” But it seems that none of these can be proffered, with even remote 
plausibility, as just re-wordings of the statement Cd that “the perception is of the 
universal.” And so such alleged re-wordings of that statement can hardly be used 
as evidence for reading Passage C as saying that acquiring a universal involves 
something like perceptual recognition.  
                                                 
33
  Barnes reads clause Cb-e in the same way as Hamlyn does. See Barnes, 266.  
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Further, an earlier part of the genetic account indicates that (at least 
typically), many sense perceptions—not just one—are required to grasp a 
universal. After Aristotle’s statement that all animals (including humans) have 
sense perception, but that only some animals can retain percepts
34
 in memory, 
Aristotle states the following:      
[E] 
 
…from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from 
memory (when it occurs in connection with the same item), experience 
[empeiria]; for memories which are one in number form a single 
experience. And from experience, or from all the universal which has 
come to rest in the soul (the one apart from the many, i.e. whatever is 
one and the same in all these items), there comes a principle of skill or 
understanding… (APo., 100a3-8) 
 
The suggestion of Passage E in connection with what is stated just before it is that 
to grasp the universal man, for example, one must perceive many men (not just 
Callias or any one man), and retain perceptions of men in memory. Such retained 
percepts form an experience (an empeiria), and the experience gives one the grasp 
of the universal man. (I will discuss shortly the “principle” that Passage E claims 
comes from a universal.) How does this affect our reading of Passage C? The first 
sentence of Passage B (of which Passage C is a part), again, is: “Let us say again 
what we have just said but not said clearly” (APo., 100b14-5).  As this sentence 
indicates, Passage B is a restatement of an earlier part of the genetic account. 
                                                 
34
  A “percept” in the genetic account is, presumably, an object of sense perception, and  Passage 
E indicates, something retained in memory.  I will discuss this in more detail in my reading of the 
genetic account in Ch. 4.  
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Hence, given Passage E, we do not have good grounds to read Passage C as 
claiming that the sense perception of a single particular (such as Callias) 
immediately gives one a universal (such as man). For as Passage E suggests, 
multiple sense perceptions of instances of the universal must be retained in 




 Hamlyn himself thinks that according to Passage E, one needs to perceive 
and retain in memory many instances of a universal one has already grasped in 
order to come to recognize them as instances of the universal. This creates a state 
(hexis) of mind that is needed by a student for a teacher to be able to use a 
dialectical epagôgê to get the student to grasp a propositional principle of 
demonstration (Hamlyn, 176-7, 181-2). But Passage E does not indicate that one 
begins the process with a universal concept already acquired, or that one acquires 
it from perceiving just one instance. Whatever the details of the correct reading of 
Passage E, the cognitive progression indicated by that passage is from perception 
to memory, from memory to an experience (empeiria), and from an experience to 
a universal.   
                                                 
35
  As Richard McKirahan remarks about taking Passage C to claim that the perception of a single 
particular immediately instills a universal, “…if perception does so much, what need is there for 
memory and experience?” (McKirahan (1992), 253). (Richard D. McKirahan, Jr., Principles and 
Proofs: Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 




At this point one might object that the genetic account still does not seem 
to indicate ampliative induction as the means of coming to know principles. For it 
appears to describe of process of grasping universal concepts from sense 
perception, whereas ampliative induction consists of discovering (or purporting to 
discover) a general truth (and a truth is a proposition) from sense perception.  
 I think there are, however, three considerations that indicate that we 
should read the genetic account as not just about grasping concepts, but also about 
grasping certain general propositional truths connected to the concepts grasped. 
First, near the beginning of APo. B.19, Aristotle asks the questions how the 
principles (archai) get to be known and what is the knowing state (APo., 99b18-
9). He then says that “…this will be plain from what follows when we have first 
set out the puzzles” (APo., 99b19-20), indicating that this is what the rest of the 
chapter seeks to answer. This strongly suggests that after the “puzzles” about 
coming to know principles are set out at 99b20-35, Aristotle seeks to answer those 
two questions. As states of knowledge are explicitly discussed at 100b5-17, it 
appears that the genetic account (at 99b35-100b5) seeks to answer the first of the 
two questions. And there is a strong suggestion early in the Posterior Analytics 
that the “principles” (“archai”), “primitives” (“prôta”), and “immediates” 





 This suggestion seems to be confirmed—or at least not 
contradicted—in B.19: “I have said earlier that you cannot understand anything 
through a demonstration unless you know the primitive immediate principles” 
(APo., 99b20-3, emphasis added). 
 Second, APo. A.4 apparently requires that the predication in an ultimate 
premise of demonstration is an essential (i.e., definitional) predication.
37
 If 
propositional principles that are ultimate premises of demonstration are 
definitional truths, we can plausibly read the genetic account as about how we 
acquire concepts and certain definitional propositional truths connected with a 
grasped concept.  
 Third, the last sentence of Passage E says that from the grasp of a 
universal, “…there comes a principle of skill or understanding…” (APo., 100a6-
9), which can be taken as claiming that from a grasped universal concept, one gets 
a propositional principle about that concept.  
                                                 
36
  Early in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle states: “…demonstrative understanding 
[epistêmên]…must proceed from items which are true and primitive [prôtôn] and immediate 
[amesôn]…There can be a deduction if these conditions are not met, but there cannot be a 
demonstration…” (APo., 71b20-4, emphases added). A little later, Aristotle indicates that he uses 
the terms primitive (prôton), immediate (ameson), and principle (archê) interchangeably: “To 
proceed from primitives is to proceed from appropriate principles (I call the same things primitives 
and principles). A principle of demonstration is an immediate proposition [protasis]…” (APo., 
72a7-9, emphasis added). 
 
37
  In particular, the requirement at APo.,73a35-b5 that the predication hold kath’ auto (“in itself”) 
of the subject indicates this. This passage indicates that the predication holds kath ‘auto of the 
subject if the predicated term is in the “what it is” (i.e., definition) of the subject, or if the subject 
is in the “what it is” of the predicated term.  
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 At the end of Passage B is a statement (which is Passage A) of how 
“primitives” are acquired:  
[B] 
 
[a] Let us say again what we have just said but not said clearly. [b] 
When one of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the soul; for although the particular is 
perceived, the perception is of the universal,--e.g. of man, not of Callias 
the man. [c] Next, a stand is made among these items, until something 
partless and universal makes a stand. E.g. such-and-such an animal 
makes a stand, until animal does; and with animal a stand is made in 
the same way. [d] Thus it is plain that [100b4 begins here:] we must get 
to know the primitives by induction [epagôgêi]; for [100b5 begins 
here:] this is the way in which perception instills the universal. (APo., 
100a14-b5, trans. Barnes modified) 
 
While the suggestion by the passage that the “primitives” are concepts like man 
and animal, the three considerations above indicate that it should be read also as 
an account of how we acquire certain propositional principles that are 
definitionally connected to the concepts acquired.
38
 Hence, from the grasp of the 
concept man, one gets a definitional principle like, “All (or most)
39
 men reason.” 
From the grasp of the concept animal, one gets a definitional principle like, “All 
(or most) animals have sense perception.” Hence, the genetic account up to its end 
                                                 
38
  And hence, Aristotle may have a wider sense of “primitive” (“prôton”) which includes both 
object items (including concepts) and ultimate premises (i.e., propositions) of demonstration, and 
a narrower sense that refers only to the ultimate premises of demonstration.  Similarly, he may 
have two senses of “principle” (“archê”) which are synonymous to the first and second sense of 
“primitive” respectively.  
 
39
  I will begin some expressions of putative Aristotelian propositional principles with “All (or 
most)” to accommodate the view, discussed in Ch. 1, Section I, that the principles Aristotle claims 
are only “for the most part” are ones for which, perhaps among other things, the quantifier is 




(i.e., the end of Passage E) should be seen as not just about acquiring concepts 
(though this seems clearly involved), but correlatively indicating a process of 
ampliative induction that yields certain definitional, propositional principles 
connected with the concepts grasped.  
We are now in a position to criticize Hamlyn’s position that “epagôgêi” at 
APo., 100b4 (in Passage A) cannot be referring to the genetic account prior 
to100b4, since the Passage C claims that sense perception of a single particular is 
enough to grasp a universal. As I have argued, Passage C should not be taken as 
claiming that sense perception of a single particular alone is enough to grasp the 
universal. This leaves out memory and the need for an experience consisting of 
many percepts, expressed earlier in the genetic account.  
     And, if we recognize that, then the genetic account can be seen as 
description of a process of epagôgê, a process of reasoning from the particular 
(which, in the context of what the genetic account, is perceived) to the universal.
40
 
And given this, it is very unnatural to read “in this way” in Passage A (at APo., 
100b4) as skipping “epagôgêi” at 100b4 and referring back to the genetic account 
                                                 
40
  This, of course, is based on Aristotle’s description of epagôgê (which I discuss in Chapter 2) as 
reasoning from the particular to the universal. One may ask at this point whether the genetic 
account as a description of (a kind of) epagôgê would be reasoning to a universal concept or 
proposition. As I have argued above, reaching concepts like man and animal is in some way 
involved, but reaching definitional propositional principles about the concepts grasped is 
apparently also involved. I agree with Hamlyn’ claim (Hamlyn, 178-9) that in common readings 
of the genetic account, reaching a universal concept in this context is correlative with reaching a 
universal proposition (see fn. 36). But again, I will discuss my reading of the genetic account in 




prior to100b4. For epagôgê is clearly a “way.” And if “in this way” at 100b4 is 
supposed to skip the way mentioned at 100b4—epagôgê—and refer back to the 
genetic account prior to100b4, we should expect Aristotle at 100b4 to have said 
“in that way” (“ekeinô”) instead of “in this way” (“houtô”). But “in this way” 
(“houtô”) is what Aristotle does say at 100b4.
41
  
 Thus, contrary to Hamlyn, the common reading of the genetic account as a 
description of the epagôgê mentioned at APo., 100b4 is evidently the correct way 







                                                 
41
  “Houtos” is a demonstrative pronoun, usually translated as “this,” which refers to something 
near in place, time, or thought (Smythe, 307). (Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press), 1972. Any further references to Smythe will be to this work.) 
“Ekeinos” is a demonstrative pronoun, usually translated as “that,” which refers to something 
more remote in place, time, or thought. “Houtô” is an adverbial form of “houtos,” often translated 
as “in this way.” “Ekeinô” is an adverbial form of  “ekeinos,” often translated as “in that way.” 
(See Smythe, 100-1. See also Liddell-Scott, 238, 580.)  
 
42
  Evidently, then, epagôgê (that is based on sense perception) is Aristotle’s short answer to his 
first question at APo., 99b18-9, namely, how we come to know the principles. Hence the 
following objection does not seem to be a good one. In his claim in Passage E that from the grasp 
of a universal, “…there comes a principle of skill or understanding…” (APo., 100a6-9), Aristotle 
may mean that once a universal concept is grasped, a definitional principle about the concept is 
grasped by “analytically unpacking” the concept, so the definitional principle is not obtained by 
induction. Recall the indication I give earlier (see fn. 36, 37, and 38) that the genetic account is not 
just concerned with the acquisition of concepts but also of propositional principles. His short 
answer at the end of the account of how the archai (apparently, both concepts and propositional 
principles), again, is evidently epagôgê.  Aristotle in the account does not make any exception for 
propositional principles, by saying (for example) that these are reached by “analytical unpacking” 
rather than by epagôgê.   
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V. Epagôgê and Dialectic 
 We can now turn to Hamlyn’s third and fourth main items of evidence. 
His third main item of evidence is, again, that Aristotle in the Metaphysics credits 
Socrates with the discovery of epagôgê, who, Hamlyn claims, used it as a 
dialectical argument, not as ampliative induction. The fourth main item is that the 
discussion in APo. B.19 of coming to know principles, in which epagôgê is 
involved, seems to refer back to A.1, which is a chapter that suggests that for 
Aristotle both syllogistic and epagogic arguments are offered in a dialectical 
(teacher-student) context.  
Further, APo. A.1 and (apparently) B.19 refer to the problem in Plato’s 
Meno, A.1 explicitly and B.19 implicitly. And, in connection with the first two 
main items of evidence, Socrates in the Meno appears to use epagôgê in a 
dialectical context, as an argument applying a general principle to particular 
cases. Further, APr. B.21 explicitly refers to the Meno, and suggests that epagôgê 
is an argument consisting of a general principle being applied to a particular case.   
With regard to these two main items of evidence, we should first note my 
defense above of the common reading of the genetic account of APo. B.19 as a 
description of epagôgê used to obtain principles. If the genetic account is a 
description of epagôgê used to obtain principles, then at least sometimes (i.e., at 




Second, two remarks made by Richard McKirahan appear to be correct.
43
 
First, while Aristotle in the Metaphysics does credit Socrates with the discovery 
of epagôgê, it is not clear that Aristotle means to credit Socrates for the features 
Hamlyn thinks are essential to Aristotelian epagôgê (at least as it occurs in APo. 
B.19). These features are: being dialectical, and involving an application of 
general principles to particular cases (McKirahan (1983), 3). McKirahan seems to 
be correct in regard to this claim and we will consider some evidence shortly that 
Aristotle does not think that being dialectical and involving an application of a 
general principle to cases are essential to epagôgê. Second, even though APr. 
B.21 and APo. A.1 make explicit reference to the Meno, we may still doubt that 
for Aristotle all epagôgê fits the model of the Meno, i.e. is a dialectical argument 
involving the application of a general principle to one or more particular cases 
(McKirahan (1983), 3-4).
44
 Let us consider why.   
In addition to my defense above of the common reading of the genetic 
account in APo. B.19, the following passage from APr. B.23 provides some 
evidence that Aristotle did indeed consider some epagôgê to be ampliative 
induction: 
                                                 
43
  The remarks are in Richard D. McKirahan, Jr., “Aristotelian Epagoge in Prior Analytics 2.21 
and Posterior Analytics 1.1,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), 1-
13. Any further reference to McKirahan (1983) will be to this work. 
 
44
  McKirahan (McKirahan, 1-13) classifies Aristotelian epagôgê into four classes. However, we 







…we have conviction about anything either through deduction 
[sullogismos] or from induction [epagôgê]. (APr., 68b13-4) 
 
Smith translates “pisteuomen” at 68b13 as “we have conviction.” The relevant 
Liddell-Scott definition for the entry “pisteuô” is: ”—to trust, trust to or in, put 
faith in, rely on, believe in a person or thing…” (Liddell-Scott, 641). Smith 
translation seems apt because, as the context indicates, Aristotle is referring to 
reasoning (syllogistic or epagogic) as the basis of something. And Aristotle surely 
knows that some beliefs held by some people are arbitrary, i.e. not based on any 
reasoning.
45
 So, rendering “pisteuomen” as “we have belief” would seem to be 
less than adequate. Further, rendering “pisteuomen” as “we trust,” “we rely on,” 
or “we put faith in” would not be plausible, as the preceding context indicates. For 
what is immediately before that quoted passage is the following: 
[G] 
 
But now it should be explained that not only dialectical and 
demonstrative deductions [sullogismoi] come  about through the figures 
previously mentioned, but also rhetorical ones, and absolutely any form 
of conviction [pistis] whatever, arising from whatever discipline. (APr., 
68b9-13)  
 
                                                 
45
  Consider, as an example of evidence for this, a statement from the Physics about what a person 
offering a theory should do: “…he should not make any mere assumption or lay down any 
unreasoned axiom, but should employ either inductive [epagôgên] or demonstrative [apodeixin] 
reasoning” (Phys., 252a23-5). This passage strongly suggests the recognition that a person is 




As its surrounding context indicates, Smith’s translation of “pistis” here as 
“conviction” is apt, since the passage is about reasoning.
46
 Hence, in Passage F, 
taking “pisteuomen” as “we trust,” “we rely on,” or “we have faith in” would 
seem to introduce an odd shift in subject-matter—a shift to matters of trust, 
reliability, or faith. So, again, Smith’s translation of “pisteuomen” in the first 
quoted passage as “we have conviction” seems correct.  
 Consider Passage F again. If Aristotle meant by “epagôgê” in that passage 
what Hamlyn suggests he must have meant, the passage would not be plausible. 
For then, the passage would claim that we have any conviction through deduction 
or through dialectical argument that consists of the application of a general 
principle to one or more particular cases. Given Aristotle’s sense-based 
epistemology, it is not plausible that the conviction that all normal humans have 
two eyes, for example, comes from a dialectical argument consisting of an 
application of a general principle to particular cases. At least, it is not plausible 
that such a conviction usually comes about that way. Aristotle must have known 
that children, for example, typically have such a conviction, and that it is not 
likely that that a child obtains it through a dialectical argument (with a teacher or 
                                                 
46
  The relevant Liddell-Scott definition of “pistis” here is: generally persuasion of a thing, 
confidence, assurance…” (Liddell-Scott, 641) 
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 The same applies to the conviction that all normal horses have four legs, a 
conviction which, like the last, would probably be common in Aristotle’s time. It 
is hardly plausible that this conviction would usually be reached by a dialectical 
argument consisting of the application of a general principle to particular cases. 
Aristotle must have been aware that, in the minds of most people, this conviction 
did not come from deduction.
48
  
 The problem of ascribing to Aristotle these highly implausible positions is 
solved if we take “epagôgê” in the passage in the more general way than what 
Hamlyn suggests, so that the term includes induction as a process of discovery. 
The convictions that all normal humans have two eyes and that all normal horses 
have four legs would probably have been reached by most people in Aristotle’s 
time as children, through ordinary (and perhaps naïve) processes of ampliative 
induction from sense perception. The claim that Aristotle would have been aware 
of this is plausible; its denial is not.    
                                                 
47
  If Aristotle thinks there can be epistêmê consisting of such a conviction, then he would think 
that, as epistêmê, it comes about from demonstrative (apodeictic) deduction.  
 
48
 Again, in the conceivable case that Aristotle thinks that there can be epistêmê consisting of such 
a conviction, then he would think that, as epistêmê, it would come about from demonstrative 




 Now consider Hamlyn’s claim that APo. B.19 refers back to A.1, which 
discusses arguments in a teaching-and-learning context (and so the epagôgê of 
B.19 should be taken as a dialectical argument). What I have argued so far 
indicates that while B.19 may be connected to A.1 (and I think it clearly is), the 
beginning of A.1 should not (and need not) be taken as claiming that all 
arguments are part of a teaching and learning context. Clearly, the chapter 
indicates that Aristotle thought that some epagogic arguments are part of such a 
context. So, we can imagine a situation in which a student has percepts 
accumulated in memory (as the genetic account of B.19 suggests) but has not 
him- or herself drawn the inductive conclusion—the principle (archê)—that all of 
what is near is non-twinkling. The teacher can offer an epagôgê to get the student, 
on the basis of his or her pre-existing perceptual cognitions, to see the truth of that 
principle. It would seem that in most cases, however, the student can complete the 




 Further, the mention of epagogic arguments in APo. A.1 at 71a5-11 is not 
necessarily referring only to epagôgê used to reach principles of demonstration 
(of the reason why
50
). Evidently, Aristotle thinks that some claims reached by 
                                                 
49
  My reading, so far, of the genetic account suggests that this is the normal occurrence. 
  
50
  Throughout most of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle seems to call “demonstrations” what in 
APo. A.13 he calls “demonstrations of the reason why.” These are contrasted in that chapter with 
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epagôgê, such as the claim that “the moon waxes in this way,” can also given an 
explanatory demonstration, and are not themselves principles of explanatory 
demonstration.
51
 Hence, we are not justified in using APo. A.1 as necessarily 
evidence about the nature of the epagôgê mentioned in APo. B.19. This weakens 
the claim that since A.1 is discussing teaching and learning, it is evidence that the 
epagôgê mentioned in B.19 is a dialectical one employed in a teaching-learning 
context.   
 We can now consider Hamlyn’s items of evidence that corroborate the last 
two main items of evidence. 
 One such corroborating item is Hamlyn’s reading of the passage at APo., 
81b6ff. According to Hamlyn, this passage states that “one cannot have episteme 
of particulars— 
for neither can one get to them from universals (sc. universal 
propositions) without epagoge, nor can one get to them through 
epagoge without sense-perception. (APo., 81b7-9, trans. Hamlyn in 
Hamlyn, 169-70) 
 
                                                                                                                                     
“demonstrations of the fact,” which are valid syllogistic deductions and have true premises like the 
former, but do not have an explanatory middle term. 
 
51
  See APo. A.13, 78b3-11.  Aristotle gives this example of a “demonstration of the fact”: all of 
what waxes in this way is spherical ; the moon waxes in this way; so, the moon is spherical (APo., 
78b4-7). “The moon waxes in this way” would, apparently, be reached by an epagôgê consisting 
of observing the shape of the lighted part of the moon on different nights, and then drawing the 
conclusion that it “waxes in this way.” But apparently, this epagogic conclusion would not be a 
principle of a demonstration (of the reason why). For his suggestion of a corresponding 
demonstration of the reason why is: all of what is spherical waxes in this way; the moon is 
spherical; so, the moon waxes in this way (APo., 78b6-11). “The moon waxes in this way” is not 
and cannot be a principle of this demonstration of the reason why (for otherwise this attempted 
demonstration would beg the question).   
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According to Hamlyn, this passage, says, more specifically,  
…that the application of general principles to particular cases 
presupposes epagoge and that the application of epagoge itself 
presupposes sense-perception. The latter is true when epagoge is 
considered as a form of argument—the use of cases in general 
argument presupposes sense-perception as a means of getting 
experience of the cases. (Hamlyn, 170)  
 
Hamlyn’s reading of the passage at APo., 81b6-9 depends on his translation and 
his translation is questionable. To evaluate Hamlyn’s translation, we should 
consider the Greek from the OCT: 
tôn gar kath’ hekaston hê aisthêsis · ou gar endechetai labein autôn tên 
epistêmên · oute gar ek tôn katholou aneu epagôgês, oute di’ epagôgês 
aneu tês aisthêseôs. (APo., 81b6-9) 
 
This passage is at the end of the short chapter APo. A.18 (which is at 81a37-b9). 
Before this passage, Aristotle presents a conditional claim, which I have presented 
in Ch. 1:  
It is clear too that if some perception is wanting, some understanding 
[epistêmê] must also be wanting—understanding which it is impossible 
to get if we learn either by induction [epagôgêi] or by demonstration, if 
demonstration depends on universals and induction on particulars, if it 
is impossible to study universals except through induction…and if it is 
impossible to make an induction without having perception… (APo., 
81a37-b6)  
 
Barnes’ translation of APo. A. 18 up to this point seems consistent with (though 
not necessarily indicative of) Hamlyn’s reading of the rest of the chapter. As such, 
Barnes’ translation up to this point seems uncontroversial. We can now consider 
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the rest of Ch. A. 18 quoted in Greek above. A translation of it, more literal than 
either Hamlyn’s or Barnes’, would be as follows: 
For perception is of things that are particular: for it is not possible to 
get understanding [epistêmên] of them, neither from the universal 
without induction [epagôgês], nor through induction without 
perception. (APo., 81b6-9, trans. mine)  
 
While this translation might be consistent with Hamlyn’s reading of the passage, 
it does not suggest his reading as his translation does. And, yet, there does not 
seem to be any reason why one should want to translate it Hamlyn’s way, other 
than to suggest his reading of the passage.  
 A more straightforward way of reading APo. A.18 (which I have used in 
Ch.1) is to take it as claiming the following. Understanding (epistêmê) depends on 
epagôgê, since epagôgê is used to reach principles of understanding (viewed as 
identical to or including the ultimate premises of demonstration).  And, epagôgê 
depends on sense perception. So, if sense perception is lacking, understanding 
will be lacking. Given my defense above of the common reading of the genetic 
account of APo. B.19 as a description of epagôgê used in reaching principles of 
demonstration, this reading of APo. A.18 is not only more straightforward, but 
also more consistent than Hamlyn’s with B.19.  
 We can now consider the second passage that Hamlyn considers in 
connection with his last two main items of evidence. At APo., 78a30-4, Aristotle 
seeks to “demonstrate the fact” that all planets are near through their not 
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twinkling. Aristotle needs to establish the premise that all of what is non-
twinkling is near. He says of this premise: “(Let this be assumed through 
induction [epagôgês] or [ê] through perception.)” (APo., 78a34-5) Hamlyn’s 
position regarding this passage, again, is that “[w]hether the ‘or’ is an ‘i.e.’ or 
whether it expresses a genuine alternative,” the passage cannot be taken as 
guaranteeing that epagôgê is ampliative induction (Hamlyn, 169). For even if 
epagôgê is a dialectical argument, it can surely still make use of facts of sense 
perception (Hamlyn, 169).  
 Hamlyn’s argument here does not clinch the claim that the epagôgê 
mentioned here is a dialectical argument. But in connection with other items of 
evidence he offers, he is right to want read the passage in this way. However, in 
light of the criticisms already made of other items of Hamlyn’s evidence, there 
does not seem to be any good reason to think that “epagôgês” here does not mean 
ampliative induction, or at least denote a wider concept that includes ampliative 
induction. For it is conceivable that Aristotle thinks that in some cases, a person 
may have the relevant sense experience and from that draw the conclusion that all 
of what is non-twinkling is near. But he may think that in other cases, a person 
has the relevant sense experience, but needs to be persuaded through a dialectical 
epagôgê based on that experience. Hence, it is perhaps most reasonable to think 
that “epagôgês” here is a general concept that subsumes both ampliative and 
dialectial induction.       
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 We can now consider the third passage that Hamlyn interprets in 
accordance with his last two main items of evidence. It is the passage at EN, 
1139b28ff. Again, this passage suggests that epagôgê is the archê (principle or 
origin or starting point) of to katholou (the universal), and that sullogismos 
(including apodeixis) is ek tou katholou (from the universal). Hamlyn says that 
this does not necessarily suggest that epagôgê is merely a process of discovering 
something general or universal (Hamlyn, 171).  
 Again, given the criticisms made of Hamlyn’s other items of evidence, it 
is reasonable to think that “epagôgê” here at least includes ampliative induction 
(in addition to dialectal induction).
52
 In particular, this is the only way to make 
this passage consistent with my defense of the common reading of the genetic 
account in APo. B.19 as a description of the epagôgê used to reach principles of 
demonstration.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Hamlyn’s claims of evidence in “Aristotelian Epagoge” that the epagôgê 
of APo. B.19 is a dialectical argument rather than what is described by the genetic 
account prior to100b4 do not ultimately seem to be correct. On the contrary, it 
                                                 
52
  A similar claim can be made about the passage at Top. I, 105a13-6 which suggests that epagôgê 
is proceeding from particular facts to a universal proposition. Although the subject matter of the 
Topics is dialectic, and Aristotle is concerned there with specifically with epagôgê that is dialectic 
(rather than epagôgê in general), observe that this passage does not explicitly define epagôgê 
dialektikos but merely epagôgê. Hence it is reasonable to think that this definition is intended to 
subsume both non-dialectical and dialectical epagôgê.   
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seems there is more real evidence for the common reading that the genetic 
account prior to100b4 as a description of the epagôgê at 100b4, used to reach and 
justify principles of demonstration. As APo. A.1 at 71a1-11 might be taken to 
suggest, there may be some cases where a student has begun a process of 
ampliative induction, as per APo. B.19, by retaining certain percepts in memory 
and forming an experience, but needs a teacher to offer a dialectical inductive 
argument to complete the ampliative induction. But the evidence indicates that the 
epagôgê of APo. B.19 in essence is (or involves) a process of inductive discovery 
and justification based on sense perception. 
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Chapter 3: Responses to Evans and Harari 
 
I. Introduction 
 Melbourne Evans and Orna Harari each interpret the genetic account of 
APo. B.19 as claiming that nous is a faculty that allows one to grasp a universal 
from the sense perception of just one particular, as per their reading of the “for” 
clause in Passage C: 
[Cb-e]:  
 
…[b] for although[c] the particular is perceived, [d] the perception is of 
the universal,—[e] e.g. of man, not of Callias the man. (APo., 100a16-




Evans and Harari are not unique in this respect (and we have already seen 
that Hamlyn also seems to take Passage C as claiming that the sense perception of 
just one particular is enough to instill the universal in the mind). However, my 
responses to Evans and Harari are complex in a certain way. For both, my 
response consists in part, as we will see, in resolving a certain contradictory triad 
with regard to what Aristotle held: 
 
 
                                                 
1
  “[T]he particular is perceived” replaces Barnes’ “you perceive particulars,” and “the perception 
is of the universal” replaces Barnes’ “perception is of universals.” This is done to make the 





(a) Epagôgê is the means of coming to know principles (as indicated 
by APo. B.19).  
(b) Epagôgê is a kind of logos (as indicated by various texts). 
(c) Nous, not logos, is the means of coming to know principles (as 
indicated by the passage from EN, 1143a35-b4).
2
 
I will discuss this triad, its relevance to the positions of Evans and Harari, and, in 
particular, the evidence that Aristotle held (b), in more detail below. As a result of 
this commonality, and because, as with Hamlyn, it is helpful to clear away their 
interpretations of the genetic account (insofar as they conflict with my own) 
before presenting my own complete reading of the account, I will consider 
respond to the positions of both Evans and Harari in this chapter. Then, in Ch.4, I 
will offer my complete reading of the genetic account. 
 
II. A Response to Evans  
 As the title indicates, Melbourne Evans' article “Causality and Explanation 
in the Logic of Aristotle”
3
 discusses the role of causality in Aristotelian 
                                                 
2
  Also, my claim is not that Evans and Harari explicitly introduce this triad as a puzzle to be 
solved (in fact, neither of them do). My claim is that my responses to them in large part, as we will 
see, consists in resolving this contradictory triad.  
 
3 
The article is Melbourne G. Evans, “Causality and Explanation in the Logic of Aristotle,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 19, No. 4 (June, 1959), 466-85. Unless 




demonstration. When he considers the genetic account in APo. B.19, his main 
conflict with my reading of it pertains to Passage C. Here is the passage again: 
[C] 
 
[a] When one of the undifferentiated items makes a stand, there is a 
primitive universal in the soul; [b] for although [c] the particular [to 
kath’ hekaston] is perceived, [d] the perception is of the universal [tou 





 As with Hamlyn, Evans reads Passage C as saying that the sense 
perception of a single particular is enough to instill the universal subsuming it in 
one’s mind. On Evans’ reading, the sense perception is enough for one to reach a 
universal truth. After mentioning the rout metaphor in Ch. B.19, Evans writes: 
However, induction for Aristotle is not a matter of mere repetition of 
experience. Although he speaks of repeated instances of a thing 
eliciting a knowledge of the universal, still the universal is manifest in 
its entirety in the particular object: “Though the act of sense-perception 
is of the particular, its content is the universal—is man, for example, 
not the man Callias.” A single act of perception, therefore, may be all 




For Aristotle, according to Evans, repetition of instances is not of any use for 
introducing (or showing the veracity of) the universal, but is of use to elucidate 
the universal. Given this, Aristotle recognizes no problem of induction: 
                                                 
4
  “[T]he particular is perceived” replaces Barnes’ “you perceive particulars,” and “the perception 
is of the universal” replaces Barnes’ “perception is of universals.” This is done to make the 
translation more closely reflect the Greek. 
 
5
 Note Evans’ translation of a part of Passage C here. I will discuss the correctness of his 
translation after discussing his reading of the passage. For, as we will see, his translation clearly 




Since the universal is given with the particular, it follows that induction 
is not a matter of mere enumeration. No repetition of instances can 
elicit the universal. The repetition can only elucidate, clarify what is 
already there. Hence the validity of a universal premise is not such that 
it can be killed by an unhappy particular. The untimely arrival of the 
traditional black swan is beside the point, and the mortality of man is 
not tied to the fate of Socrates. (Evans, 484) 
 
Evans provides some support for his reading of Passage C from APo. B.2, where, 
at 90a26ff, Aristotle says (or seems to say) that if we stood on the moon during an 
eclipse, by just perceiving that the earth is screening sunlight from the moon, we 
would grasp a universal truth (Evans, 480-1). Evans further cites in a footnote a 
passage in A.31 (at 88a13ff) where Aristotle says that an act of vision, such 
seeing light pass through pores in glass (assuming such vision were possible), 
would be enough to give us the universal generalization that this must happen in 
all such cases.
6
   
 Evans recognizes that Aristotle considers particulars to be the objects of 
sense perception and universals to be the objects of epistêmê (Evans, 479-80). If, 
then, epagôgê beyond the survey of one instance is only for the further 
elucidation, not the justification, of a universal claim, how does one come to 
know the universal ultimate premises of demonstration with certainty? Evans’ 
answer is that nous for Aristotle is rational intuition and allows one to grasp with 
certainty the truth of a universal ultimate premise of demonstration from the sense 
perception of just one instance (Evans, 481, 484). Evans’ support for this 
                                                 
6
  Evans makes this citation on p. 481, fn. 49.  
103 
 
conception of nous (apart from the fact that it would seem to answer the question 
of how Aristotle thinks the truth an ultimate premise of demonstration could be 
grasped with certainty) comes from the Nicomachean Ethics. In EN VI.6, 
Aristotle writes the following: 
[H] 
 
…comprehension [nous] is concerned with ultimates [eschatôn] in both 
directions; for both the primary definitions and the ultimates are objects 
of comprehension and not of argument [logos], and in demonstrations 
comprehension grasps the unchangeable and primary definitions, while 
in practical reasonings [praktikais] it grasps the last [tou eschatou] and 
contingent fact, i.e. the second proposition. (EN, 1143a35-b4) 
 
Evans, plausibly, takes this passage to state (in part) that the major ultimate 
premise of a demonstration is obtained by nous as rational intuition, and to 
suggest that the minor ultimate premise of a demonstration is also so obtained 
(Evans, 481). It is significant that this passage contrasts nous and logos, lending 
support for the position that it is not reasoning or argument that provides certainty 
of the truth of ultimate premises of demonstration, but intuition that does so.  
 The main conflict between Evans’ and my view of induction in the genetic 
account of APo. B.19 pertains to Evans’ claim that Aristotle regards nous (as 
intuition) as the means of attaining certainty of a universal generalization from 
sense perception (and so there is no problem of induction for Aristotle). I deny 
that Aristotle considers nous to have such a function. I will thus consider this 
claim by Evans first. Related to this claim is Evans’ view that in Aristotelian 
104 
 
induction, sense perception of just one particular fact is needed to justify a 
universal claim, and that adducing of particular facts beyond the first serves only 
to elucidate, not justify, the universal claim. I will consider this claim by Evans 
second.   
 Again, the main piece of textual evidence that Evans’ relies on for this 
claim is Passage H. The passage treats nous as a faculty and contrasts nous and 
logos, suggesting that the function of justifying principles of demonstration 
belongs not to argument (whether inductive or deductive) but to an intuition that 
provides the basis of sound argument. There is also an earlier passage in the 
Nicomachean Ethics which suggests nous is a faculty for grasping principles 
(archai) of demonstration: “…it is comprehension [noun] that grasps the first 
principles [archôn]” (EN, 1141a7-8).  
 This view, taken by Evans, of the function of nous implies that for 
Aristotle, the truth of principles is grasped with certainty by nous, not by any 
logos, including any epagogic logos.  
This, however, comes into conflict with other textual evidence. As I have 
argued earlier (in Ch. 2 on Hamlyn), the genetic account of APo. B.19 describes a 
process of epagôgê based on sense perception for getting to know (gnôrizein) 
principles.  
Further, there seems to be unassailable evidence that Aristotle regards 
epagôgê as a kind of logos.  Aristotle apparently regarded the genus of both 
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sullogismos and epagoge to be logos in the sense of “reasoning” or “argument.” 
Recall the quote from APr. A.2 that contains Aristotle’s definition of sullogismos: 
…a deduction [sullogismos] is an argument [logos] in which certain 
things being supposed, something different from the suppositions 
results of necessity through these things being so. (APr., 24b18-20) 
 
 According to that definition, the genus of sullogismos is evidently logos. 
Similarly, consider the passage quoted in that section from APo., 71a5-9. The 
clause just before it is: “Similarly with arguments [tous logous] both deductive 
[hoi dia sullogismôn] and inductive [hoi di’ epagôgês]:…” (APo., 71a5-6, 
emphasis added) This clause strongly suggests that Aristotle regarded sullogismos 
and epagôgê as the two main sorts of logos.
7
 The passage quoted in Ch. 1 from 
Top., 105a10-4 similarly suggests that Aristotle regarded sullogismos and 
epagôgê as the two main sorts of dialectical logos. Finally, the passage quoted in 
Ch. 1 from Rhet., 1356b12-9 suggests that Aristotle regarded sullogismos (as 
enthumêma) and epagôgê (as paradeigma) as the two sorts of rhetorical logos.  
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 That is, Aristotle seems to divide logos into other classes as well, such as demonstrative, 
dialectical, and rhetorical. But none of these classes seem to extend beyond sullogismos and 
epagôgê, (e.g., he does not seem to recognize any dialectical argument that is neither epagogic nor 
deductive). With regard to the issue of whether one is reasoning to or from the more universal, 




(a) Epagôgê is the means of coming to know principles (as indicated 
by APo. B.19).  
(b) Epagôgê is a kind of logos (as indicated by various texts). 
(c) Nous, not logos, is the means of coming to know principles (as 
indicated by the passage from EN, 1143a35-b4).
8
   
I have presented a lengthy argument in defense of (a) (in Ch. 2), and there is much 
textual evidence for (b). If one seeks to deny (b), the denial seems, in particular, 
to contradict the passages from Top., 105a10-4 and  Rhet., 1356b12-9, both of 
which, evidently, treat logos as the genus of epagôgê.
9
    
With regard to (c), however, I maintain that we can deny it and that the 
evidence that Aristotle held (c) can be understood in a way to make it consistent 
with his holding (a) and (b). My reasons are as follows. After presenting my 
reasons, I think it will be clear that it is better—more consistent with the textual 
evidence—to deny (c) in the manner I suggest than (a) or (b).  
My denial of (c) consists in denying that “logos” in the text used to 
support (c) has the same sense that it does in (a) and (b). If we take the sense of 
                                                 
8
  Of these three theses, Evans seems to deny that Aristotle holds (a), but he does not state this 
explicitly in his paper. Moreover, it is clear that Evans thinks that for Aristotle, epagôgê does do 
some work in coming to know a principle: epagôgê introduces the universal upon the sense 
perception of a single instance, and continuing the epagôgê (i.e. adducing more instances) serves 
to elucidate or clarify the universal. But certain knowledge of the truth of a universal principle is 
obtained through nous, not epagôgê.   
  
9
  The Topics passage seems to be definition of dialectical epagôgê, and the Rhetoric passage is a 
description of rhetorical epagôgê. But, as both passages treat the kind of epagôgê being discussed 




“logos” in (c) as “explanatory account,” (whereas “logos” in (b) has the sense of 
“reasoning”) we no longer have a contradictory triad. And, in APo. B.19, there 
seems to be strong evidence that Aristotle in some contexts uses “logos” in the 
former sense. Consider this argument from that chapter that the principles 
(archai) of demonstration are objects of nous (rather than epistêmê): 
[I] 
 
…the principles [archai] of demonstration are more familiar, and all 
understanding [epistêmê] involves an account [esti meta logou]. Hence, 
there will not be understanding of the principles; and since nothing 
apart from comprehension [noun] can be truer than understanding, 
there will be comprehension of the principles. (APo., 100b9-12) 
 
This passage says that epistêmê involves logos, or in a more literal translation, 
that epistêmê is with logos. Given the conclusion that “there will not be 
understanding of the principles,” the premise that a state of knowledge with logos 
is not of the principles appears to be tacitly presupposed. Given the last 
conclusion that “there will be comprehension [nous] of the principles,” it is 
implies that nous is not with logos. This appears to agree with Passage H, if we 
take “logos” in both passages to have the same sense. But what is logos here in 
Passage I? Given my defense in Ch. 2 of the view that, according to APo., B.19, 
the principles of demonstration are grasped by epagôgê based on sense 
perception, i.e. that (a) is true, and given all of the evidence that Aristotle held (b) 
(where “logos” is reasoning or argument”), it is not plausible that logos in Passage 
I is reasoning or argument. For evidently Aristotle thinks the principles (in the 
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sense of ultimate premises) are with (i.e., are the results of epagogic) reasoning. 
Given Aristotle’s view that epistêmê—demonstrated knowledge—involves an 
explanation provided ultimately by the principles (in the sense of ultimate 
premises), what is plausible is that logos in Passage I is an explanatory account 
(in the sense of being an ultimate premise of demonstration).
10
 For, if such is the 
sense of “logos” in Passage I, then the claim that epistêmê is with logos and the 
implication that nous is without logos are hardly surprising for Aristotle to make. 
But the claim and the implication are surprising—they seem to be contradicted by 
textual evidence—if we take “logos” in Passage I as reasoning or argument.  
 We can find corroborating evidence for the former sense of logos in 
Passage I within the genetic account of APo. B.19 itself. Within that account of 
how we come to know the principles of demonstration, Aristotle states: 
…some [animals] can still hold percepts in their soul after perceiving 
them. When this occurs often, there is then a further difference: some 
animals come to have an account [logon] based on the retention of 
these items, others do not. (APo., 99b39-100a3) 
 
A little later in the genetic account, Aristotle states the following:  
…from experience, or from all the universal [tou katholou] which has 
come to rest in the soul (the one apart from, i.e. whatever is one and the 
same in all these items), there comes a principle [archê] of skill 




                                                 
10
  Hence, Barnes’ translation of “logou” as “account” appears to be correct. 
 
11




This passage appears to be part of an attempt to explain in greater detail the 
passage at 99b39-100a3 (and what is stated just before it). If we take “archê” in 
this passage as a principle in the sense of an ultimate premise of demonstration (or 
reasoning in technê, as the passage suggests), and the same as the logos 
mentioned in the passage at 99b39-100a3 and Passage I, it helps to make all three 
passages coherent. A principle (in the sense of an ultimate premise) of 
demonstration is a logos (an “explanatory account” for demonstrated knowledge), 
but does not have a logos. And as the state of nous consists in comprehending 
such principles (based on sense experience), it is without, i.e. not based on, such 
logos. But epistêmê, which is founded on the principles, is with such logos.
12
  
Thus, the evidence that Aristotle holds (c) need not be interpreted in a way 
that would make it contradict (a) and (b).  
We can now return to the question of whether Aristotle regards nous as 
direct, rational intuition (as Evans thinks he does)  that allows a person to know 
with certainty the truth of a principle of demonstration, thus allowing Aristotle to  
“solve” (or avoid) the problem of induction.  
 Passage H and the passage from EN, 1141a7-8 suggest that nous is a 
faculty for coming to know principles. However, APo. B.19, appears to explicitly 
regard nous as the state of knowing the principles (and epagôgê based on sense 
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perception as the means).
13
 Combining these statements from the Nicomachean 
Ethics with APo. B.19, the following picture seems to result. Nous in APo. B.19 is 
the state (but not the process) by which we know principles. It is a state which is 
innate in the sense of being a certain innate faculty (dunamis, capacity, 
potentiality), namely sense perception.
14
 As this faculty is used, nous comes to 
consist in cognitive content (percepts, experiences, and principles of 
demonstration) and in capacities beyond sense perception (such as the faculty of 
experience-formation). Since the faculty of nous builds on (and thereby becomes 
more than) the faculty of sense perception, since it comes to include actual 
cognitive content, it is the faculty of providing the principles (archai) for epistêmê 
(demonstrated knowledge). But nous is not the process by which we know 
principles. The process performed by nous, the answer to the first of the two 
questions at the beginning of APo. B.19, is epagôgê based on sense perception. 
This is a picture that resolves the conflict between the claim of APo. B.19 that 
nous is the state of knowing the principles (which evidently, again, is the answer 
to the second of the two questions) and the passages in the Nicomachean Ethics 
which imply that nous is a faculty.    
                                                 
13
  As I mention in Ch. 2, at the beginning of APo. B.19, Aristotle asks the questions of how we 
come to know the principles and what the knowing state is, and says “…this will be plain from 
what follows…” (APo., 99b18-9). And Passage A (presented in Ch. 2) at 100b3-5 evidently gives 
epagôgê (that is based on sense perception) as the answer to the first question, and the passage 
about states of knowledge at 100b5-17 evidently gives nous as the answer to the second question.  
 
14
  In APo. B.19 at 99b35-6, Aristotle states that all animals (and, by implication, humans) are born 
with a faculty (dunamis, potentiality), namely sense perception.  
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Given this, the textual evidence that Evans cites to support his claim that 
nous for Aristotle is intuition that allows one to grasp with certainty a universal 
truth from the sense perception of just one particular fact is suspect. Clearly, there 
is textual evidence that Aristotle, in some way, considers nous to be a faculty, and 
not just a state. But, as I have indicated, the way in which Aristotle seems to 
consider nous to be a  faculty is as a state which is a potentiality (faculty) of 
performing sense-based epagôgê to grasp principles of demonstration. The result 
is nous the state which, in addition to being a potentiality (of sense perception, 
memory, etc), consists in actual cognitive content. Given the sense of “logos” as 
reasoning in general, there is hardly any good evidence to think Aristotle contrasts 
nous and logos in this sense. Hence, the fact that Aristotle takes nous to be a 
faculty (not just a state) cannot by itself be taken as evidence that he takes it as 
non-inferential intuition that solves (or allows one to avoid) the problem of 
induction.  
Evans’ additional piece of evidence for his conception of nous is that it 
would explain how Aristotle could think that one can secure from sense 
perception general principles that are ultimate premises of demonstration. But, in 
the absence of good textual evidence for that conception, there is a problem with 
this additional piece of evidence. Further, in Chapters 4, 5 and 7, I will offer and 
defend my view how Aristotle thinks we can secure such ultimate premises from 
sense-based induction and without an appeal to nous as certifying intuition.  
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Let us now turn to Evans’ claim that epagôgê for Aristotle, insofar as it 
extends beyond one instance, is for elucidation, not justification. This claim, if 
true, would lend some credibility to the claim that Aristotle regards nous as 
intuition that allows one to grasp with certainty a universal truth from sense 
perception. For it seems that in most cases, it is hardly plausible that the sense 
perception of a single instance of a general proposition is enough to secure the 
truth of the proposition.  
I do not seek to deny here that Aristotle might in some contexts treat 
epagôgê as only for elucidation. What I deny is that every instance of epagôgê for 
reaching a principle of demonstration seeks to justify the general conclusion on 
the basis of the sense perception of just one fact.  
Again, Evans’ main evidence for this position of his is a passage he cites 
from the Posterior Analytics about standing on the moon seeing the earth screen 
sunlight from the moon:  
[J] 
 
That the search is for the middle term is shown by those cases in which 
the middle is perceptible. If we have not perceived the middle term, we 
seek it: e.g. we seek if there is a middle term for the eclipse or not. But 
if we were on the moon we would seek neither if there is an eclipse nor 
why there is: rather, these things would be plain at the same time. By 
perceiving we would come to know the universal: perception would tell 
us that the earth is now screening it (it is plain that it is now eclipsed); 




 Again, Evans takes this passage to support his claim that Aristotle thinks that the 
sense perception of only a single particular fact is needed to reach a universal 
truth. (Note the last statement in the passage: “…from this the universal would 
come about.”) To determine whether this passage should be taken as evidence for 
such a claim, we need to consider another passage from a few chapters earlier 
(specifically, Ch. A.31):  
[K] 
 
Particulars must be perceived, whereas we have understanding 
[epistêmê] insofar as we get to know universals.
[15] 
 
This is why, if we were on the moon and saw the earth screening it, we 
would not know the explanation of the eclipse. We would perceive that 
it is now eclipsed, but not why; for we have seen that there is no 
perception of universals. Nevertheless, if we observed this happening 
often and then hunted for the universal, we would possess a 
demonstration; for it is from many particulars that the universal 
becomes plain. (APo., 87b37-88a5)  
 
Passage J, at least on Evans’ reading, seems to contradict Passage K. Passage K 
seems to say that, while standing on the moon and seeing the earth screen the 
sunlight from it, we cannot know the universal causal truth that the earth’s 
screening sunlight from the moon causes a lunar eclipse, unless we saw, from the 
moon, many more instances of this screening. Passage J, however, seems to say 
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  A translation of this “whereas” clause that more literally captures the OCT text is: “…whereas 




that, while standing on the moon, seeing this screening just once would be enough 
for us to reach that universal causal truth.
16
 
 In response to this apparent contradiction, one might be tempted to read 
Passage J and/or K in a way that makes them mutually consistent. One might 
attempt this by reading Passage J as about middle terms that are particulars as 
examples of middle terms that are directly perceived, and Passage K as about 
universal explanations. However, what seems to stifle any attempt to resolve the 
apparent contradiction is the last sentence of Passage J. If the clause “from this” 
(“ek…touto”) in that sentence were instead “from this kind of thing” or “from 
these,” or something similar, we could read that sentence as saying that “the 
universal comes about” from sense perceptions of multiple particulars. This 
would help make Passage J consistent with Passage K’s claim that “it is from 
many particulars that the universal becomes plain” and that many sense 
perceptions from the moon are required to grasp the universal truth about the 
eclipse. However, as the last sentence of Passage J stands, such reconciliation 
seems impossible to perform while staying true to the text.  
                                                 
16
  Apparently, Passage K is saying, in addition, that once the causal truth that a lunar eclipse is 
caused by the earth screening the sunlight from the moon is reached, it will serve as one of the 
premises of a demonstration. Passage J, on the other hand, seems to treat that causal truth as an 
example of a definition (in this case, lunar eclipse is being defined). This is indicated by the fact 
that the material above Passage J at 89b21-90a24, and specifically at 90a15-6 (which says that in 
certain cases what a thing is same as why it is) suggests that Passage J is concerned with finding 
out what a lunar eclipse is. However, the fact that the two passages appear to have different 
concerns does not erase the appearance of a contradiction between them.  
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 However, even if the two passages cannot be read as entirely consistent 
with each other, Passage J still does not seem to provide the evidence that 
according to Aristotle, the sense perception of only a single particular is needed to 
grasp a universal truth. To see this, we need to consider what comes shortly after 
the earlier passage, Passage K. Passage K, right after describing how the universal 
truth about the eclipse is reached, ends with the clause: “…for it is from many 
particulars that the universal becomes plain.” In the same chapter as Passage K 
(Ch. A. 31), shortly after that passage, Aristotle writes the following:  
[L] 
 
Thus it is clear that it is impossible to understand anything 
demonstrable by perceiving it—unless you say that possessing 
understanding through a demonstration is perceiving.  
 
Nevertheless, certain features in problems are referred to want of 
perception. In some cases if we saw we should not seek—not because 
we have knowledge [eidotes] by seeing but because we grasp the 
universal from seeing. E.g. if we saw the glass to be perforated and the 
light coming through it, it would be plain why it does—even if we saw 
each piece of glass separately whereas we think at a single time that it 
is thus in every case. (APo., 88a9-17)   
 
What exactly this passage is claiming, and its exact relation to Passage K, is not 
clear. However, we should first note that the statement after “unless you say that” 
presents what is, for Aristotle, a falsehood. For, earlier in this chapter, Aristotle 
states that “[y]ou cannot understand anything through perception” (APo., 87b28). 
A little later, Aristotle says that  
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…it is clear that you cannot understand anything through perception. 
Rather, it is plain that even if we perceive that triangles have angles 
equal to two right angles, we would still seek a demonstration and 
would not, as some people say, already understand it. (APo., 87b33-7)  
 
Note also the first sentence of Passage K, which follows this passage. Hence, it is 
clear that Aristotle intends the statement following “Thus” in Passage L to be true.  
 Second, whatever is the exact, correct reading of Passage L, it appears to 
make an exception—or certain exceptions—to Passage K’s claim that “it is from 
many particulars that the universal becomes plain.” If we could see a single 
particular instance of light passing through pores in glass, Passage L seems to say, 
we would grasp the universal explanation of why glass is transparent.  
 As stated earlier, Evans cites the second part of Passage L as evidence that 
Aristotle considers the sense perception of a single particular fact as sufficient to 
reach with certainty a universal truth. However, again, if Passage L is considered 
in the context of what comes before it, including Passage K, it appears to be 
making a kind of exception to the rule that “it is from many particulars that the 
universal becomes plain.” 
 Evans might want to read L as saying that the sense perception of one 
particular fact is enough to grasp and fully justify a universal truth, and Passage K 
as saying that many particular facts are needed to elucidate a universal truth. In 
other words, Evans might read Passages L and K as each concerned with two 
different kinds of epistemic goals (the former with justification, the latter with 
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elucidation). However, the texts of and surrounding those two passages do not 
seem to make any such distinction in the way that Evans needs.
17
 The chapter of 
those two passages, APo. A.31, and the immediately previous chapter, A.30 
(discussed in my Ch. 2 on Hamlyn) are evidently about the perceptual basis of 
demonstration, and hence, about justification. Further, both passages discuss 
reaching the universal in terms of it becoming “plain” (“dêlos”). Passage K says: 
“…it is from many particulars that the universal becomes plain.” (Emphasis is 
added.) Passage L says: “…if we saw the glass to be perforated and the light 
coming through it, it would be plain why it does…” (Emphasis is added.) If the 
two statements are concerned with two different kinds of epistemic goals, it is 
extremely unclear of Aristotle to describe the universal in both statements as 
becoming dêlos. This rather suggests that in each of the statements, he has the 
same kind of epistemic concern in mind.
18
  
 Still another reason to consider both Passage K and L to be concerned 
with the same kind of epistemic goal is that this will help us reconcile Passage K 
with the later Passage J. If we consider Passage J to make an exception to Passage 
                                                 
17
  In fact, if the two passages do appear to suggest such a distinction, it would seem that it is 
Passage J, the passage apparently about the perception of a single particular fact being enough, as 
being about elucidation. Consider this sentence form Passage J: “Nevertheless, certain features in 
problems are referred to want of perception.” One might try to read this sentence as shifting the 
concern to elucidation or clarification.  
 
18
  Nor does the use of “dêlos” in both statements indicate that he is concerned with elucidation (as 
against justification) in both statements. For it is far from clear that the word “dêlos” refers to 
lucidity as distinct from the state of being justified. And as I have argued, both Ch. 30 and 31 (the 
chapter of both Passages K and L) are evidently about justification. 
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K, to say that there are certain cases where we can reach the universal through the 
sense perception of a single particular,
19 
we can consider Aristotle in Passage J to 
merely be changing his mind about the lunar eclipse example. Given this reading, 
Aristotle is not in Passage K necessarily serious that one cannot while standing on 
the moon grasp the universal cause of a lunar eclipse by perceiving a single 
instance of the earth screening sunlight from the moon. He is merely using that 
claim as an off-hand example of the principle that usually “it is from many 
particulars that the universal becomes plain.” In Passage J, given this reading, the 
lunar eclipse example is now used as an example of the exceptional kind of cases. 
He seems to say that standing on the moon, seeing a single instance of the earth 
screening the sunlight from the moon is enough to grasp the universal cause of a 
lunar eclipse. But, again, this claim is being used as an example; Aristotle is not 
necessarily convinced of its truth.
20
 The upshot is that, on this reading, Passages K 
and J do not contradict one another. Both agree on the principle that usually “it is 
from many particulars that the universal becomes plain.” One passage merely uses 
the lunar eclipse scenario as an example of the rule; the other modifies it to use it 
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  Barnes (2002), 194, reads the beginning of the second paragraph of Passage J as saying that 
although perception is not sufficient to grasp the universal cause, it is necessary. However, the Part 
of Passage J beginning with “if we saw we should not seek…” also suggests that there are certain 
cases in which a single perception is enough for us to grasp the universal cause.    
   
20
  It is hard to say which of the two example-providing claims Aristotle would consider true. It 
seems as though he must consider one and only one to be true. Charity would suggest the former, 
since, if the question is the cause of a lunar eclipse, there does not seem to be any way to know, 
from just one observation while on the moon, that it is always the earth screening the sunlight that 




as an example of an exceptional kind of case. Given my prior argument that the 
example-providing claims of Passages K and J do not seem to be reconcilable, 
this seems to be the most coherent reading of Passages K, L, and J. And, with this 
reading, we have, it seems, two sound criticisms of Evans’ view: (1) as argued 
earlier, Evans would not seem to be justified in taking Passage K as about the 
elucidation (as against justification) of a universal claim through the sense 
perception of many particular facts, but taking Passage J as about the justification 
of a universal claim through the sense perception of a single particular fact.  
Again, both passages, it seems, are about justification.
21
 (2) Evans does not seem 
to be justified in taking Passages L and J as evidence that Aristotle regards a 
single perception of a fact to always be sufficient to fully justify a universal claim. 
Again, our reading indicates that for Aristotle, this is the exception rather than the 
rule.   
 Thus, as I have argued in the last chapter on Hamlyn, it seems that 
contrary to Evans, we are not justified in reading Passage C as claiming that the 
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  However, they are not necessarily not also about elucidation; Aristotle might consider the 
perception-based justificatory process to also be an elucidating process.   
  
22
  See, in particular, Ch. 2, Section IV, where I indicate that an earlier part of the genetic account 
suggests that many percepts are needed for form an experience, and that from this a universal and 
a propositional principle of demonstration is obtained.  
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 In conclusion, Evans does not appear to be justified in his view that for 
Aristotle, induction of a universal claim based on the sense perception of a single 
particular fact, through the use of nous as certifying rational intuition, secures the 
truth of the claim. The claim that nous for Aristotle is certifying rational intuition 
is highly suspect. And, though Aristotle may think there are cases where one can 
generalize with certainty from the sense perception of a single fact, it appears that 
he thinks that such cases are the exception and not the rule. As a result, Evans’ 
translation of the Greek for the clause Cb-e does not seem to be correct. His 
translation, again, is:   
Though the act of sense-perception is of the particular, its content is the 
universal—is man, for example, not the man Callias. (APo., 100a16-b1, 
trans. Evans in Evans, 480)  
 
The Greek for this passage is:  
kai gar aisthanetai men to kath’ hekaston, hê d’ aisthêsis tou katholou 
estin, hoion anthrôpou, all’ ou Kalliou anthrôpou… (APo., 100a16-b1) 
 
Evans’ translation of this passage does not closely reflect the Greek. (There is, for 
example, no Greek word or phrase in the passage for “content.”) And given my 
criticisms above of Evans’ view of Aristotelian induction, Evans’ translation of 
this passage does not appear to be justified. For, as I argue, this passage should 
not be read as claiming that the sense perception of a single particular fact is 
sufficient to secure the truth of a universal claim. My modification of Barnes’ 





…for although the particular is perceived, the perception is of the 
universal,—e.g. of man, not of Callias the man. (APo., 100a16-b1, 
trans. Barnes modified)  
 
As such, my modification of Barnes’ translation of this passage is preferable to 
Evans’ translation.  
 
III. A Response to Harari 
 Orna Harari in Knowledge and Demonstration
23
 presents a view of 
induction in the acquisition of principles (as presented in APo. B.19) similar to 
that of Evans. I will respond  to Harari’s view insofar as it conflicts with my own. 
 First, Harari appears to think that APo. B.19 is about the acquisition of 
concepts as against propositions (Harari, 19-20, 30). She makes a distinction 
between apparently inductive processes described in Met. A.1 and APo. B.19: 
…the identity between these two processes does not hold for their 
results. The process described in Metaphysics I.1 leads to universal 
judgments, such as “this medicine has done good to all persons”, 
whereas in the Posterior Analytics II.19 the process leads to universal 
concepts such as “man” or “animal”. (Harari, 19-20)  
 
Harari further corroborates her claim by noting that Aristotle in APo. B.19, with 
its question of how principles come to be known, is concerned about the parodox 
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  Orna Harari, Knowledge and Demonstration: Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004). Unless otherwise noted, any further reference 
to a work by Harari will be to this work.  
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in Meno, and Plato’s Meno is clearly about the knowledge of universal ideas 
(concepts), not propositions (Harari, 30).  
 For my response to this position, please note the textual evidence I have 
pointed out (in my response to Hamlyn in Ch. 2) that the genetic account in APo. 
B19 is about the acquisition of both concepts and correlative propositional truths. 
Clearly, APo. B.19 is about reaching concepts like man and animal. However, the 
fact that Aristotle’s explicit examples in that chapter of items reached are man and 
animal does not clinch the case that the chapter is concerned with the acquisition 
of concepts as against that of propositional truths. Yet that is what Harari seems 
to think in making her distinction in the quote above between APo. B.19 and Met. 
A.1.  
 Turning now to Harari’s corroborating evidence from the Meno, we 
should note that that work and its paradox are not about the acquisition of 
concepts as against that of propositional truths. It is evidently about both. 
Consider, for example, when Socrates asks initially at 71d2ff what virtue is. 
Socrates and Meno are, in some sense, seeking to grasp or understand or clarify a 
concept—virtue. But the answer to Socrates’ question would be a proposition of 
the form: “Virtue is P.” Further, when Socrates interrogates Meno’s slave boy, the 
paradox that Socrates, in effect, introduces is that learning presupposes that one 
lacks the knowledge that one is seeking to learn—but that to lack this knowledge 
is not to know what one is seeking. Hence, learning is impossible (if one does not 
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know what one is seeking) or it is unnecessary. Socrates’ solution is that 
knowledge, or even true opinion, does not come from learning but from 
recollection. (See Meno, 81e6-86a2.) Socrates’ questions are about concepts such 
as square or triangle, but the slave boy’s answers to his questions are, in effect, 
propositions.   
 In short, Harari’s claim that “the intellect [nous] grasps essences and not 
judgments” (Harari, 37) does not appear to be true for Aristotle, just as it does not 
appear to be true for Plato. For both, it seems, the grasp of an essence occurs 
correlatively with the grasp of a propositional truth.  
 Second, Harari claims that for Aristotle the grasp of principles (which in 
her reading are just concepts) is not through reasoning. Harari claims that the 
epagôgê employed in the grasp of a principle is not an argument or an inference 
(Harari, 20-1, 24-5). Recall the contradictory triad introduced in connection with 
my criticism of Evans’ view: 
(a) Epagôgê is the means of coming to know principles (as indicated 
by APo. B.19).  
(b) Epagôgê is a kind of logos (as indicated by various texts). 
(c) Nous, not logos, is the means of coming to know principles (as 
indicated by the passage from EN, 1143a35-b4).   
My view, again, is that we can and should deny (c), if we take “logos” in (c) to 
have the same sense that it has in (b). By contrast, Harari’s view is that we should 
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deny (b). Her view is that epagôgê in coming to know principles is not a kind of 
logos (Harari, 20-1). 
Harari adds, as a reason in support of her view, the following:  
In Posterior Analytics II.19 Aristotle characterizes knowledge 
[epistêmê] as accompanied by inference (meta logou), arguing that 
there is no knowledge [epistêmê] of the first principles (100b10-11). 
Although Aristotle in this passage does not explicitly claim that the 
cognition of first principles by the intellect [nous] is not argumentative, 
the distinction between knowledge [epistêmê] and intellect [nous] 
implies that this is one of the characteristics that distinguish these two 
mental states. (Harari, 20) 
 
 Harari’s claim here (along with Passage H from the Nicomachean Ethics) seems 
to support (c) from the contradictory triad.  
 Harari’s second additional reason for denying (b) is that it would make 
sense of epagôgê discussed in APo. B.19 as a means of reaching universal 
concepts rather than justifying propositions. For, as we have seen, she thinks that 
chapter is concerned with reaching concepts and not propositions. And, she thinks 




 With regard to Harari’s first additional supporting reason, I do not think 
that her reading of the passage at APo., 100b10-1 as saying that epistêmê is 
accompanied by inference (with the implication that the principles are not reached 
                                                 
24
  Harari’s view is that the epagôgê discussed in APo. B.19 consists in grasping the form of an 
ultimate particular, and hence grasping the universal predicate, the “what it is,” under which the 
particular falls. Epagôgê in this use is not an argument and is solely for acquisition (of concepts), 
not for justification. See Harari, 24-30. 
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by inference) is correct. For as I have argued in Section II on Evans above, a 
better way of reading that passage is as saying that epistêmê is accompanied by 
logos, where logos here should be understood as an explanatory account. The 
implication is that a principle does not have an explanatory account. As I have 
argued above, it is more plausible to deny (c) (assuming “logos” in (c) has the 
sense of “reasoning”) rather than (b).  
 But in order to plausibly deny (c), we also need to counter Harari’s second 
additional supporting reason. I will note again that I have provided evidence in 
Ch. 2 that the genetic account of APo. B.19: that it concerns our coming to know 
concepts and correlatively of certain propositional truths, not of one or the other 
alone. Given this, Harari’s premise that “argumentative induction does not form 
content but justifies already given content” does not seem as though it is correct. 
For induction in coming to know a truth (as a truth) would consist also in 
justifying (not just grasping) the conclusion. And, it would be an argument, since 
there would be premises (such as this is an emerald and is green, that is an 
emerald and is green, etc.) and a conclusion. The argument may not be one that is 
fully articulated. The particular premises would likely only be implicit in sense 
perceptions (and this, it seems, is the kind of epagôgê discussed in APo. B.19). 
Further, the inducer may not be self-consciously aware that his mind is engaged in 
argument. However, it is implausible to think that for Aristotle (and indeed for 
most of us) not being aware of what something is changes what it is.   
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 This seems to discredit Harari’s second additional reason for denying (b). 
The sole reason left is that the denial of (b) would resolve the contradictory triad. 
But without the two additional supporting reasons, my argument above that it is 
most plausible to deny (c) to resolve the contradictory triad still stands.  
 Harari’s third point of conflict with my view is her view that the genetic 
account of APo. B.19 is not concerned with methodology or justification. Noting 
that near the beginning of that chapter Aristotle asks how one comes to know the 
principles and what the state of knowing them is, she gives (what she takes as) 
Aristotle’s answer to the first: 
[M] 
 
Thus the states neither belong in us in a determinate form, nor do they 
come about from other states that are more cognitive; but they come 
about from perception… (APo., 100a10-11, trans. Harari in Harari, 30) 
 
In connection with this as the answer to Aristotle’s first question, Harari argues: 
In this passage Aristotle reiterates his answer to how the first principles 
become known [gnôrimoi]. It indicates that this question does not 
concern a method or process of concept acquisition. Maintaining the 
correlation between Aristotle’s question and answer, it seems that the 
question: “How do the first principles become known [gnôrimoi]?” is 
to be construed as equivalent to the question of whether knowledge 
[gnôsis] of the first principles is innate. Indeed, this question is phrased 
explicitly in the second paragraph of the Posterior Analytics II.19, 
where Aristotle asks “whether the states are not present in us but come 




                                                 
25
  By her claim in this quote that Aristotle’s answer in Passage M to his question of how we come 
to know the principles “does not concern a method or process of concept acquisition,” Harari 




Harari is surely correct to think that Aristotle’s first question in some way 
concerns whether the principles are innate or acquired, for APo. B.19, and 
especially the evidence from it that she herself cites, makes this inescapable. What 
I disagree with is her claim that the first question should be understood as 
equivalent to the question of whether the knowledge of the principles is innate. As 
others point out, one who is asking how one comes to know principles that are 
“truer” and “more exact” than what is demonstrated, as the foundation of what is 
supposed to be a kind of unshakeable knowledge (epistêmê), is apt to be 
concerned about the justification of the principles.
26
 Further, to repeat an 
observation from Ch. 2, Aristotle’s suggestion at APo., 99b28-30 that the grasp of 
the principles (like all knowledge) must in some way rest on pre-existing 
knowledge further suggests that Aristotle has in mind the question of what 
supports (i.e. justifies) the principles.
27
 Indeed, the question of justification, it 
seems, is implicit in the very question of how one comes to know the principles.
28
  
 Thus, it is hardly plausible to take the question quoted at the end of the 
quote from Harari above as equivalent to and an explicit rephrasing of the first 
                                                                                                                                     
question before it about how we come to know the principles is asking whether the principles (i.e., 
concepts) are innate or not, not what the specific method or process of acquiring them is.   
 
26
  Again, see, for example, Bayer, 112, fn. 8.  
 
27
  Again, see Bayer, 112.  
 
28




question of APo. B.19. The former is better understood as a major (perhaps the 
major) subsidiary question of the latter.  
 Again, given my reading of the genetic account, Aristotle’s answer to the 
first question of APo. B.19, the question of how one comes to know the 
principles, is epagôgê based on sense perception.
29, 30
  
 Harari’s last point of conflict with my view concerns her reading of 
Passage C, a reading which is similar to that of Hamlyn and Evans. Passage C, 
again, is:  
[C] 
 
[a] When one of the undifferentiated items makes a stand, there is a 
primitive universal in the soul; [b] for although [c] the particular [to 
kath’ hekaston] is perceived, [d] the perception is of the universal [tou 
katholou],—[e] e.g. of man, not of Callias the man. (APo., 100a14-b1, 
trans. Barnes modified) 
 
Harari’s reading of this passage is based on her peculiar and closely interrelated 
conceptions of “perception” (“aisthêsis”) and “induction” (“epagôgê”) in APo. B 
19. According to Harrari, there is a sense of “perception” (which she calls 
“inductive perception”) in that chapter that is intellectual (i.e. nous-performed) 
                                                 
29
  Hence Harari’s conclusion in Harari, 36 that epagôgê in APo. B.19 is not a process of 
justification seems incorrect.  
 
30
  Harari has a view of Aristotelian epagôgê in APo. B.19 that is different from my own. See fn. 
24 and Harari, 35. This view, however, depends on her view that principles in APo. B.19 are 
concepts and not propositions, and that this is what that chapter is concerned with. However, I 
have already criticized the latter view. Passage A (presented in Ch. 2, Section I) from the genetic 
account (in connection with my criticism in Ch. 3 of Hamlyn’s  view of the role of epagôgê in the 
genetic account) seems to make clear that the genetic account is a description of the epagôgê used 




perception rather than sense perception (Harari, 34-5). As a result, Harari thinks 
that the term “perception” (“aisthêsis”) in the statement Cd that “perception is of 
the universal” has a different sense from “perception” whose object is a particular 
(which is the sense of “perceived” in statement Cc). The sense of statement Cc is 
sense perception; the sense of statement Cd is “inductive perception” (Harari, 31-
2). “Inductive perception” consists of nous grasping, in the sense perception of a 
particular, the universal form of that particular (Harari, 34-5). Harari evidently 
thinks that the sense perception of a single particular is always all that is needed 
for the “inductive perception” of the universal form (Harari, 32-3). Obviously, 
this reading of Passage C conflicts with my own. 
Her argument for this is essentially in three parts. 
She first argues that Aristotle recognizes a sense of “induction” that is like 
perceptual recognition, such that, upon the sense perception of a triangle, one 
grasps that it is a triangle. For textual evidence, she refers to the passages in APo. 
A.1 (at 71a17ff) and APr. B.21 (at 67a21ff) that suggest something like the 
perceptual recognition of a triangle as having angles equal to two right angles, and 
suggest that this is epagôgê (Harari, 25-30).  
To answer the question of how epagôgê that is like perceptual recognition 
would fit Aristotle’s description of it as an advance from the particular to the 
universal, Harari appeals to Met. Z.17. There Aristotle discusses questions like 
“Why is this a statue?” and “Why is this a house?” Apparently, Aristotle thinks 
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that such questions are about formal cause or explanation and amount to: “Why is 
this mass of bronze a statue?” and “Why is this collection of wood, metal, and 
concrete a house?” The answers to such questions would be: because the mass of 
bronze, or the collection of wood, metal, and concrete, has a certain shape and 
structure (i.e., a certain form).  
Harari thinks that here, in Met. Z.17, Aristotle is discussing a process of 
cognition that consists in recognizing the universal form of a collection of matter 
(such a bronze, or a mix of wood, metal, and concrete) upon perceiving that 
collection with one’s senses (Harari, 27-8). Harari thinks that this is a type of 
epagôgê for Aristotle that is non-argumentative. She thinks that this is the sort of 
epagôgê Aristotle has in mind in the passages in APo. A.1 and APr. B.21(Harari, 
27-30). And, she thinks it fits Aristotle’s description of advancement from the 
particular to the universal since it consists in advancing cognitively from the sense 
perception of a particular parcel of matter to the recognition of a universal form 
(Harari, 29-30).  
For the second stage of her argument, Harari argues that Aristotle upholds 
a certain kind of perception which is not sense perception and which she calls 
“inductive perception.” These “inductive perceptions” consist in “induction” in 
the sense that she claims in the first stage of her argument that Aristotle upholds. 
She thinks that the “inductions” (epagôgai) in the passages in APo. A.1 and APr. 
B.21 involve this inductive perception. To support this claim, she relies on a 
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passage in the Nicomachean Ethics that she takes to imply that there is a sort of 




…practical wisdom [i.e., “phronêsis” at 1142a23] is concerned with the 
ultimate particular [tou eschatou], which is the object not of knowledge 
[epistêmê], but of aisthesis [perception]—not aisthesis of qualities 
peculiar to each sense but aisthesis akin to that by which we perceive 
[aisthanometha] that the particular figure before us is a triangle. (EN, 
1142a26-9, trans. Harari in Harari, 32)  
 
Based on this, for the third stage of her argument, she thinks that, in 
Passage C, the statement Cc that “the particular is perceived” is about perception 
of a different kind than the perception mentioned in the statement Cd that “the 
perception is of the universal.” The first statement is about sense perception. But 
the second is about inductive perception. Hence, in Harari’s reading of Passage C, 
the sense perception of a single particular collection of matter (such as Callias) is 
enough for one to “inductively perceive” its universal kind (such as man). And, 
she thinks that this sense of “induction” (“epagôgê”), the sense she thinks occurs 
in the passages in APo. A.1 and APr. B.21, is the sense used in APo. B.19.  
I will now turn to my response to this three stage argument. 
In the first stage of her argument, her interpretation of Met. Z.17 relies on 
her acceptance (in the contradictory triad) of the claim that (c) nous, not logos, is 
the means of coming to know principles and her rejection of the claim that (b) 
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epagôgê is a kind of logos. It also relies on her view that APo. B.19 is about the 
acquisition of concepts and not propositions. I have already criticized these two 
positions. When we add to this the fact that there is no inflection of “epagôgê” 
found in Met. Z.17, it is not plausible that that chapter is about epagôgê or some 
kind of epagôgê. It is evidently about explanation, or, more exactly, certain 
questions of the form: Why is S P?  There is no indication there that in answering 
a question like “Why is this mass of bronze a statue?” Aristotle thinks some kind 
of epagôgê is necessarily involved, nor, in particular, that Harari’s notion of 
“inductive perception” is involved.  
Without Harari’s reading of Met. Z.17 and the two premises (about the 
contradictory triad, and about concepts as against propositions as the subject of 
APo. B.19) on which it is based, it is very unlikely that the passages in APo. A.1 
and APr. B.21 are about induction in the sense of grasping a universal form in the 
sense perception of a particular. Rather, it seems as though inflections of 
“epagôgê” in those two passages have one of two meanings. There is some 
indication that the meaning is a non-technical one, a “leading on,” in which one is 
led deductively to a conclusion (this seems to be Ross’ view
31
). The second 
possibility is that there is epagôgê in the technical sense of reasoning from the 
                                                 
31
  See Ross (Ross, 476). Given that both the passages in APo. A.1 and APr. B.21 are explicit 
considerations and attempted solutions to the puzzle in the Meno, it is perhaps plausible that 
Aristotle’s uses of “epagôgê” (or its inflections) here are simply in the non-technical sense of the 




particular to the universal. This would consist of moving from a recognition of the 
fact that this is this (i.e., that a particular that one perceives is itself) to a 
recognition of the fact that this is a triangle.
32
 The first fact is particular; the 
second is universal in the sense of having a universal predicate. Such “reasoning” 
would establish the minor premise of the deduction that this has angles equal to 
two right angles.  
With regard to the second stage of Harari’s argument, consider again the 
passage from the Nicomachean Ethics that she relies on: 
[N]  
 
…practical wisdom [i.e., “phronêsis” at 1142a23] is concerned with the 
ultimate particular [tou eschatou], which is the object not of knowledge 
[epistêmê], but of aisthesis [perception]—not aisthesis of qualities 
peculiar to each sense but aisthesis akin to that by which we perceive 
[aisthanometha] that the particular figure before us is a triangle. (EN, 
1142a26-9, trans. Harari in Harari, 32) 
 
Passage N does appear to suggest that we have a kind of perception that is 
different from sense perception. A closer examination, however, will reveal that 
this passage does not provide evidence that Aristotle thinks that we have 
intellectual, nous-performed perception. To see this, we need to consider Passage 
N with the sentence fragment just prior to it: 
                                                 
32
  Note that such recognition is different from Harari’s “inductive perception,” which could 
consist of grasping, for the first time, the concept triangle from the sense perception of a single 
triangle. “Inductive perception” is not exactly the perceptual recognition which consists (for 
example) of applying the concept triangle, which one already has, to this figure. My description of 
a cognitive move from recognition of a particular to a universal fact is also intended to fit the 
definition of epagôgê as a sort of logos, for Aristotle could arguably see this move as a logos, 
though clearly not a deductive logos. Thus, in this respect it also differs from “induction” in 
“inductive perception,” which is supposed to be alogon, and hence non-technical, sort of epagôgê.     
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[N with prior sentence fragment]  
 
It [i.e., “phronêsis” at 1142a23] is opposed, then, to comprehension 
[nôi]; for comprehension is of the definitions, for which no reason 
[logos] can be given, while practical wisdom [i.e., “phronêsis” at 
1142a23] is concerned with the ultimate particular [tou eschatou], 
which is the object not of knowledge [epistêmê], but of aisthesis 
[perception]—not aisthesis of qualities peculiar to each sense but 
aisthesis akin to that by which we perceive [aisthanometha] that the 




Recall Passage C. Passage C, from APo. B.19, is about the knowledge (gnôsis) of 
the principles (archai) of demonstrations and demonstrations yield epistêmê (not 
phronêsis, i.e., “practical wisdom”). APo. B.19 at 100b5-17 calls this state of 
knowledge of the principles “nous” (“comprehension” in Barnes’ translation). 
Thus, if the perception mentioned in statement Cd is intellectual perception as 
Harari claims, it seems that the perception would have to be performed by the 
intellectual faculty which is nous. But the claim of Passage N with the sentence 
fragment just before it is that phronêsis is like perception (aisthêsis), not that nous 
is. Indeed, this passage opposing nous and phronêsis implies that nous is not like 
phronêsis, which implies that nous, unlike phronêsis, may not be like perception.  
 Passage N provides evidence that Aristotle thinks we have intellectual 
perception, or something like perceptual recognition, that is phronêsis (“practical 
wisdom” or “prudence”). But the Posterior Analytics is work on, not phronêsis, 
                                                 
33
  The translation at EN, 1142a25-6 up to “while” (“de”) is by Ross in Aristotle, The Complete 
Works of Aristotle Vol. II (ibid.); the translation at 1142a6-9 from “practical wisdom” (referenced 
by “hê” in the Greek text) is by Harari in Harari, 32. As with “logos” in Passage H above, I have 
already provided evidence that “logos” in this passage is better translated as “account.”  
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but epistêmê and nous, and, again, APo. B.19 is evidently about how we acquire 
the state which is nous and which grounds epistêmê. And it is clear that Aristotle 
thinks that phonêsis is not epistêmê or the state of knowledge that grounds 
demonstrations yielding epistêmê, namely nous.
34
 
We are now set to criticize the third stage of Harari’s argument. The 
grounds, again, that Harari tries to establish for taking Passage C to say that sense 
perception of a single particular is always enough to “inductively perceive” the 
universal are as follows. (1) Aristotle thinks there is a sense of epagôgê 
(induction) which means something like perceptual recognition, except that it 
consists of grasping a universal for the first time. (2) Aristotle thinks we have a 
kind of perception which is not sense perception, but intellectual, nous-performed 
perception. These two grounds, it appears, have been undercut. Further, as I had 
argued earlier, the genetic account itself suggests that this view is wrong: it 
mentions that the katholou comes after sense perception, memory, and experience 
(empeiria) which is formed from many percepts.   
I will make a further criticism of Harari’s reading of Passage C. Given that 
the genetic account begins by discussing a faculty, perception (aisthêsis) that it 
says all animals share (APo., 99b34-5), and that Aristotle does not think all 
                                                 
34
  Passage N with the sentence fragment just before it contains evidence that Aristotle does not 
think that phronêsis is epistêmê ro nous. And, shortly before that passage, Aristotle says: “That 




animals have intellect (noêsis),
35
 the genetic account evidently begins by 
discussing sense perception, not intellectual perception. Moreover, the two 
instances of inflections of “perception” (aisthêsis) in Passage C differ only in that 
the first is a passive verb with its grammatical subject (“to kath’ hekaston,” i.e. 
“the particular”) in the nominative case,  and the second is a noun with its 
modifying adjective (“tou katholou,” i.e., “of the universal”) in the genitive case. 
This is hardly enough to indicate a radical change in the kind of perception from 
the first instance to the second. If, after the beginning of the genetic account in 
Passage C, Aristotle suddenly introduces a kind of perception (intellectual 
perception) different from the kind (sense perception) discussed at the beginning, 
we should expect him to note the difference. Further, Aristotle is typically 
sensitive when words are used in more than one sense. Given his style 
elsewhere,
36
 if Aristotle in Passage C has two kinds of perception in mind, we 
should expect him in that passage to say something like, “Perception, said in one 
way, is of the particular, but said in another way, is of the universal,” or to 
otherwise note that he has introduced another kind of perception. But he does not 
do this.    
                                                 
35
  See, for example, On the Soul III.10: “…many men follow their imaginations as against their 
knowledge [epistêmên], and in the other animals, while there is neither thought [noêsis] nor 
rationality [logismos], there is imagination” (DA, 433a10-3). Indeed, the genetic account of APo. 




  See, for example, DA, 410a14ff, where Aristotle discusses different senses of “that which 
exists” (“to on”), DA, 412a6ff, where he discusses different senses of “substance” (ousia), and 
Met., 1054a33ff where he discusses different senses of “the same” (“henos”).  
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 In conclusion, Harari’s reading of the genetic account conflicts with mine 
in four respects. First, she thinks that the genetic account is about the acquisition 
of concepts and not propositions, whereas I think it is about the acquisition of 
concepts and correlatively of certain propositional truths. Second, Harari thinks 
that for Aristotle, the acquisition of these principles (which she thinks are just 
concepts and not propositions) is not the result of reasoning or argument, whereas 
I think that according to the genetic account the acquisition of principles involves 
(epagogic) reasoning. Third, Harari thinks that the genetic account is not 
concerned with a methodology of acquiring principles or with the justification of 
principles. She thinks the question, asked near the beginning of APo. B.19, of how 
we come to know the principles is intended to be equivalent to the question of 
whether the principles are innate or not. I, however, do think the genetic account 
is concerned with the justification of the principles, and think the question of 
whether the principles are innate or not is intended to be subsidiary, rather then 
equivalent, to the question of how we come to know them. Finally, in Harari’s 
reading of Passage C, Aristotle mentions two kinds of perception: sense 
perception, which is of the particular, and an intellectual, “inductive perception,” 
which is of the universal. I, however, think that statement Cc that “the particular 
is perceived” and statement Cd that “the perception is of the universal” are both 
referring to sense perception.
37
  
                                                 
37
  My position, which I have argued for in Ch. 2 on Hamlyn, is that for Aristotle only the 
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 It appears that for all four points of conflict, I have disqualified, or at least 
significantly undermined, the evidence for her positions. I have presented the 
evidence for my sides of the four points of conflict partly in Ch. 2 on Hamlyn and 
partly in this chapter.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 In Aristotle’s works, there appears to be the following contradictory triad: 
(a) Epagôgê is the means of coming to know principles (as indicated 
by APo. B.19).  
(b) Epagôgê is a kind of logos (as indicated by various texts). 
(c) Nous, not logos, is the means of coming to know principles (as 
indicated by the passage from EN, 1143a35-b4).   
In regard to this contradictory triad, Evans seems to deny that Aristotle holds (a) 
whereas Harari denies that Aristotle holds (b). However, I have defended (mostly 
in Ch.2 on Hamlyn) my claim that Aristotle holds (a), and have provided much 
evidence that he holds (b). We should, however, deny that he held (c) if “logos” in 
(c) is given the same meaning as in (b), i.e. “reasoning.” It is more reasonable to 
hold, instead, that in the evidence taken to support that Aristotle held (c), “logos” 
has a different sense than in other places in his works, the sense of “explanatory 
account.”  
                                                                                                                                     
particular is the object of sense perception. Again, what exactly Cd claims with regard to sense 
perception I will discuss in the next chapter.  
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 In Evans’ interpretation of the genetic account, nous is rational intuition 
which, according to Passage C, allows one to grasp a universal truth as a truth 
from the sense perception of just one particular, thereby solving the problem of 
induction. In Harari’s interpretation, nous is intellectual perception which, 
according to Passage C, allows one to “inductively perceive” a universal concept 
from the sense perception of just one particular instance. But on the basis of my 
resolution of the contradictory triad, and my disqualification of other evidence, 
the evidence that nous in the genetic account should be conceived of as direct 
intuition or perception that allows one to grasp the universal in the sense 
perception of particulars has been undercut. What I have defended so far with 
regard to Passage C is, in Ch. 2 on Hamlyn and in this chapter, is: (1) According 
to statement Cc that “the particular is perceived,” the particular is the object of 
sense perception. (2) In statement Cd that “the perception is of the universal,” 
sense perception is mentioned, but the statement does not claim that the universal 
is the object of sense perception. (3) Given that an earlier part of the genetic 
account that indicates that many percepts retained in memory form a single 
experience, and that from this a universal is obtained, we are not on good ground 
to take Passage C as claiming that the sense perception of just one particular is 
sufficient for grasping a universal (concept or truth).  
 I will offer a more complete reading of the genetic account of APo. B.19, 




Chapter 4: My Reading of the Genetic Account 
 
I. Introduction 
 Up to this point, I have defined a certain sense of “induction” and have 
provided evidence that Aristotle considers some epagôgê to be induction in that 
sense (Ch.1). Further, I have argued against certain complex readings of the 
genetic account of APo. B.19 that conflict with my own. I have done this to “clear 
the way” to present my own reading of the genetic account (Ch. 2 and 3). 
With regard to my own reading of the genetic account, so far, in Ch. 2 and 
3, I have offered only a part of my reading. In both chapters, I have defended the 
view that the genetic account is not just about the acquisition of concepts, but also 
of certain propositional definitional truths connected with the concepts acquired. 
Moreover, in both chapters, I have considered a crucial passage that is near the 
end of the account, Passage C: 
[C] 
 
[a] When one of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the soul; [b] for although [c] the 
particular is perceived, [d] the perception is of the universal,--[e] e.g. of 
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  “[T]he particular is perceived” replaces Barnes’ “you perceive particulars,” and “the perception 
is of the universal” replaces Barnes’ “perception is of universals.” This is done to make the 





In both Ch. 2 and 3, I have argued that this passage should not be read as claiming 
that the sense perception of a single particular, such as Callias, is sufficient to 
grasp its universal kind, such as man. Finally, in Ch. 2 on Hamlyn, I considered a 
passage at the end of the genetic account, Passage A: 
[A] 
 
It is clear then that we must recognize the first (principles) by induction 
(epagoge); for sense perception introduces the universal in this way. 
(APo., 100b3-5, trans. Hamlyn in Hamlyn, 171) 
 
In that chapter, I argued against Hamlyn that “in this way” (“houtô”) at 100b5 
should be taken as referring to “epagôgêi” at 100b4. The resulting reading is that 
the genetic account prior to 100b4 is a description of the epagôgê mentioned at 
100b4.  
My intention in Chapter 4 is to provide my complete reading of the 
genetic account in APo. B.19. I will offer some initial evidence for my reading. 
However, the main defense of my reading will be provided in the next chapter.  
 Before offering my reading of the genetic account, I will offer an 
argument (in Section II below) that Aristotle upholds the existence of both 
particular and universal forms. This argument will be mainly based on material 
from the Metaphysics and On the Soul. The argument does not seek to resolve the 
controversy among scholars about whether Aristotle, at the end of the “middle 
books” of the Metaphysics, decides that particular forms or universal forms (or 




It merely seeks to establish that Aristotle thinks that both particular forms and 
universal forms exist and that particular forms instantiate universal forms. This 
argument will provide a basis for my support for my reading of the genetic 
account as well as my subsequent criticisms of other readings of the genetic 
account. 
 Then, in Section III, I will offer my positive reading of the genetic account 
and provide some support for it, and in Section IV I will offer my conclusion.  
 
II. Particular and Universal Forms 
 There is an exegetical puzzle in the “middle books” (Z, H, and θ) of 
Metaphysics, familiar to commentators, that has led to disputes about whether 
Aristotle considers forms to be particular or universal. This puzzle can be 
presented in the form of three apparently incompatible theses, each of which 
Aristotle seems to uphold in the Metaphysics. In Met. Z.3 and Z.13, he suggests 
that substances are particular.
2
 Further, statements in Z.7 suggest that forms are 
                                                 
2
  One suggestion that substances are particular is in Met. Z.3 at 1029a27-8. Here, Aristotle says, 
in response to the consideration that substance is matter, that “…this is impossible; for both 
separability [to choriston] and individuality [to tode ti] are thought to belong to substance.” A 
more explicit, seemingly unequivocal statement that substances are particular can be found in 
Z.13: “…it seems impossible that any universal term should be the name of a substance.  For 
primary substance is that kind of substance which is peculiar to an individual, which does not 
belong to anything else; but the universal is common, since that is called universal which naturally 







 Finally, statements in Z.4, 7 and 11 suggest that forms are universal.
4
 
Different commentators on the middle books of the Metaphysics have offered and 
defended different solutions to this puzzle. I will discuss some of these 
commentators at the end of this section. However, my primary purpose here is not 
to solve this puzzle. It is only to defend the thesis that ultimately Aristotle 
recognizes both particular and universal forms, even if he regards one as primary 
substance (or in some other way as ontologically primary) and the other as 
ontologically secondary and unimportant.  
 One can find textual evidence that Aristotle recognizes particular forms, 
and also that he recognizes universal forms. (For some of the latter evidence, 
please see the last footnote.) The main textual evidence that he recognizes 
particular forms can be found in three passages in On the Soul considered 
together. First consider the following passage:  
                                                 
3
 An example of one such statement in Z.7 is: “[b]y form, I mean the essence of each thing and its 
primary substance.” (Met. Z.7, 1032b1-2)  
 
4
 Consider this statement in Z.11: “…definition is of the universal and of the form.” (Met., 
1036a28). Consider also this one in Z.15: “…there is neither demonstration nor definition of 
sensible individual substances…” (Met., 1039b27-8) These two statements suggest that definition 
is of the universal and never of the particular. Consider also this statement in Z.4: “…there is 
essence only of those things whose formula is a definition” (Met., 1030a6).  This in connection 
with a statement in Topics (“…let us call the sort [of unique property] that signifies what it is to be 
[which can be paraphrased as “the essence of”] something a definition…” (Top. I, 101b23, italics 
in original)) suggests that definitions signify essences. So far, we have the suggestions that 
definition is only of the universal, and that definitions signify essences. Combine these with a 
statement in Z.7 that suggests that forms are essences: “[b]y form, I mean the essence of each 
thing and its primary substance” (Met., 1032b1-2). The resulting suggestion is that forms are 





One kind…of the things that there are we call substance, and part of 
this group we say to be so as matter, that which is not in itself a 
particular thing, a second part we say to be so as shape [morphên] and 
form [eidos], in accordance with which, when it applies, a thing is 
called a particular, and a third as that which comes from the two 
together. (DA, 412a6-9, italics in original) 
 
In connection with this passage, consider the following passage: 
It must…be the case that soul is substance as the form of a natural body 
which potentially has life. (DA, 412a20-1, italics in original) 
 
Further, in connection with the two passages above, consider the following 
passage: 
It is quite clear…that the soul is not separable from the body, or that 




The remark that at least parts of the soul are inseparable from the body strongly 
suggests that each living thing has its own soul, and that all living things, or all 
living members of a given species, do not share a single soul. For if more than one 
living body shared a universal soul, it seems that then Aristotle, to be consistent, 
would have to say that the soul as such is separable from particular bodies.   
 There is also a passage in the Metaphysics, other than that referred to 
above (see fn. 2) that strongly suggests that Aristotle recognized particular forms. 
Indeed, this passage suggests what I want to maintain: that Aristotle recognized 
                                                 
5
 A short, later chapter in On the Soul (Ch. III.5) apparently claims that the part of the human soul 
which is the active part of the intellect is the only part of the soul that survives the death of the 
body. On this reading of that chapter, in connection with the passage above, Aristotle thinks that 




both particular forms and universal forms, and that particular forms instantiate 
universal forms: 
…those [causes] of things in the same species are different, not in 
species, but in the sense that the causes of different individuals are 
different, your matter and form and moving cause being different from 
mine, while in their universal formula they are the same.  (Met., 
1071a27-9)  
 
It is implausible to read the clause, “your matter and form and moving cause 
being different from mine” (emphasis added) in a way other than one making 
reference to “your” form, and to a different form, “my” form, i.e. to particular 
forms. But the clause “while in their universal formula they are the same” also 
suggests that the different individuals in the same species share the same 
universal, i.e. species form.
6
  
 The clearest evidence that Aristotle recognized universal forms, in 
addition to the passage above, seems to be the passages in the Metaphysics 
referred to above (see fn. 4).  
Some commentators think that this apparent discrepancy is best explained 
by the developmentalist hypothesis that Aristotle, upon considering certain 
problems with his view that forms are particular, eventually changes his mind in 
                                                 
6
  “Universal formula” (katholou logoi) suggests definition of the species. Bear in mind that 







 Others adopt the more unitarian view that in the middle books 
of the Metaphysics, Aristotle still considers forms to be particular.
8
 
My purpose here is not to attempt to resolve the apparent discrepancy 
myself, nor to defend the position of any of the commentators on this issue. It is 
rather to argue for a simpler and much more general thesis. This is the thesis that 
in some sense of “form,” Aristotle upheld the existence of particular forms, and 
that in some sense, he upheld the existence of universal forms. My position is 
that, though he may have regarded particular forms or universal forms to be 
ontologically secondary or unimportant, he upheld the existence of both.  
Some of the textual evidence that Aristotle recognized particular forms is 
cited above. Additional evidence can be found in DA II.12, where Aristotle 
describes sense perception as the grasp or reception of a sensible form: 
…we must grasp in general in connection with perception as a whole, 
that the sense is the recipient of the perceived forms without their 
matter, as the wax takes the sign from the ring without the iron or 
gold… (DA, 424a17-20) 
  
                                                 
7
  See, for example, Michael Loux, Primary Ousia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). For a 
related view, see G.E.L. Owen, “Particular and General” in G.E.L. Owen, Logic, Science, and 
Dialectic (Ithaca: Connell University Press, 1986), 279-94. Owen seems to think that Aristotle’s 
final view is that primary substance is the universal form insofar as it is embodied in, or, in the 
case of generation, about to be embodied in, a certain parcel of matter.  
 
8
  For example, see Terrence Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 261-3. Any further reference to a work by Irwin, unless otherwise noted, will be to 
this book.  See also Klaus Brinkmann, “The Consistency on Aristotle’s Thought on Substance” in 
William Wians, ed., Aristotle’s Philosophical Development (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publsihers, 1996), 289-302. Any further reference to a work by Brinkmann, unless otherwise 





 As I have established in Ch. 2 and as Passage D in particular (presented in Ch. 2) 
from On the Soul indicates, the objects of sense perception are particulars.
9
 
Clearly, the sensible forms are particular forms. Given that Aristotle also thinks 
that universal forms exist, and that it is in virtue of its form that a thing is what it 
is,
10
 particular, sensible forms instantiate universal forms, which should be 
viewed as what all the particular forms of a given kind have in common.     
 Commentators like Michael Loux, who hold that Aristotle’s revised and 
final position is that forms are universal, might object in a certain way. They 
might claim that he would have considered the particular forms I mention above 
to be derivatives of universal forms. In this view, only the commonalities of the 
particular forms of all oak trees or axes, for example, would constitute their 
respective universal form, while the differences would be consequences of the 
universal form being embodied in matter. This view, however, is consistent with 
my position: it acknowledges that Aristotle, in some sense, recognized particular 
forms.  
 The main textual evidence from the Metaphysics that Aristotle recognized 
universal forms is cited above (see fn. 4). Even if one thinks that the middle books 
                                                 
9
  Recall, in particular, statements Dc, “…perception in activity is of particular things… (DA, 




  See, for example, Phys. II.2: “Another account [of nature, different from matter] is the shape 
[hê morphê] or form [to eidos], which is specified in the definition [ton logon] of the thing” 




of the Metaphysics ought to be read as claiming that forms are particular (and that 
these are primary substances), one still needs to allow that in some sense Aristotle 
recognized universal forms. For this is the only way, as we have seen, that 
essences and definitions are possible for Aristotle. Thus, if one is convinced that 
Aristotle’s final position is that primary substances are particular forms, one must 
allow that universals are forms in some sense, which appears be what the forms of 
the particulars in a universal kind have in common.  
 Indeed, commentators on the middle books of the Metaphysics who think 
that Aristotle ultimately decides on particular forms as primary substances seem 
to acknowledge that, nonetheless, he also believes in universal forms. For 
example, Terrence Irwin in Aristotle’s First Principles thinks that Aristotle, in the 
middle books of the Metaphysics ends up regarding universal forms as secondary 
substances of one sort (Irwin, 261-70).
11
 A crucial part of Irwin’s reason is the 
one I give above: that Aristotle (at one point in the middle books) considers 
definitions to be “of the universal” and “of the form” (Irwin, 261-3).  
 Also, Klaus Brinkmann, who in “The Consistency of Aristotle’s Thought 
on Substance” also considers Aristotle to decide on particular forms as primary 
substances in the Metaphysics, allows that Aristotle must also uphold universal 
                                                 
11
  Irwin claims that Aristotle in the middle books of the Metaphysics does not call universal forms 
“secondary substances” apparently because Aristotle thinks there are secondary substances (such 









 In short, if one takes Aristotle to ultimately decide on particular forms as 
primary substance, his allowance of universal forms in addition nonetheless 
seems inescapable.  
 In regard to the issue of whether Aristotle considered forms to be 
particular or universal, I maintain that the only plausible position is that he upheld 
both particular and universal forms, regardless of which (if any) he ultimately 




III. My Positive Reading of the Genetic Account 
Before I offer my positive reading of the genetic account, I will review 
two preliminary claims about APo. B.19 that I made in Ch. 2 in my response to 
Hamlyn. The first is that the chapter begins with two questions: how archai are 
acquired, and what is the state that grasps them. The answers to these two 
questions, respectively, are: epagôgê based on sense perception, and nous.  
                                                 
12
  See also the view expressed by Jonathan Barnes in “Metaphysics” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 66-108. Barnes’ position 
on Aristotelian forms is similar to mine: “…in a sense Socrates and Callias have the same form, 
and in a sense, each has his own form” (ibid., 98).   
 
13
  Hence, with regard to a natural kind, such as man or horse, each member would have a different 





The main pieces of evidence for this claim are as follows.  Near the 
beginning of Ch. B.19, Aristotle asks about the principles (“peri tôn archôn”) 
how they become known (“ginontai gnorimoi”) and what is the state (“hexis”) 
which comes to know (“gnôrizousa”) them (APo., 99b17-9). Next, consider again 
Passage A from Ch. B.19 (discussed in Ch. 2): 
[A2] 
 
Thus it is plain that we must get to know the primitives by induction 
[epagôgêi]; for this is the way in which [houtô] perception instills the 




In Ch. 2, I argued against Hamlyn that we should take “houtô” in this passage 
(translated here as “this is the way in which”) to refer to “epagôgêi,” which would 
imply that the genetic account preceding this passage describes a process of 
epagôgê. And the genetic account beginning at APo., 99b35 describes a process 
that begins with a faculty (dunamis) possessed by animals (presumably, human or 
otherwise): perception (aisthêsis). Thus, by the end of Passage A2, Aristotle 
appears to have answered his first question. How do we come to know the archai? 
Aristotle’s answer appears to be: by epagôgê based on sense perception.      
                                                 
14
  My modification is to replace Barnes’ “universals” with “the universal” to make the translation 
more closely reflect the Greek. In Ch. 2 on Hamlyn, I used Hamlyn’s translation of this passage 
since that chapter was a response to Hamlyn. Here, since my purpose is mainly to present my 
reading of the genetic account rather than to respond to other commentators, I am using Barnes’ 
standard translation, slightly modified so that it more closely reflects the Greek text. Since it is the 
second translation of this passage I have presented, I have designated that fact by adding “2” to its 




But, after Passage A2, at APo., 100b5-17, Aristotle says that the state (hexis) of 
knowing the archai is not epistêmê but nous. Here, Aristotle appears to answer his 
second question. What is the state that comes to know the archai? Aristotle’s 
answer, evidently, is: nous.
15
 This is my reason for taking Aristotle’s answer to 
the second question to be nous.  
This claim has the implication that “nous,” as used in the context of Ch. 
B.19, explicitly denotes a state (hexis), not a faculty (dunamis). As will become 
evident in my next chapter, this implication is part of my support for my claim 
that Aristotle does not think that the solution to (or the way to avoid) the problem 
of induction is simply nous as intuition.
16
 
The second preliminary claim is that the genetic account is not just about 
acquiring concepts, nor just about acquiring true propositions of certain sort, but 
acquiring both. My claim, more specifically, is that the account is about acquiring 
concepts, which correlatively involves acquiring true propositions of a certain sort 
(namely, those which fall into the class of things Aristotle calls “archai” in the 
Posterior Analytics). This claim helps us resolve the tension in reading the genetic 
account created by evidence that it is about concept-acquisition, and other 
evidence that it is about the acquisition of true propositions of a certain sort. 
                                                 
15
  Both Barnes (in Barnes (2002), 260-9) and McKirahan (in McKirahan (1992), 244-50, 257-8) 
take epagôgê and nous as Aristotle’s answers to his first and second questions respectively.  
 
16
  See, in particular, Barnes (2002), 268, where Barnes recognizes this implication and also sees it 




Recall the three considerations I present in Ch. 2, Section IV to support this claim. 
The first begins with the point I make just above. The beginning of APo. B.19, 
again, asks how we come to know the principles and what the knowing state is. 
Since states of knowledge are explicitly discussed at 100b5-17, it appears that the 
genetic account at 99b35-100b5 is intended to answer the first question. Further, 
there is a strong suggestion early in the Posterior Analytics that the “principles” 
(“archai”), “primitives” (“prôta”), and “immediates” (“amesa”) are intended to 
be synonymous, all referring to the ultimate premises of demonstration.
17
 Indeed, 
APo. B.19 says: “I have said earlier that you cannot understand anything through 
a demonstration unless you know the primitive immediate principles” (APo., 
99b20-3, emphasis added). Second, APo. A.4 seems to require that the predication 
in an ultimate premise of demonstration be an essential (i.e., definitional) one.
18
 
Third, as I argue in Ch. 3, the statement at APo., 100a6-9 that from the grasp of a 
universal “…there comes a principle of skill or understanding…” should be taken 
as claiming that from a grasped universal concept, one gets a propositional 
principle connected with that concept. In connection with these considerations, 
though the “primitives” that Passage A2 seems to refer back to are concepts like 
“man” at 100b1 and “animal” at 100b3, the “primitives” can be interpreted as also 
                                                 
17
  See Ch. 2, fn. 36.  
 
18




referring to certain related, definitional propositions (such as “all (or most) 
humans reason” and “all (or most) animals have sense perception”).
19
 
I will now turn to my more detailed, positive reading of the genetic 
account. I will begin with statements Aristotle makes just before he offers his 
genetic account.  
Early in Ch. B. 19, Aristotle writes: 
[O] 
 
I have said earlier that you cannot understand [endechetai epistasthai]    
anything through a demonstration unless you know [gignôskonti] the 
primitive immediate principles. (APo., 99b20-3) 
 
There seem to be several of these “earlier” passages in the opening chapters of the 
Posterior Analytics. One is in Ch. A.1 at 71a1-16, where Aristotle says that all 
teaching and learning depend on having prior knowledge. This implies that 
demonstration depends on some kind of prior knowledge. Another is in Ch. A.2 at 
72a6-24, where Aristotle says that demonstrations must proceed from principles 
                                                 
19
  Given that the state of knowledge of the principles is nous, the statement in EN VI at 1142a26 
that “comprehension [nous] is of the definitions [tôn horôn]” and at 1143a36-7 that “both the 
primary definitions [tôn prôtôn horôn] and the ultimates [tôn eschatôn] are objects of 
comprehension [nous]” appear to support my claim that the genetic account (in addition to being 
about the acquisition of concepts) is about the acquisition of certain definitional propositions 
connected with the concepts that are acquired. “The ultimates” mentioned by the latter statement 
appear to be ultimate premises of demonstration. This is more reasonable that their being extreme 
terms, since it seems that the genetic account, given that it is in part about the acquisition of 








 Later in that chapter, at72a37-5, Aristotle says that anyone who is to 
possess demonstrative understanding (epistêmê) must know better and be more 
convinced of the principles of demonstration than what is understood. Finally, 
another is in Ch. A.3 at 72b5-25, where Aristotle posits that a demonstration or a 
chain of demonstrations comes to an end; it does not regress infinitely or form a 
circle. Immediates, Aristotle says, are indemonstrable (APo., 72b19-23). Later in 
that chapter, at 72b25-73a20, Aristotle provides his argument for that posit.   
Returning to Ch. B.19, following that quoted statement, Aristotle writes: 
As for knowledge [gnôsin] of the immediates, one might wonder 
whether it is the same or not the same, and whether there is or is not 
understanding in each case or rather understanding in the one case and 
some other kind of knowledge in the other… (APo., 99b22-5) 
 
Given that Passage O is just prior to this one, it seems that the reasonable way to 
take the first alternative expressed is: “whether knowledge of the immediates also 
depends on immediates or does not.” The second alternative expressed, 
apparently, is: whether knowledge of immediates is also understanding (epistêmê) 
or some other kind of knowledge.  
Aristotle finishes that statement with another alternative.  He writes: 
[P] 
 
…and also whether the states, not being present in us, come about in us 
or are present in us without being noticed. (APo., 99b24-7)  
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  And, as mentioned in Ch. 2 of this work, at 72a6-15, he appears to equate principles, primitives 




The alternative that Aristotle has in mind seems to be: either we acquire this 
knowledge (i.e., the gnôsis mentioned above at 99b22) or it is innate without our 
noticing that we have it.  
 Aristotle then offers a brief argument that the latter alternative, i.e. that 
this knowledge is innate without our noticing it, is incorrect: 
[Q] 
 
It is absurd to suppose that we possess such states; for then we should 
possess pieces of knowledge more exact than demonstration without its 
being noticed. (APo., 99b26-7)  
 
By “we possess these states,” Aristotle apparently means “we possess these states 
at birth”; he is apparently objecting to the second of the two alternatives 
expressed in the passage quoted just before this one.  
Following this, Aristotle considers the first of the two alternatives, but 
appears to reject it as well:  
[R] 
 
But if we get them without possessing them earlier, how could we 
come to acquire knowledge and to learn except from pre-existing 
knowledge? This is impossible, as I said in connection with 
demonstration. (APo., 99b28-30) 
 
The last sentence seems to be referring back to Passage O, presented above. Next, 








It is clear, then, both that we cannot possess these states and also that 
they cannot come about in us when we are ignorant and possess no 
state at all. We must therefore possess some sort of capacity 
[dunamin]—but not one which will be more valuable then these states 
in respect of exactness. (APo., 99b30-4)  
 
The second sentence in this passage appears to present the conclusion of the 
argument begun in Passage P. While, as I have mentioned above, Aristotle in 
Passage P seems to consider only two alternatives, it seems that he really begins 
with a premise with three disjoined alternatives. At least, that is what seems to be 
needed to make his argument, ending with his conclusion in Passage S, valid. The 
premise consisting of the three disjoined alternatives seems to be the following. 
Either (1) we possess the states of actual knowledge of the principles at birth, or 
(2) we acquire such states of actual knowledge from no prior knowledge, or (3) 
we possess at birth a state which is a capacity (dunamis, potentiality, faculty) to 
acquire the states of actual knowledge. The argument in Passage Q argues against 
alternative (1). Passage R seems to rule out alternative (2). Hence, Passage S 
seems to draw the conclusion that (3) we possess at birth a state which is a 
capacity to acquire the states of actual knowledge.
21
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  The qualification that Aristotle makes in Passage S appears to be that the state which is a 
capacity (dunamis) that we possess at birth cannot be more exact than the actual states of 
knowledge that are obtained from it. This qualification seems to be concerned with Passage Q. For 
although Passage Q says that it is absurd that we possess states of knowledge (at birth) more exact 
than demonstration without our noticing it, that passage can be read as tacitly upholding the wider 
claim that it is absurd that we possess any state of knowledge at birth (even one which is a mere 




Aristotle then begins his genetic account by discussing sense perception 
(aisthêsis), which he says we share with all animals: 
And this is clearly true of all animals: they have a connate 
discriminatory capacity [dunamin sumphuton kritikên], which is called 
perception. (APo., 99b34-5) 
  
Clearly, it is perception that is the capacity (dunamis) state that Aristotle thinks is 
innate, the state from which the actual state of knowledge of the archai is 
acquired. More exactly, as we will see later, the state of knowledge of the archai 
is acquired from the innate capacity of perception in connection with certain other 
capacities (such as memory and the capacity to form “experiences” (empeiria).)  
 Aristotle continues: 
[T]  
 
Given that perception is present in them, in some animals the percepts 
are retained and in others they are not. If they are not, then the animal 
has no knowledge [gnôsis] when it is not perceiving (either in general 
or with regard to items which are not retained). But some can still hold 
percepts in their soul after perceiving them. When this occurs often, 
there is then a further difference: some animals come to have an 
account [logon] based on the retention of these items, others do not. 
(APo., 99b36-100a3) 
 
Three remarks need to be made about this passage. First, the Greek word (or 
phrase) that is translated as “percept” is an inflection of the noun “to aisthêma” 
(literally, perception (Liddell-Scott, 23)) or a passive participle form of the verb 
“aisthanomai” (perceived by the senses (Liddell-Scott, 23)) used as a noun. What 
                                                                                                                                     
demonstrated knowledge) that are obtained from it.  Reading Passage Q in this way allows us to 





this indicates is that a “percept” is an object of perception (and as something 
retained in memory in the case of some animals, as the passage also indicates). As 
I have indicated earlier (in Ch.2) that for Aristotle particulars are objects of sense 
perception and (in Section II above) that Aristotle considers sense perception to 
be the reception of the perceived form of thing apart from the matter, it is 
reasonable to take the particulars retained in memory, i.e. the retained percepts, to 
be particular forms.  Second, as I have already suggested in Ch. 3 and above in 
this section, that the “account” should be taken as a propositional principle of 
demonstration. Third, the process described by this passage is evidently described 
in more detail or “fleshed out” by the following passage, as the following passage 
suggests. So we should now consider the following passage: 
[U] 
 
[a] Thus from perception there comes memory [mnêmê], as we call it, 
and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same 
item) experience [empeiria]; for [b] memories which are many in 
number form a single experience. [c] And from experience, or from all 
the universal [tou katholou] which has come to rest in the soul (the one 
apart from the many, i.e. whatever is one and the same in all these 
items), there comes a principle [archê] of skill [technês] or 
understanding—[d] of skill if it deals with how things come about, of 
understanding if it deals with how things are. (APo., 100a3-9)
22
   
 
As the content of this passage suggests, it adds detail to the description of Passage 
T. (Hence, the “Thus” (“oun”) at the beginning of the passage should be taken in 
an explanatory, rather than inferential, sense.) Accordingly, “memory” that comes 
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from “perception” should be taken as a “retained percept,” in the terms of the 
prior passage. Statement Ua, next, says that from memory, when it occurs in 
connection with the same item, comes experience. There is a question of whether 
“item” here means a particular thing (such as Callias) or a kind of thing (such as 
man). For now I will simply proffer my reading of this statement: “item” refers to 
a kind of thing (such as man), though this should not be taken to imply that the 
person performing the cognitive process has, at this stage, grasped the kind. (The 
person is in the process of grasping the kind.
23
)  Given this, I think it is clear that 
the “experience” (“empeiria”) referred to by this statement (and indeed, elsewhere 
in the genetic account) is supposed to be particular percepts of the same kind 
(e.g., man) retained in memory and associated in memory with one another. In 
addition, they are associated with one another on the basis of the particular objects 
of perception having similar particular forms. For, as will be made clearer in this 
chapter and in Ch. 7, this will explain how Aristotle could try to justify, plausibly, 
how one could grasp the universal (i.e. the species form), on the basis of 
perceptions of particular tokens of the universal.    
 Statement Uc should be taken as claiming two things. First, from an 
experience arises a universal—i.e. what one grasps is common to all the 
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  I uphold this reading in part because it would help explain how Aristotle could try to justify 
grasping a universal kind from sense perceptions of particulars. Further, I will defend this reading 






particulars grasped in the experience, such as the form man—in the soul. The 
universal, according to statement Uc is “the one apart from the many, i.e. 
whatever is one and the same in all these items…” It is reasonable to take “all 
these items” to here to refer to all the particular percepts comprising the 
experience. For statement Uc appears to describe a move from grasped particulars 
to the grasp of a universal, and the particulars grasped so far are percepts 
comprising an experience. As we will see, this “one apart from the many, this 
thing that is “one and the same in all these items,” should be taken to be the 
universal form. Second, from that universal comes a propositional principle of 
understanding or skill—such as “all humans are mammals” (if one has already 
advanced beyond this stage and has grasped the genus animal) or “all (or most) 
humans reason.” Recall that my second preliminary claim is that the genetic 
account is about the acquisition of concepts and true propositions of a certain sort. 
The sort is definitional truths that serve as principles of demonstration.
24
 
Accordingly, it seems that the two examples I gave are two that Aristotle would 
consider definitional truths.
25
 Again, my main justification for this reading is that 
it helps produce a coherent reading of the entire genetic account, as will become 
                                                 
24
  Only definitional truths can satisfy the predication requirements for the premises of 
demonstration laid out in APo. A.4.   
 
25
  This, of course, is on the reasonable assumption that Aristotle would take “rational animal” or 
“rational mammal” as a definition of man. For evidence that Aristotle considered rationality 
distinctive to humans, see, for example, On the Soul III.10: “…many men follow their 
imaginations as against their knowledge [epistêmên], and in the other animals, while there is 




clearer later. In particular, the second putative claim can be made to tie in to the 
passage quoted prior to this one. The “account” (“logon”) referred to by the last 
sentence of Passage T should be taken to be the propositional principle referred to 
by statement Uc-d.   
Finally, this last passage says that if the principle is about how things 
come about, it is a principle of skill (or, alternatively, of “craft,” another 
translation of “technê”). So, presumably, a proposition like “all marble statues 
come about from marble being carved by certain hand tools” would be a principle 
of skill, rather than of understanding (epistêmê).  
So far, my reading of the genetic account gives us a picture in which one 
begins with sense perception and proceeds to a propositional principle. One 
perceives many particulars of a kind (for example, humans), and retains the 
percepts in memory. The percepts are associated with one another as a result of 
having similar particular forms, thereby forming an experience (empeiria). From 
such an experience, one grasps the universal kind (for example, man). Evident in 
the particulars grasped, and as a result in the universal, is a propositional 
definitional principle or archê (such as “all (or most) humans reason”).    









[a] Thus the states in question neither inhere in us in a determinate form 
nor come about from other states which are more cognitive; rather, they 
come about from perception—[b] as in a battle when a rout has 
occurred, first one man makes a stand, then another does, and then 
another, until a position of strength is reached. [c] And the soul is such 
as to be capable of undergoing this. (APo., 100a10-4)  
 
Statement Va is evidently repeating what Aristotle has stated already. For 
apparently, the “states in question” that it mentions are states of the knowledge of 
the archai. The claim that these states do not inhere in us in a determinate form 
should be taken to mean that the states of actual knowledge of the archai are not 
innate. The next claim—that these states come from sense perception—should be 
taken to mean that that the capacity (dunamis, potentiality) which is sense 
perception, when actualized (in connection with the subsequent actualization of 
other potentialities, such as memory, forming experiences, etc.) yields the state of 
actual knowledge of the archai. Given that statement Va is a repetition of what 
has already been said, the “Thus” (“dê”) in the sentence should be taken as 
explanatory rather than as inferential.  
 As for statement Vb, there is one main issue: what exactly are the 
individual soldiers intended to represent? The passage itself suggests that they are 
intended to represent particular percepts. Two aspects of Passage V suggest this. 
First, this description of a rout as a metaphor is given right after the statement that 




perception,” with the phrase “as in a rout” following. This suggests that each 
soldier represents a something that is grasped by sense perception (i.e. a percept). 
Second, each soldier is an individual (i.e., a particular), and, as argued in Ch. 2 on 
Hamlyn, and as suggested by the prior passages of the genetic account, Aristotle 
considers particulars to be the objects of perception.   
 However, my position is that each soldier is really intended to represent an 
experience (empeiria) or a collection of universals rather than an individual 
percept. To see evidence for this we need to consider the next passage, one which 
we have discussed in Ch. 2:   
[B] 
 
[a] Let us say again what we have just said but not said clearly. [b] 
When one of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the soul; for although the particular is 
perceived, the perception is of the universal,—e.g. of man, not of 
Callias the man. [c] Next, a stand is made among these items, until 
something partless and universal makes a stand. E.g. such-and-such an 
animal makes a stand, until animal does; and with animal a stand is 
made in the same way. [d] Thus it is plain that we must get to know the 
primitives by induction [epagôgêi]; for this is the way in which 







Understanding exactly what Aristotle intends the “undifferentiated items” 
(adiaphora) to be is crucial to understanding what the individual soldiers in 
                                                 
26
  “[T]he particular is perceived” replaces Barnes’ “you perceive particulars,” and “the perception 
is of the universal” replaces Barnes’ “perception is of universals.” In the last sentence, “universal” 
replaces Barnes’ “universals.” This is done to make the translation more closely reflect the Greek.  
 
27




Passage V are intended to represent. For Passage B is intended to be a 
clarification of the description of the rout metaphor in Passage V. For Aristotle 
begins Passage B with the sentence: “Let us say again what we have just said but 
not said clearly” (emphasis is added). And, according to Passage B, one of the 
undifferentiated items first “makes a stand” (“stantos”), just as in Passage V, one 
of the routed soldiers first “makes a stand.”  
 Given this, we should recognize that a serious problem results if we take 
the adiaphora of Passage B to be particulars perceived or particular percepts. For 
then, the first sentence in Passage B would seem to say that the sense perception 
of a single particular, a single percept, is enough to instill in the soul the universal 
subsuming the particular. However, recall the evidence I present in Ch. 2 and 3 
that for Aristotle, sense perception of a single particular is (usually) not sufficient 
to grasp a universal. In particular, consider the part of the genetic account that 
describes the formation of experiences (empeiriai), each consisting of multiple 
memories “of the same item.”
28
 Passage U, as we discussed, treats memories and 
the formation of an experience as a stage in the process of acquiring an archê.    
 My view is that each adiaphoron is intended to represent an experience 
(empeiria) or collection of universals, that is undifferentiated (hence, the word 
“adiaphora”) in one’s mind from other percepts and experiences in ones memory. 
This view of the adiaphora of Passage B solves the problem that results when an 
                                                 
28
  Whether each “item” should be understood by the reader as a single particular or as a kind of 




adiaphoron is taken as a single particular. For on my view, the stage of forming 
an experience is not omitted in Passage B. And though one may claim that on my 
view, Passage B omits the stage of sense perceptions of particular things, one 
need not consider that as contradicting the earlier part of the genetic account that 
evidently describes sense perceptions of particulars as the beginning of the 
process. For one can read Passage B as “picking up” with an experience having 
been formed, and then proceeding from there.  
 Further, assume that the first few adiaphora are each an experience that 
consists of multiple memories, each being the retained percept of the same kind of 
thing (so that, for example, an experience consists of a percept of Socrates, one of 
Callias, one of Alcibiades, etc.). We can now make more sense of statement Bb in 
a plausible way. On that assumption, we should consider an adiaphoron’s 
“making a stand” to be the act of becoming a diaphoron, i.e. becoming 
differentiated from other percepts and experiences in one’s memory.
29
 For recall 
that an adiaphoron should be taken as analogous to a retreating soldier in the rout 
metaphor. From the perspective of a member of the opposing side, the retreating 
soldier would be a blur—undifferentiated from other retreating soldiers—until he 
“makes a stand.” When he “makes a stand,” he is no longer a blur; he is 
differentiated from the others.  
                                                 
29
  We could say that the differentiation of the experience suggests or implies a differentia 
(diaphoron) distinguishing it from others it its genus. Explicitly identifying the differentia will 
become possible once the genus of the experience is grasped, but is not possible or necessary 




 For an adiaphoron to “make a stand,” i.e., to become differentiated, is for 
the species form of the kind of particulars subsumed by the experience to be 
differentiated from the forms (particular or species) of other percepts and 
experiences in one’s memory. That is, the species form becomes salient in one’s 
mind. For an experience to make a stand—become differentiated—in one’s soul is 
for its species form to make a stand in one’s soul. A simple example of this 
process would be that of a child in the fourth-century B.C. Athens. Having 
perceived, and retained in memory percepts of, many animals, including horses, 
the percepts of horses are an undifferentiated experience (empeiria) in his or her 
mind. At a certain point, however, that experience becomes differentiated (e.g., 
from retained percepts of cows, sheep, goats, etc.), i.e. the experience “makes a 
stand” in his or her mind. Its becoming differentiated is the universal form of 
horse “making a stand,” i.e., becoming salient, in the child’s mind, as the 
universal form of horse is different from that of cows, goats, etc.  At that point, 
“there is a primitive universal [namely, horse] in the soul” of the child.
30
  
 For the next stage, a soldier would represent an undifferentiated collection 
of universals, such as man, horse, dog, etc. When these “make a stand,” i.e. when 
                                                 
30
  I hold that “primitive” in this context should simply be taken to mean infima species level. 
Also, I am aware that some commentators, such as Barnes, take adiaphora to be infima species (as 
such species have no differentiae within them). I will discuss these readings in the next chapter. 
For now, we can consider one advantage of my reading. The statement “[w]hen one of the 
undifferentiated items make a stand , there is a primitive universal in the soul” seems redundant on 





they become differentiated, the universal form that they share is distinguished 
from other forms in the soul, and thereby made salient. At that point, a higher 
universal, such as animal, is in the soul.   
Hence, my interpretation of “adiaphora” as experiences each consisting of 
multiple retained percepts of particulars of the same kind plausibly solves 
problems that interpreting “adiaphora” as particulars creates.  
But what about what was said in favor of taking an adiaphoron as a 
particular? Recall that the “rout” passage in Passage V comes right after a claim 
that the states (apparently of knowledge of archai) comes from sense perception, 
and each soldier on the routed side “making a stand”  is an individual, i.e. a 
particular. And, as I argued in Ch. 2, for Aristotle, particulars are the objects of 
perception.  
 Given my reading of Passage B so far, these would be presumably 
unintended suggestions by Aristotle that each adiaphoron is a single particular, 
and such suggestions would constitute a lack of clarity on the part of Aristotle. 
But such lack of clarity is preferable to the alternative. For on the view that an 
adiaphoron is a single particular perceived, or single percept, we get the result of 
Passage B claiming that the sense perception of a single particular (or a single 
particular percept) is enough to instill in the soul a universal. And I have already 
argued in detail in Ch. 2 and 3 against this reading. Recall, in particular, that this 




account: the formation of an experience through multiple memories “of the same 
item.”  
 Further, given my interpretation, it seems that we can justifiably claim that 
Aristotle is, in some terms, aware of this lack of clarity. For observe again that 
Passage B comes right after Passage V and claims to be a clarification of Passage 
V. Yet, as the commentary on these passages indicates, Passage B hardly clarifies 
Passage V. If we assume my interpretation of the “adiaphora” in Passage B, we 
can take Aristotle’s claim of clarification at the start of Passage B as intended to 
remove the suggestion that the routed soldiers each represent a particular 
perceived or a particular percept. We can take the claim to indicate instead that 
each retreating soldier represents an experience consisting of multiple retained 
percepts that are as yet undifferentiated from other percepts in one’s memory.      
Let us now consider more of Passage B, namely, Passage C, which we 
discussed in Ch. 2 and 3:   
[C] 
 
[a] When one of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the soul; [b] for although [c] the 
particular is perceived, [d] the perception is of the universal,--[e] e.g. of 
man, not of Callias the man. (APo., 100a15-b1, trans. Barnes modified) 
 
I argued in Ch. 2 on Hamlyn that statement Cc of this passage—“the particular is 
perceived”—refers to the particular as the object of sense perception. But for 




intended between the universal and sense perception, arguing only that “tou 
katholou” (“of the universal”) should not be taken as being in the genitive of 
object (so that this statement is not saying that the universal is the object of 
perception). I now claim that statement Cd should be taken as claiming that the 
universal is the subject of the sense perception in the sense that the particular 
perceived represents its universal. Recall the evidence I cited in Section II above 
from On the Soul that for Aristotle, sense perception consists of the reception of 
the particular form, apart from the matter, of the object. Further, recall my 
argument above that Aristotle upholds the existence of both particular and 
universal forms, where a universal form consists of what is common to the 
particular forms it subsumes. With this in mind, we can make sense of how for 
Aristotle, the perception of a particular object—Callias, for example—could 
represent a universal—man, for example. For the act of perceiving Callias would 
consist of perceiving at least the particular form of Callias.
31
 And, as my 
argument above on particular and universal forms indicates, the particular form of 
Callias is what makes him instantiate the universal man, i.e., what makes him a 
man. As such Callias, with his particular form (if not also his matter), represents 
(in the sense of instantiating) the universal man. That is, when one perceives 
                                                 
31
  For Aristotle, the act of perceiving Callias might also consist of perceiving the matter of 
Callias, so that it consists of perceiving the matter-form substance which is Callias. This 
conception of Aristotelian perception is also compatible with my reading of Passage B, since 





Callias, Callias is the object of the perception, but man is the subject. We can, in 
this way, make sense of the entirety of Passage C.  
 This reading of statement Cc-d should not be taken to imply that the act of 
perceiving a single particular (e.g., Callias) is sufficient to grasp its universal kind 
(e.g., man). For, again, this appears to contradict the earlier part of the genetic 
account that the formation of an experience, consisting of many memories “of the 
same item,” is needed as a stage.
 32
 Given this, my reading of the statement Cc-d 
indicates that Aristotle is aware of an epistemic gap between knowledge of (or 
acquaintance with) a particular and knowledge (or a grasp) of the universal 
subsuming it. Clause Cb-d in Passage C, accordingly, would be explanatory and, 
in a sense, justificatory. It would be an intended explanation of how acts of 
perceiving particulars (of the same kind, which lead to the formation of an 
experience consisting of multiple percepts in memory) could lead one to grasp the 
universal subsuming the particulars. As such, clause Cb-d would be justificatory 
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  Michael Ferejohn in “Empiricism and the First Principles of Aristotelian Science,” in Georgios 
Anagnostopoulos, ed., A Companion to Aristotle (West Sussex, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 
2009), 66-80, expresses a view that seems similar. (Any further reference to Ferejohn (2009), 
unless otherwise noted, will be to this work.) Ferejohn reads Passage C as saying that while the 
object of sense perception is the particular, the content is (also?) the universal (Ferejohn (2009), 
71-2). I have already argued against the claim that the sense perception of a single particular is 
always enough for one to grasp the universal. Ferejohn, however, does not clearly ascribe this 
thesis to Aristotle. His reading of Passage C seems to imply that often after perceiving with one’s 
senses more than one particular of the same kind, one will grasp the universal with the aid of one’s 
intellect, and so the content provided by sense perception is both the particular and the universal. 
If this is the import Ferejohn’s reading of Passage C, his reading is, in my view, unassailable.  




in the sense that it would indicate why a universal concept so grasped could be 
considered justified, i.e., veridical.  
 In regard to the evidence for this reading of statement Cd, let us consider 
three items. First, the phrasing of the “for clause” (i.e., Cb-e)
33
 suggests an object-
subject distinction between “the particular” (of which Callias is an example) and 
“the universal” (of which man is an example) respectively. Recall also my 
argument in Ch. 2 that “the particular” in statement Cc of clause Cb-d should be 
taken as the object of the act of perceiving.  
Second, let us consider a passage from APo. A.31 which I think provides 
some evidence for my reading of Passage C:  
[W]  
 
[a] Understanding [epistasthai] is not through perception [di’ 
aisthêseôs]. [b] For even if perception is of the such-and-such [estin hê 
aisthêsis tou toioude] and not of a this [mê toude tinos], nevertheless it 
is necessary to perceive a this [aisthanesthai ge anankaion tode ti] at 
some place and now. [c] It is impossible to perceive [aisthanesthai] the 
universal [to…katholou] and all-encompassing. (APo., 87b28-31, trans. 
mine)  
 
We should note that statement Wc explicitly states a position I had argued in Ch. 
2 that Aristotle holds: that the universal cannot be perceived. Note that the 
sentence refers to the universal (i.e., “what is universal and holds in every case”) 
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  Recall again that my translation of clause Cb-d reflects the grammar of the Greek more closely 




as the impossible object of sense perception.
34
 Thus, the last sentence seems 
consistent with, and perhaps even suggestive of, my reading of clause Cb-d in 
Passage C.  
 Next, consider statement Wb. If we are to make sense of Passage W as an 
argument for or explanation of the first sentence in that passage—the sentence 
that understanding (epistêmê) cannot be obtained through perception—then the 
meanings of certain phrases in the second sentence are fairly clear. “[T]he such-
and-such” (“tou toioude”) seems to refer to a kind of thing, what is a universal. 
Further, “a this,” seems to mean a particular, to something that, as the deictic 
expression suggests, can be pointed to. With this in mind, consider statement Wb 
again. Observe that in the expression “perception is of the such-and-such,” the 
phrase denoting the universal is in the genitive case, just as in the expression of 
statement Cd, which is about what perception is of. Further, observe that in the 
expression “it is necessary to perceive a this,” the phrase denoting the particular 
denotes the object of perception, just as in statement Cc. Just as clause Cb-d, 
statement Wb suggests that the particular is the object of perception, but that the 
universal is the subject (in the sense I mentioned earlier).  
 Given this suggestion of statement Wb, Passage W also suggests that the 
distinction between the object and subject of perception expressed in clause Cb-d 
of Passage C as I read it is not something novel or an anomaly for Aristotle, but a 
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settled, ordinary philosophical fact. This is important because if my reading of 
clause Cb-d in Passage C results in Aristotle holding the clause as a tenet that is 
not expressed or suggested elsewhere in his works, my reading is less plausible 
than it would be otherwise.
35
 Thus, we can take Passage W as a confirmation of 
my reading of Passage C.  
 Let us now turn to the third item of evidence for my reading of statement 
Cd. The third item of evidence is that my reading of statement Cd contributes to a 
coherent reading of Passage C. As I have argued, taking the adiaphora mentioned 
in that passage as experiences (empeiria) rather than as particular percepts, 
combined with my reading of clause Cb-d as not claiming that the sense 
perception of a single particular is enough to grasp a universal, allows us to read 
Passage C in a way that is consistent with earlier parts of the genetic account. 
That is, such a reading allows for the formation of an empeiria between the sense 
perceptions of particulars and the grasp of a universal. My reading of statement 
Cd in turn allows us to read clause Cb-d in a way that is genuinely explanatory. 
For given my reading of clause Cb-d (including statement Cd), Aristotle 
recognizes that there is a gap between the sense perception of particulars and the 
                                                 
35
  As with the genetic account in B.19, one can raise the question about whether Passage W from 
A.31 is about particular and universal things or facts. As worded, the suggestion is that Passage W 
is about particular and universal things. For the phases “a this” and “the such-and-such” suggest 
things. However, as with the genetic account, it is reasonable to take Passage W to correlatively be 
about particular and universal facts.  For in perceiving a particular thing, such as Callias, one 
presumably correlatively perceives certain particular facts, such as the fact that Callias is here. 
Similarly, in grasping a universal thing, such as man, one presumably correlatively grasps certain 




grasp of their universal kind, that how one can justifiably get the latter from the 
former needs explanation. Given my reading of clause Cb-d, the explanation is 
that while the object of perception is a particular, the subject (in the sense of what 
is represented by the perception of the particular) is the universal. For the act of 
perceiving the particular for Aristotle, as I have argued, consists of perceiving at 
least the particular form of the particular. And, given what I have argued above, 
namely that species forms for Aristotle consist in what the forms of particulars 
within the species have in common, the perception of the particular is thereby able 
to represent the universal. The perceptions of many particulars within a universal 
are retained in the soul as an empeiria. By virtue of the particular percepts 
representing the universal, the empeiria will eventually “make a stand,” i.e. 
become differentiated from other percepts and emperia in the soul so that 
universal form shared by the particulars comprising the empeiria becomes salient, 
which is the veridical grasp of the universal.
36, 37
    
                                                 
36
  James Madden advances a similar view of how, according to Aristotle, a universal is grasped 
on the basis of sense perception. (James D. Madden, “Aristotle, Induction, and First Principles,” 
International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March, 2004), 35-52.) According to 
Madden, it is because the senses receive the form of their object that they able to instill the 
universal it instantiates in the soul (Madden, 44-6). Madden, however, seems to think that the 
senses directly receive the species form (Madden, 45). My reading is that the senses receive the 
particular form, and that particular forms instantiate, and thereby represent, universal (species) 
forms. Given the evidence I have provided that for Aristotle, only particulars are objects of the 
senses, it appears that my reading is more reasonable.   
  
37
  Deborah Modrak holds a similar view of how, according to Aristotle, the universal is grasped 
from the sense perception of the particular. (Deborah K. W. Modrak, Aristotle: the Power of 
Perception (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987).) For Aristotle, according to Modrak, 




 Turning now to the issue of the grammar of statement Cd, I have argued in 
Ch. 2 that “tou katholou” in statement Cd should not be taken to be in the genitive 
of object. What genitive is it in then? Given my reading of statement Cd, it seems 
that the most reasonable answer is: genitive of quality. For given my reading of 
statement Cd as claiming that the universal is the subject (in the sense of what is 
represented) of sense perception, it seems that the clause is qualifying “the 
perception” (“hê aisthêsis”). For to say that sense perception is of the universal (in 
the sense just mentioned) qualifies sense perception, as the statement that this 
painting is of the Parthenon qualifies the painting. And given my suggestion that 
the claim from statement Wb that “perception is of the such-and-such” is parallel 
to statement Cd, it seems that we can say that “tou toioude” (“of the such-and-
such”) from that claim is also in the genitive of quality.
38
  
 Having given my reading of Passage C, we can now turn to my reading of 
the remainder of Passage B. Consider the two sentences of Bc. These two 
sentences apparently describe the acquisition of more concepts until a widest 
concept is reached. Presumably, the widest concept would be determined by the 
field in question. Given the examples of concepts (man and animal), the field 
                                                                                                                                     
instantiate universals, the sense perception of particulars provides the intellect with the 
information needed to grasp the universal (Modrak, 120-3, 169-71).  
 
38
  See Smythe, 313-320 for the uses of the genitive with a noun, and in particular, Smyth, 317 for 
the genitive of quality. My point in making suggestion above is simply that even if we do not take 
“tou katholou” from Passage C and “tou toioude” from Passage W to be in the genitive of object, 









 These two sentences may seem like an implausible description of concept 
acquisition, since our processes of concept acquisition are not always linear 
progressions from infima species to a summum genus. However, the two 
sentences do not have to be taken as necessarily describing a linear progression. 
Clearly, the examples of the concepts in the sentences suggest such a progression. 
But we do not have to take that to imply that every progression in concept 
acquisition from infima species to summa genera is linear. There could be 
acquisitions of concepts that are divisions of genera that one has already grasped. 




 As for statement Bd (which is also Passage A2), I have argued in Ch. 2 
against Hamlyn that “epagôgêi” refers back to the genetic account. Note that 
                                                 
39
  “Partless” (“amerê”) at 100b2 seems to be an odd adjective, since, presumably, the widest 
concept would not be partless in the sense of having no species. The account of reaching it 
describes a process that begins with the acquisition (from sense perception, memory, and 
experience formation) of what are apparently (for Aristotle) infima-species concepts. We can, 
however, make some sense of the adjective “partless” if we remember that Passage B is a 
purported “clarification” of the rout metaphor in Passage V. Apparently, the re-formed routed side, 
after each soldier having made a stand, would be “partless” in the sense that its total strength 
would derive from each standing soldier contributing to it. So, presumably, “partless” as used at 
100b2 to describe the widest concept means that the epistemic strength, i.e. veracity, of the widest 
concept derives from each narrower, constituent concept contributing to it. That is, each narrower, 
constituent concept, contributes to making the universal form behind the widest concept salient. 
 
40
  It seems difficult, however, to escape the conclusion that for Aristotle, concept acquisition does 
involve a progression, i.e. that each “string” of concept acquisition begins with infima species and 




given Aristotle’s description of epagôgê as reasoning from the particular to the 
universal (discussed in Ch. 2), and given my description of the genetic account as 
describing both the reasoning from particulars to universal concepts, and a 
correlative reasoning from particular facts to universal propositional principles, 
“epagogei” in the last sentence of Passage B should be taken as referring to both 
the conceptual and propositional processes.  
 Finally, let us consider “placing” the process described by Passage B (and 
suggested by the rout metaphor in Passage V) within the process described earlier 
by the genetic account. Consider Passage U again:  
[U] 
 
[a] Thus from perception there comes memory [mnêmê], as we call it, 
and from memory (when it occurs often in connection the same item) 
experience [empeiria]; for [b] memories which are many in number 
form a single experience. [c] And from experience, or from all the 
universal [tou katholou] which has come to rest in the soul (the one 
apart from, i.e. whatever is one and the same in all these items), there 
comes a principle [archê] of skill [technês] or understanding—[d] of 
skill if it deals with how things come about, of understanding if it deals 
with how things are. (APo., 100a3-9) 
 
The process described by Passage B (and suggested by the rout metaphor in 
Passage V), reasonably, should be taken be the process before the grasping of the 
principle (archê) of skill or understanding, described by Uc. For recall that I had 
argued earlier that this archê should be taken to be a fundamental, true 
proposition, and the process described by Passage B (and suggested by the rout 




of propositional truths. Thus, Passage B (and the rout metaphor in Passage V) can 
be seen as coherent with the above passage if the process thereby described is 
taken as not yet reaching the stage of propositional-truth acquisition.  
This brings us to the end of the genetic account. Aristotle, by this point, 
has evidently answered the first of the two questions he posed at the beginning of 
APo. B19: how does one come to know the archai? Aristotle’s answer, evidently, 
is: by epagôgê based on sense perception. The epagôgê, accordingly, is the means 
of reaching and justifying principles.  
The rest of APo. B.19 (100b5-17) evidently offers an argument that nous 
is the state of knowledge (gnôsis) of the archai. As I have argued earlier, this 
evidently answers the second of two questions Aristotle asks at the beginning of 
the chapter: what is the state of knowing the archai? Aristotle’s answer, evidently, 
is: nous. This indicates, again, that nous in the genetic account is not intended to 
be (all or part of) Aristotle’s answer to the first question, i.e. that should not be 
taken as intuition that allows one to grasp a universal kind or truth, either without 
epagôgê or as an aid to secure epagôgê.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 It seems that the genetic account of APo. B.19 can and should be read in a 
coherent way, according to which epagôgê based on sense perception is how we 




the process begins with sense perception of particulars. Particular percepts 
retained in memory that are similar (i.e. of the same kind, such as man) are 
associated as a result of their being similar, forming an experience (empeiria). 
Such an experience is at first undifferentiated from other percepts and experiences 
in one’s mind. But at some point, the experience becomes differentiated, i.e. the 
universal form of its particulars is distinguished from other forms (particular and 
universal) in one’s mind. At that point, one has grasped the universal form, i.e., 
the concept (such as man). Evident in the particular percepts (and, as a result, in 
the universal) is one (or more) propositional definitional principle (such as “all (or 
most) humans reason”) that reflects the distinctive universal form. Such, 
evidently, is the process of epagôgê based on sense perception that according to 
the genetic account is how we come to reach and justify principles of 
demonstration. Finally, nous is evidently Aristotle’s answer to the question of 
what the state of knowing the principles is, and not intuition which allows one to 





Chapter 5: A Defense of My Reading 
 
I. Introduction 
So far, I have argued against certain commentators (Ch. 2 and 3) to clear 
the way for my presentation for my own reading of the genetic account of APo. 
B.19, backed by some initial evidence (Ch. 4). I will now turn to providing a 
defense of my reading against conflicting readings.  
My reading of the genetic account is intended to support my claim 
(discussed in detail in Ch. 7) that in the genetic account, Aristotle is aware of the 
problem of induction and has an implicit, putative solution to the problem. Given 
this, there are five crucial theses comprising my reading of the genetic account 
that need defense.  
 The first thesis is connected with Passage C, discussed in Ch. 2, 3, and 4: 
 [C] 
 
[a] When one of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the soul; [b] for although [c] the 
particular is perceived, [d] the perception is of the universal,--[e] e.g. of 





                                                 
1
  “[T]he particular is perceived” replaces Barnes’ “you perceive particulars,” and “the perception 
is of the universal” replaces Barnes’ “perception is of universals.” This is done to make the 








The thesis is that the genetic account does not claim that the sense perception of a 
single particular is sufficient to grasp the universal it instantiates. As we have 
seen, an earlier part of the account claims that many percepts retained in memory 
form an experience (empeiria), and that a universal is grasped from an experience 
(APo., 99b35-100a10). This thesis is important because it provides some evidence 
for my view of Aristotle’s explanation of how we can grasp universals and certain 
definitional truths connected with the universals. My view, again, is that when an 
experience consisting of many particular forms (percepts) retained in memory 
becomes differentiated from other forms in one’s mind, the universal form which 
all the particulars share becomes salient. This is the grasp of the universal, and 
allows us to grasp certain definitional truths connected with the universal. I have 
already provided my defense for this thesis in Ch. 2 on Hamlyn, Ch. 3 on Evans 
and Harari, and Ch. 4 on my reading of the genetic account. For this chapter, I 
will focus on defending the other theses. 
 The second crucial thesis is that the experiences (empeiriai) mentioned in 
the genetic account do not have as their object one particular, but many 
particulars. This is important, not only because it provides evidence for my 
reading of Passage C (as I discuss in Ch. 4), but, like my reading of Passage C, 
and in the same way, it provides evidence of my view of Aristotle’s explanation 





The third crucial thesis is my view of Aristotle’s explanation of how we 
can grasp universals and certain definitional truths connected with the universals. 
My view is that the grasp of a universal from an undifferentiated item 
(adiaphoron), described in statement Ca above, consists in an experience that is 
undifferentiated from other forms in one’s mind becoming differentiated, so that 
the universal form shared by the particulars comprising the experience is salient. 
This thesis depends on a view of what exactly an undifferentiated item is intended 
to be. Since my view and (as we will see) the view of certain other commentators 
is that the undifferentiated items are experiences, this thesis is very closely related 
to the second thesis. Hence, I will defend both of these theses in one section, 
Section II. 
The fourth thesis pertains to the role of epagôgê in the genetic account. 
The thesis that epagôgê has the role of justifying the propositional principles. In 
Section III, I defend this thesis against T. Engberg-Pedersen’s position that 
epagôgê in the genetic account has the role only of generalizing from cases and 
thereby allowing one to arrive at (but not secure) putative principles.    
 The fifth thesis is that nous in the genetic account is not intuition that 
allows one to grasp a principle (especially a universal truth), so that it solves the 
problem of induction (if nous is taken as a supplement to induction to strengthen 
it) or allows us to avoid any problem of induction (if it, rather than induction, is 




is obvious. If we take Aristotle to hold in the genetic account that there is no 
problem of induction, this conflicts with my position that he thinks, in the genetic 
account, that there is such a problem. And, if we take Aristotle in the genetic 
account to hold that the solution to the problem is simply intuition, this conflicts 
with my view of what he holds, in the genetic account, to be the solution. I have 
argued in Ch. 3 against Evans’ and Harari’s versions of viewing nous in such a 
way. In Section IV, I will argue against certain other commentators who view 
nous in the genetic account in such a way.  
 Finally, in Section V, I will present my conclusion.  
 
II. Experiences and Undifferentiated Items 
 I will turn now to my defense of the second thesis, the thesis that an 
experience (empeiria), as described in the genetic account, has for its object, not 
one, but many particulars.  
It is clear that according to the genetic account, the acquisition of a 
principle begins with sense perception, and from memories of sense perceptions, 
experiences (empeiriai) are formed. After the controversies about sense 
perception (and whether a single sense perception can instill a universal), the next 
major controversy about the genetic account is the nature of these experiences. 
Typically, an experience is viewed as many percepts, grouped together in 




Socrates, and other humans. In connection with Met. A.1, the percepts are often 
viewed as of facts. Accordingly, an experience will include percepts of the facts 
that Callias reasons, Socrates reasons, etc.
2
   
This is typically how an experience as described by the genetic account is 
viewed (and how I view it, as my section on my positive reading of the genetic 
account indicates). 
Greg Bayer, however, offers a view of these experiences that is unusual in 
a certain respect. According to Bayer, an experience consists of many percepts 
(retained in memory) of the same item, where an item is a single particular. In this 
view, an experience would consist, for example, of retained percepts of the facts 
that Callias is pale, Callias is bearded, Callias with a certain illness is curable by 
X, etc. (Bayer, 126).  
The strength of Bayer’s view is that it appears to give the genetic account 
a certain coherence. For it is rather implausible to consider Passage C to be 
describing a process of reaching a universal, from sense perception, which 
completely skips memory and experience. For as the genetic account indicates 
earlier, memory and experience are between sense perception and the grasp of a 
                                                 
2
  See Met., 980b29-981a12.  The example of an experience there is apparently one that consists of 
the retentions of the perceived facts that when Socrates is sick with X, he is cured with Y; when 
Callias is sick with X, he is cured with Y; etc. Regarding my example of an experience retaining 
the facts that Socrates reasons, Callias reasons, etc., such facts may seem non-perceptual, until we 
bear in mind that “logos” (the word typically translated as “reasoning”) has the root sense of word. 
Bearing this in mind, it is easy to conceive of Aristotle as taking Callias reasoning and Socrates 
reasoning as more or less equivalent to Callias speaking and Socrates speaking, and taking these 




universal (see, again, APo., 99b35-100a10). In Bayer’s view, Passage C does not 
describe a process in which memory and experience are skipped; it says that sense 
perceptions of a particular (such as Callias) retained in memory—i.e. an 
experience of Callias—instills a universal (such as man) in the soul (Bayer, 126-
30). On this reading, Passage C is, as its text suggests, in a certain sense about the 
grasp of a universal from a single particular, but not in a sense in which memory 
and experience are skipped. Consider the passage again: 
[C] 
 
[a] When one of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the soul; [b] for although [c] the 
particular is perceived, [d] the perception is of the universal,— [e] e.g. 
of man, not of Callias the man. (APo., 100a15-b1, trans. Barnes 
modified) 
 
According to Bayer, the undifferentiated item (adiaphoron) referred to by 
statement Ca is an experience (empeiria), which is of a particular, such as Callias. 
It consists of multiple facts about the particular, perceived and retained in 
memory.
3
 Statement Ca continues and says that from this undifferentiated item, 
one grasps a universal (such as man). The clause beginning with Cb then offers an 
explanation: “for although the particular is perceived” (i.e., the experience 
                                                 
3
  In Bayer’s reading, each “undifferentiated item” is a grasp of attributes of a single particular, 
attributes such as Callias is bearded, Callias is pale, etc. The attributes are “jumbled together,” i.e. 
“undifferentiated,” in the mind of the person who grasps them. Such an undifferentiated 
experience, according to Bayer, when ‘making a stand’ suggests a universal such as human. This 
is part of the process of epagôgê, which according to Bayer, is fallible (Bayer, 123-30). Bayer, 
apparently, considers the grasp of propositional principles as a step in addition to the epagogic 
grasp of universal concepts, and thinks that Aristotle, recognizing the problem of induction, 
regards epagôgê as too frail to secure the truth of the foundational propositional principles of 




consisting of percepts is of a particular object of perception), “the perception is of 
the universal” (i.e., that particular object of experience must be viewed as a 
member of a universal, such as man, which gets implanted in the perceiver’s 
soul).   
Further, it is perhaps natural to take the soldiers in the rout metaphor as 
representing particulars, since each is himself a particular (an individual human). 
Bayer’s reading allows each soldier in the rout metaphor to represent a 
particular—or rather an experience of a particular—in the “restatement” at APo., 
100a15-b5, which includes Passage C. Hence, in this reading, the soldiers in the 
rout metaphor do, in a certain way, represent particulars, and it perhaps seems 
clear how it is a metaphor of the process described in the subsequent “clarifying” 
passage.  
I will make three points about why my view of the “experiences” 
(empeiria), which are the “undifferentiated items” (adiaphora) in both of our 
readings, is preferable to Bayer’s view. The first is that his view is not, as a result 
of its attempt to take each soldier to represent a particular, as plausible as it might 
first seem. Let us consider this.  
I agree with Bayer that the adiaphora are each represented by a soldier. As 




the adiaphora as both “making a stand”
4
 seems to demand that we treat a soldier 
as analogous to an adiaphoron. I further agree that an adiaphoron is an 
(undifferentiated) experience. But, again, my view of an experience is that it 
consists of many percepts, retained in memory, of the same item, where an item is 
not a single particular, but a kind (such as man). Hence, in my view, an 
experience will consist of percepts where each will likely be of a different 
particular (e.g., Socrates, Callias, etc.) of the same kind (e.g., man). Accordingly, 
in my view, each soldier represents an experience, and as a result, a collection of 
particulars, rather than a single particular. Because in my reading, a particular 
soldier does not represent a particular, but a collection of particulars of a given 
kind (such as man) retained in memory, Bayer’s reading may seem more plausible 
than mine.  
 However, even on Bayer’s reading, every soldier in the passage of the 
rout metaphor cannot be taken to represent a particular. For in the clarifying 
passage afterwards, among the things that Aristotle describes as “making a stand” 
are clearly universals such as man and animal. Here again is the passage (that 




                                                 
4
  Again, this should be understood in connection with Aristotle’s claim that the passage after that 






[a] Let us say again what we have just said but not said clearly. [b] 
When one of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the soul; for although the particular is 
perceived, the perception is of the universal,—e.g. of man, not of 
Callias the man. [c] Next, a stand is made among these items, until 
something partless and universal makes a stand. E.g. such-and-such an 
animal makes a stand, until animal does; and with animal a stand is 
made in the same way. [d] Thus it is plain that we must get to know the 
primitives by induction [epagôgêi]; for this is the way in which 





Passage Bc appears to describe universals like man, horse, dog, etc. each “making 
a stand” until animal does, and then animal and, presumably, plant making a stand 
until, presumably, organism does, etc. Hence, if we take each of the soldiers 
“making a stand” in the rout metaphor to be analogous to something “making a 
stand” in the following “clarifying” passage (Passage B), each soldier will not 
represent a particular mentioned by Passage B. Some soldiers will each represent 
a universal mentioned by Passage B.    
To defend Bayer, one may object that what Aristotle means is that the 
experiences, each of a particular, behind the universals such as man and animal 
“make a stand.” But this objection is not plausible with regard to animal “making 
a stand” (which Aristotle mentions at APo., 100b3). For as Passage B indicates, 
the cognitive items directly behind the grasp of animals is kinds of animals (man, 
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  “[T]he particular is perceived” replaces Barnes’ “you perceive particulars,” and “the perception 
is of the universal” replaces Barnes’ “perception is of universals.” In the last sentence, “universal” 





horse, etc.), and apparently not experiences. And Aristotle does mention animal 
“making a stand”—as though it were a separate step, not just the same step as 
man, horse, etc. each making a stand. Hence, on Bayer’s reading, one or more of 
the soldiers need to be taken as representing universals. As a result, Bayer’s view 
can hardly count for greater plausibility if only some of the soldiers in the rout 
metaphor represent particulars. For, aren’t all the soldiers, by nature, particulars 
(i.e., individuals)?   
 My view, again, is that Aristotle did not intend a soldier to represent a 
particular, and that this is part of the reason he begins Passage B with the 
sentence: “Let us say again what we have just said but not said clearly” (APo., 
100a14, emphasis is added).  
 A second point in support of my view is that it gives a plausible account of 
how Aristotle could think that one derives a universal from sense perceptions of 
particulars. Again, in my view, an undifferentiated experience making a stand is 
its becoming differentiated, i.e. its universal form becoming distinguished from 
the forms of other things in the soul, and as such, becoming salient. Similarly, an 
undifferentiated set of universals—such as man, horse, dog, etc.—making a stand 
is their becoming differentiated, i.e. their universal form becoming distinguished 
from other forms in the soul, and thereby becoming salient. (This is related to 
Aristotle’s awareness of and attempted solution to the problem of induction, 




except (like many commentators) by taking nous as intuition that grasps the 
universal (Bayer, 137-41). I have objected to this view in my response to Evans 
and Harari, and will discuss it more in Section IV below. 
 A third point in favor of my view of experiences is a certain passage from 




…from memory experience [empeiria] is produced in men; for many 
memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single 
experience. Experience seems very similar to science [epistêmêi] and 
art [technêi], but really science and art come to men through 
experience… And art arises, when from many notions gained from 
experience one universal [katholou] judgment about similar objects is 
produced. For to have a judgment that when Callias was ill of this 
disease this did him good, and similarly in the case of Socrates and in 
many individual cases, is a matter of experience,   but to judge that it 
has done good to all persons of a certain constitution, marked off in one 
class, when they were ill of this disease, e.g., to phlegmatic or bilious 
people when burning with fever,—this is a matter of art. (Met., 980b29-
981a12)  
 
Aristotle here is evidently describing part of the same process as in the genetic 
account of APo. B.19. For the passage above mentions a transition from memory 
to experience to technê or epistêmê. And, it is evident that Passage W takes sense 
perception as the cognitive base of the process, as the passage just above it (at 
Met., 980a27-b29) states that animals by nature have sense perception, that some 
have memory, and little of connected experience, and that non-human animals 




the passage gives to illustrate the process, two men, Callias and Socrates, are 
mentioned. Clearly, if the experience being formed is of men, then this example 
of an experience indicates that, contrary to Bayer, an experience is not just of one 
particular, but of more than one particular of the same kind.  
 Bayer might object that there is no need to take the above passage as 
giving as an example just one experience, that we can and should take Callias and 
Socrates as each subsumed by a different experience.
6
 But there is some reason to 
think that the example in Passage W is about just one experience. First, in the 
phrase “from many notions gained from experience,” “experience” (“tês 
empeirias”) is in the singular. The same is true of the word “experience” in the 
part of the sentence that mentions both Callias and Socrates: “…to have a 
judgment that when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good, and similarly 
in the case of Socrates and in many individual cases, is a matter of experience 
[empeirias]…” Second, as I have indicated, this passage seems parallel to the 
passage in APo. B.19 at 100a3-9 (Passage U, presented in Ch. 4) which describes 
the transition from sense perception to memory to experience to the universal. 
Consider this clause in the latter passage: “…for memories which are many in 
number form a single [mia] experience” (APo., 100a5-6, emphasis is added). This 
is parallel to the first sentence from the Passage W which says: “…for many 
memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single [mias] 
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experience” (emphasis is added). These clauses indicate that Passage U at APo., 
100a3-9, as well as Passage W at Met., 980b29-981a12, are each about one 
experience obtained from multiple memories. Accordingly, it is more plausible to 
take Passage W as about one experience obtained from multiple memories. In 
Passage W, Callias and Socrates (and other individual men) should accordingly be 
taken as subsumed by the same experience. Hence, Passage W is strong evidence 
that the experiences (empeiriai) that the genetic account of APo. B.19 discusses 
each consist of more than one particular of the same kind, retained in memory.   
Bayer has a view of an experience (empeiria) contrary to my own, which 
is the more commonly accepted view. However, my view of the grasp of the 
universal—the third crucial thesis in my reading—is not as commonly accepted. 
My view of the grasp of the universal, again, is that the grasp consists of an 
undifferentiated experience becoming differentiated (i.e., “making a stand”), 
which is its universal form becoming differentiated from other forms in one’s 
mind. At that point, one has grasped primitive universal form, i.e. the infimae 
species, of the particulars subsumed by the experience. As is evident, this view 
depends on a view of what exactly an “undifferentiated item” (adiaphoron) is.  
 I have already argued against the claim that according to the genetic 
account the sense perception of a single particular is enough to instill a universal 
in the soul. I will now consider some other views, conflicting with my own, of 




exactly what the undifferentiated items (adiaphora) mentioned in Passage B are 
intended to be.  
 A common view (one held by Ross, Barnes, and McKirahan) is that an 
undifferentiated item is infimae species, as an infimae species is 
“undifferentiated” in a certain sense: it is not a genus internally differentiated into 
narrower species. For support of this view, the mention of undifferentiated items 
at APo., 97b31 is often cited.
7
  
 One problem with this view is a reading of a certain part of the genetic 
account that seems to necessarily result. Consider Passage C again: 
[C] 
 
[a] When one of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the soul; [b] for although [c] the 
particular is perceived, [d] the perception is of the universal,--[e] e.g. of 
man, not of Callias the man. (APo., 100a15-b1, trans. Barnes modified) 
 
With this view of undifferentiated items (adiaphora), statement Ca seems to be 
redundant, i.e. to say: when there is a simple concept in the soul, there is a simple 
concept in the soul. One of the consequences of such redundancy is a lack of 
explanation. Recall again that this part of the genetic account is intended to be a 
clarifying restatement of the passage of the rout metaphor. That passage is 
intended, through the metaphor, to explain how one arrives at a principle; thus, we 
should expect Passage C and the statements surrounding it to do the same. But to 
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say that when there is a simple concept in the soul there is a simple concept in the 
soul is non-explanatory.  
 Note that, given my reading, this problem does not occur. An 
“undifferentiated item” here is an experience, which is memories of percepts of 
particulars of the same kind mentally connected on the basis of similarity. But at 
this stage, the percepts and the experience are undifferentiated from other things 
in one’s mind. The experience “making a stand” is its becoming differentiated, the 
universal form instantiated by the particulars of the experience becoming 
distinguished (and thereby salient) from other forms in one’s mind. (Only at this 
point is there a differentia or the need for a differentia between the resulting 
universal and some wider genus implied; when one explicitly formulates a 
definition, one seeks an explicit differentia. Hence my view, just as the more 
common one, has the virtue of connecting Aristotle’s use of the term 
“undifferentiated item” to the term “differentia” referring to a part of a definition.) 
Clearly, my reading of the statement in Passage C before the “for” clause makes it 
more explanatory.    
 Further, consider the textual evidence cited for this at APo., 97b7-9 and 
b31. This chapter (B.13) is concerned with finding definitions through making 









You should look at items which are similar and undifferentiated 
[adiaphora], and first seek what they all have in common. (APo., 97b7-
9)  
 
Consider the second passage: 
[Y]  
 
[a] Every definition is always universal [katholou]: doctors do not say 
what is healthy for some particular [tini] eye, but rather for every eye or 
else for some determinate form of eye. 
 
[b] It is easier to define the particular [to kath’ hekaston] than the 
universal (that is why you should move from the particulars [tôn kath’ 
hekasta] to the universals). [c] For homonymy more often escapes 
notice among universals than among undifferentiated items [tois 
adiaphorois]. (APo., 97b25-31) 
 
For Passage Y, Barnes takes “particular” and “particulars” in statement Yb to 
refer to infimae species rather than to individuals. The main evidence cited for this 
is statement Ya, which says that all definitions are universal. This suggests that by 
“particular” and “particulars” in the next sentence, Aristotle does not mean 
ultimate particulars, but relative particulars, i.e. infimae species. And since 
“undifferentiated items” (adiaphora) in statement Yc seem to be the “particulars” 
referred to by Yb, there is a suggestion that the undifferentiated items are infimae 
species.
8
 (And, hence, there is evidence that the undifferentiated items mentioned 
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  Statement Yc appears to use the concept of homonyms (“homônumiai”) to refer to, not words, 
but two or more things (whether ultimate particulars or universal kinds) that are different in 
definition but denoted by the same word. Aristotle appears to use the concept similarly elsewhere. 





by Passage X are also infimae species.) In turn, Barnes takes Passages X and Y as 
evidence that the “undifferentiated items” in Passage C are infimae species 
(Barnes (2002), 248, 249-50, 266).
9
  
 In response to this, we should note that it is questionable whether 
“particular” and “particulars” in statement Yb refer to infimae species rather than 
ultimate particulars. For even if we take those words to refer to ultimate 
particulars, Passage Y can still be read in a coherent way. The way to do that is to 
read the phrase “define the particular” in statement Yb as meaning define, 
together, all particulars that are in a given species.  
But even if we treat those instances of “particular” (and its inflection) in 
Passage Y as referring to infimae species, we can still take “undifferentiated 
items” in Passages X and Y to refer to ultimate particulars that are 
undifferentiated from each other (i.e., are in the same infimae species). For this 
does not appear to undermine at all the coherence of either passage.  
 But whether “undifferentiated items” in the first passage and in the second 
sentence of the second passage refer to ultimate particulars or infimae species, my 
view is that it is not very relevant to how “undifferentiated items” in APo. B.19 
should be understood. For the context of usage in APo. B.13 is evidently 
significantly different from that of APo. B.19. B.19, again, is fairly clearly about 
the acquisition of concepts (and correlatively of propositions of a sort). In this 
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  Ross similarly takes the undifferentiated items mentioned in Passage C and APo. B.13 to be 




context it makes sense to speak of an experience from being undifferentiated from 
other forms in one’s mind. It’s becoming differentiated (i.e. its ‘making a stand’, 
its universal form becoming salient) serves to explain how one can come to know 
a universal from sense perceptions of particulars. B.13, on the other hand, is 
evidently about finding explicit definitions of concepts one already has.
10
 If one 
seeks to prescribe guidelines for reaching an explicit definition of such a concept, 
it is apparently useful to refer (as Aristotle seems to be doing), in order to indicate 
the items for which a commonality should first be sought, to individuals that are 
undifferentiated from each other (i.e. are in the same species) or to infimae 
species that are each internally undifferentiated.  We should, in other words, 
expect answers to the questions of how or from what an item is undifferentiated to 
change as the context (and in particular, the nature of the “item” in question) 
demands.  
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  A clear indication of this is a passage in APo. B.13 where Aristotle considers, as an example of 
finding a definition, finding the definition of magnanimity: “I mean, e.g., that if we were seeking 
what magnanimity is, we should inquire, in the case of some magnanimous men we know, what 
one feature they have in common as such” (APo., 97b16-8). Aristotle then proceeds to consider 
Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax as examples of magnanimous men (APo., 97b18-25). The passage 
that considers finding the definition of magnanimity as an example of finding a definition, says 
that “we should inquire, in the case of some magnanimous men we know…” This indicates that in 
the example, the definer(s) already has the concept of magnanimity, that he or she should consider 
magnanimous men, i.e., predicate the concept magnanimous to some men one knows, and 
consider what they have in common. Obviously, one cannot predicate a concept one does not does 
not have. This example indicates that the theoretical discussion of finding definitions beginning at 
APo., 96a20 (the beginning of Ch. B.13) of finding definitions through division assumes that the 
definer(s) has the concept he or she seeks to divide and define. For one cannot try to divide a kind 





 Robert Bolton in “Aristotle’s Method in Natural Science” also upholds an 
uncommon view of “undifferentiated items.” I find much in Bolton’s paper to be 
agreeable, especially his view that the acquisition of principles as described in 
APo. B.19 is intended to be an inductive, inferential process.
11
 I disagree, 
however, with his view of the nature of an “undifferentiated item,” and connected 
with this, his view of the nature of an “experience,” and a “universal” (katholou) 
in APo. B. 19.  
 Bolton holds that the “undifferentiated items” of Passage C are 
“experiences,” a claim with which I agree. He thinks, however, that what these 
“undifferentiated items” and “experiences” are should be understood in the light 
of Phys. I.1 (Bolton, 4-9). According to Phys I.1, what is “more familiar to us” (as 
against “more familiar in nature”) is what is katholou, which Aristotle in that 
chapter describes as a “compounded” mental content, i.e. a whole consisting of 
parts that have not yet been distinguished from each other (Phys., 184a1-26). 
Aristotle in that chapter gives two examples of such a content. The first is the 
notion denoted by “circle,” which Aristotle says includes many things before they 
are distinguished from each other. The second is the notions a young child 
denotes by “mother” and “father.” Aristotle says that young children refer to all 
women as “mother” and all men as “father” until they distinguish the persons to 
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whom “mother” and “father” correctly refer from whom they do not (Phys., 
184a26-b5).  
  According to Bolton, an “experience,” “undifferentiated item” and 
“katholou,” as described in APo. B.19, should be understood as such a mental 
“compound” (Bolton, 5-9). It is by analyzing such compounds into parts that one 
obtains principles, and this (presumably) is part of the epagôgê mentioned in that 
chapter as the means to acquiring a principle.
12
  
 Bolton presents an internally coherent view of how to understand the 
genetic account. My argument against Bolton’s view is that we should prefer my 
reading because it is also internally coherent and preferable in some respects to 
Bolton’s view.   
 Part of the reason Bolton gives for reading APo. B.19 in light of Phys. I.1 
is that according to Aristotle, the scientist’s justification of principles cannot be 
dialectical. And though much of The Physics (including the very next chapter, I.2) 
seems to argue dialectically, Bolton reasons that this is not because Aristotle 
thinks that a dialectical justification of principles is sufficient for the scientist. 
Rather, it is because dialectical arguments—arguments that proceed from a 
                                                 
12
  Presumably, an example of the process, according to Bolton’s reading of the genetic account, 
would be to begin with a jumbled mental compound one denotes with the word circle. This is the 
“undifferentiated item” (adiaphoron). The compound includes ovals, ellipses, and other non-
circles. One then analyzes it into parts, and recognizes that the ovals, ellipses, etc. are unlike 
circles, and sets them aside. Once the word “circle” in one’s mind denotes only circles, one can 
then arrive at a definitional principle, like: any circle has all of its points on its edge an equal 





consideration of endoxa—are appropriate for addressing past scientists such as 
Parmenides and the other Eleatics.
13
 This is part of the reason Bolton thinks that 
Phys. I.1, which seems to be about the acquisition and justification of principles, 
should be read as discussing the same topic as APo. B.19, and not, as others have 
thought, as discussing the discovery of principles in the context of dialectical, as 
against demonstrative, reasoning (Bolton, 13-9).    
 One problem with Bolton’s reading of APo. B.19 in light of Phys., I.1 is 
that Phys. I.1 appears to contradict, in a certain way, a chapter from the same 
work as APo. B.19, Ch. A.2. On the one hand, Phys. I.1. implies that the katholou 
is “more familiar to us,” and the kath’ hekasta are “more familiar in nature” 
(Phys., 184a16-26).  On the other, APo. A.2 implies the reverse (APo., 71b34-
72a6). Bolton recognizes that Phys. I.1 appears to contradict APo. A.2. Bolton’s 
way of reconciling the two is to understand “katholou” in Phys. I.1 in the way I 
indicated and translate it as “comprehensive,” while translating “to kath’ 
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  Bolton thinks that Aristotle is aware that Parmenides, for example, would not accept a non-
dialectical inductive argument, based on sense perception, that change exists, precisely because 
Parmenides would consider the sense perception intended to ground the particular premises to be 
deceptive. But Parmenides could not be expected to accept any of the endoxa from which a 
dialectical argument proceeds, either. Bolton, however, does not think that Aristotle would 
consider others’ rejection of such endoxa a problem. For he thinks that, for Aristotle, certain 
acceptable endoxa are, by the very nature of dialectic, the starting point of dialectic argument. If 
Parmenides or other scientists refuse to accept them, they are simply refusing to do proper 









 For my response to Bolton, consider another way of reconciling APo. A.2 
and Phys I.1. We can read Phys. I.1 as about the acquisition of principles in a 
dialectical, as against demonstrative, context, while recognizing that APo. A.2 
assumes a demonstrative context.
15
 On this view, we can keep the common 
translation of “katholou” as “universal” and of “kath’ hekasta” as “particulars” for 
both chapters.  
Bolton may object that that the Physics is a work of a certain science or 
epistêmê (namely, that of nature), and that Aristotle does not think that a 
scientist’s justification of principles can be dialectical. Though I agree with 
Bolton that Aristotle thinks that a scientist’s justification of a principle cannot be 
dialectical, it is reasonable that an Aristotelian scientist could think that dialectic 
is, in a certain sense, a means to arriving at principles. This is the sense of 
dialectic allowing a scientist to distinguish principles from non-principles. Again, 
on my reading of the genetic account of APo. B.19, a person acquires principles 
(of science, i.e. epistêmê, and craft, i.e., technê) through epagôgê based on sense 
perception. But, as I have indicated, APo. A.4 requires that predications in the 
                                                 
14
  Apparently, for APo. A.2, Bolton thinks we should keep the common translations of “katholou” 
and “kath’ hekasta,” i.e. “universal” and “particulars” respectively (Bolton, 4).  
 
15
  The stated subject of the Analytics is demonstration: “We must first state what our inquiry is 
about and what its object is, saying that it is about demonstration and that its object is 




ultimate premises of demonstration meet certain requirements. The predications 
must be definitional. In order to distinguish real principle premises, i.e. those that 
have definitional predications as per APo. A.4, from other generalizations one has 
obtained from sense perception and epagôgê, we need to arrive at explicit 
definitions of concepts. The role of dialectic would be to help a prospective 
scientist arrive at and test a definition of a concept, and thereby distinguish a 
principle premise connected with that concept from non-principles. To determine 
whether “all (or most) humans reason,” for example, is a real principle of 
demonstration, one would seek to dialectically find and test the definition of 
man.
16
 If through the testing, one recognizes “rational” as the correct differentia 
of man (and, perhaps, mammal as the genus), one would, presumably, recognize 
that that the predication in the putative propositional principle is definitional and 
satisfies the requirements set by APo. A.4 for a principle of demonstration.
17
 By 
contrast, the generalization that all (or most) humans can use tools, would 
presumably, fail the requirement of its predication being definitional. This is a use 
of dialectic that does not consist in seeking to justify a principle of science (as, 
                                                 
16
  APo. B.13, discussed above in connection with Barnes, appears to be about a positive 
dialectical process of finding definitions through a method of divisions, while Top. VI appears to 
be about testing definitions in dialectic to see if they satisfy certain criteria.  
 
17
  One of the criteria set by APo. A.4 is that a predication in a premise of demonstration hold “in 
every case” (“kata pantos”), (APo.,73a24-35). This seems to contradict the claim of Ch. B.12 
(APo., 96a8ff)  that some principles that hold only “for the most part.” (See Ch. 1, fn. 8.) But to 
make the Posterior Analytics internally consistent, it seems that the latter claim needs to be 
interpreted as relaxing the “in every case” (“kata pantos”) requirement of Ch. A.4 (for, perhaps, 




again, I agree with Bolton that Aristotle does not think that the scientist’s 
justification of principles would be dialectical). It would rather be used to 
distinguish principles of epistêmê from generalizations that are not principles of 
epistêmê, and presupposes that the scientist has already acquired some concepts 
and general propositions as described by the genetic account of APo. B.19. Again, 
the justification of a principle of science (epistêmê), as per my reading of the 
genetic account, would be epagôgê based on sense perception.    
 This is my reading, and it is also internally coherent. But why should we 
prefer my reading? Here are two reasons why. 
 First, it would be rather sloppy of Aristotle if APo. A.2 and Phys. I.1 
employ the same language (i.e. “more familiar to us” vs. “more familiar in nature” 
or in an unqualified sense, and “katholou” vs. “to kath’ hekaston”), both in the 
context of demonstrative reasoning, and yet seem to blatantly contradict one 
another. For again, APo. A.2 claims that the kath’ hekasta rather than the katholou 
is more familiar to us. Phys. I.1 claims the reverse.  
We could instead take Aristotle to change his mind by the time of writing 
Phys. I.1. But, evidently, the more charitable interpretation is my own. It avoids 
ascribing to Aristotle such a sharp change of mind. And because it reads the two 
chapters as assuming two different contexts (demonstrative reasoning for APo. 
A.2 and dialectical reasoning for Phys. I.1), the appearance of a blatant 




context of demonstrative reasoning. Its claim at 71b34-72a6 is, that the kath’ 
hekasta (particulars) are more familiar to us. In my view, it is because they can be 
perceived directly with our senses. The katholou (universal), by contrast, cannot 
be directly perceived by us.
18
 We must arrive at the katholou by reasoning 
(specifically, epagôgê based on sense perception which is what my reading of the 
genetic account of APo. B.19 describes). But, if in Phys. I.1, Aristotle is, as I 
claim, assuming a context of dialectical reasoning, using division to find 
definitions, then we can make sense of its claim that the katholou (universal) and 
not the kath’ hekasta (particulars) is more familiar to us. For in dialectical 
reasoning, in the process of dialectical division, we begin with a universal 
concept, and through a method of division, we analyze it into particulars. The 
particulars may be particular species or ultimate particulars. We may continue the 
process of division until we reach ultimate particulars. But dividing a concept into 
the particular species or ultimate particulars it subsumes must be done before we 
can ask what they have in common, a question which is part of the process of 
finding a definition.
19
 We also need to use the method of division to find the 
differentia within the genus of the concept we are defining.
20
   
                                                 
18
  This is supported by the evidence I present in Ch. 2 that for Aristotle, only particulars are 
objects of sense perception.  
 
19
  APo. B.13, discussed in connection with Barnes, appears to describe such a process at 97b6-31.  
 
20
  This seems to be discussed in APo. B.13 at 96b26-97a23. Testing to determine whether one has 




More generally, the process of taking apart a mental compound, if it is a 
process of induction, seems more naturally like part of a dialectical process than 
that of a non-dialectical process of inductive discovery. And in my interpretation, 
the former is exactly what Phys. I.1 intends the process to be, whereas APo. B.19 
intends it to be the latter.   
Second, and connected with this, it would be preferable to translate 
“kathalou” and “to kath’ hekaston” one way rather than two in order to make a 
claim using these terms in APo. A.2 consistent with another, apparently 
conflicting claim using these terms in Phys. I.1.  Bolton does the latter. I do the 
former, as I have just indicated above. In my reading, we can translate “katholou” 
as “universal” and “to kath’ hekaston” as “particular” in both APo. A.2 and B.19. 
 Let us now turn to defending my fourth crucial thesis, which is about the 
role of “epagôgê” in APo. B.19. To do this, we need to consider a certain view of 
“epagôgê” in that chapter.  
 
III. The Role of Epagôgê 
In responding to Harari, I have indicated that for Aristotle, the genus of 
epagôgê is logos, and though in the Topics he defines  dialectical epagôgê as a 
species of dialectical logos, it is not plausible that he thinks that all epagôgê is 
dialectical. But the view of epagôgê as described in the genetic account for which 




T. Engberg-Pedersen in his article “More on Aristotlelian Epagoge,” has 
denied that epagôgê for Aristotle involves an inference. In what follows, I will 
present Engberg-Pedersen’s essential argument for this position, and then criticize 
the argument. As will be seen, I agree with many of John Upton’s criticisms, in 
his article “A Note on Aristotelian Epagoge,” of Engberg-Pedersen’s argument.  
Engberg-Pedersen bases his position on an analysis of two terms in 
Aristotle’s works: “epagôgê” and “nous.” Engberg-Pedersen thinks there are 
several senses of “epagôgê” in Aristotle’s works, but that they are all related in a 
certain way. According to Engberg-Pedersen, none of these senses refer to a 
process of inference, but rather refer to a process of gaining “insight” into 
something, often a universal term or universal proposition. 
Engberg-Pedersen thinks that there is evidence of one of the senses of 
“epagôgê” in the Prior Analytics before Ch. B.23 and in the Posterior Analytics 
(Engberg-Pedersen, 303).
21
 This is the sense of: “leading another person into 
something with the aim and consequence that he acquires insight into it” 
(Engberg-Pedersen, 301). Engberg-Pedersen argues that this is the sense that leads 
to other, more advanced senses that Aristotle held. So, we should consider this to 
be the primary sense of “epagôgê” for Aristotle (Engberg-Pedersen, 301-2). 
Engberg-Pedersen discusses what he thinks are other senses, based on his 
identification of the primary sense. For example, he thinks that the first sense 
                                                 
21




leads to a second one: “leading another person towards something katholou or 
universal with the aim and consequence that he acquires insight into it” (Engberg-
Pedersen, 301). And he thinks that the second sense leads to a third one: “leading 
another person, by pointing to particular cases, towards something katholou with 
the aim and consequence that he acquires insight into it” (Engberg-Pedersen, 
301). Engberg-Pedersen identifies six such related senses and tries to provide 
textual evidence for each.  
For the senses of “epagôgê” that refer to gaining an insight into a 
universal truth, Engberg-Pedersen takes Aristotle to take “nous” to have a sense 
that refers to a faculty with a role in the process. According to Engberg-Pedersen, 
the relevant sense for Aristotle is that of only a generalizing faculty that does not 
certify its generalizations. Indeed, any immediate result of epagôgê and nous may 
be either true or false (Engberg-Pedersen, 310-11). The generalization, based on a 
few examples—and often just one or two—should, however, be held on to until 
and unless one is confronted with counter-examples (Engberg-Pedersen, 311). It 
is nous in such a role that is the “insight” in a process of epagôgê that consists of 
being led to a universal proposition (Engberg-Pedersen, 307, 310-1).  
 The implication of such an account of epagôgê and nous is that epagôgê, 
for Aristotle, is not inferential. It is rather intuitional. When one performs an 
epagôgê that consists of considering one, two, or a few particular facts, one does 




based on the facts, a generalization which may or may not be true, but which one 
should hold on to until and unless counter-examples are produced.   
 Engberg-Pedersen is aware that APr. B.23 is often read in a way that 
makes epagôgê perfect induction, and as such, inferential (indeed, a type of 
sullogismos). Engberg-Pedersen, however, thinks that that chapter ought to be 




 Upton, in “A Note on Aristotelian Epagoge,” criticizes Engberg-
Pedersen’s position, and I essentially agree with Upton’s criticisms. The central 
criticism that Upton levels against Engberg-Pedersen is that the position that nous 
for Aristotle is only a generalizing faculty is false. Upton points out (Upton, 173) 
that even if Engberg-Pedersen is correct that nous for Aristotle is a generalizing 
faculty as per DA,
23
 Engberg-Pedersen’s evidence that nous in the context of an 
epagôgê is only supposed to be a generalizing faculty is inconclusive and as such 
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  Engberg-Pedersen’s reading of APr. B.23 is based on his view of Aristotelian “epagôgê” and 
“nous” which he argues for earlier. Because my criticism is of this basis—Engberg-Pedersen’s 
view of Aristotelian “epagôgê” and “nous”—I do not discuss his reading of APr. B.23 in detail 
here. Essentially, he thinks that APr. B.23 has to be read as follows. Before we perform the 
“deduction from induction,” we must know that B (bile-less) holds of all C (individual long-lived 
species) and only of C. However, APr. B.23 is not concerned with how we come to know these, 
and in particular, does not claim that we come to know these by a complete enumeration of all 
long-lived and gall-less species. See Engberg-Pedersen, 311-4. This makes the reading consistent 
with Engberg-Pedersen’s view of Aristotelian “epagôgê” and “nous” discussed above.   
 
23
 Actually, Engberg-Pedersen does not cite any particular passage in DA to support this view, but 
makes only a passing and general reference to DA III.4ff (Engberg-Pedersen, 308). The discussion 







 Indeed, as Upton points out (Upton, 173-4), Engberg-Pedersen’s 
own account of APo. A.31 indicates that for Aristotle, nous helps provide 
knowledge: it enables one to recognize the true general causes of burning glass 
and eclipses, not just reach generalizations that may or may not be true. But 
Engberg-Pedersen evidently does not take the “true” part very seriously (Upton, 
174).   
 Upton offers some additional and very strong evidence against Engberg-
Pedersen’s position. Upton points out first that Aristotle does not admit either in 
APo. A.31 or EN VI.11 that the immediate results of epagôgê and nous can be or 
are admitted to be false (Upton, 174). Indeed, according to Posterior Analytics, 
epagôgê provides the foundations of demonstration, somehow yielding its starting 
points (archai), which, presumably, would include (or would be) ultimate 
premises. And the premises of a demonstration are “better known than” the 
demonstrated knowledge (APo. A.2, 71b17-33). Further, given that Posterior 
Analytics clearly implies demonstrated knowledge is certain, it is impossible to 
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 Engberg-Pedersen refers to APo. A.31 where Aristotle claims that one cannot come to know 
(epistasthai) something through sense perception alone, because we perceive particulars and not 
universals. This may be taken to imply that we also need intellect (nous) to know (epistasthai) 
something, because nous enables us to generalize and thereby become aware of the universal. But 
this chapter does not seem to imply that nous is only a generalizing faculty. Indeed, as I continue 
above, Upton points out that Engberg-Pedersen’s own account of the examples in APo. A.31 of 
coming to know the general causes of burning glass and of eclipses suggests that for Aristotle 
nous not only makes generalizations but does so veridically. For further evidence that nous for 
Aristotle is a generalizing faculty Engberg-Pedersen refers to EN VI.11, 1143a35-b5 (Engberg-
Pedersen, 310), where Aristotle seems to say that nous is responsible to reaching the ultimates of 
demonstration. To reach such “ultimates,” Engberg-Pedersen says, nous must be able to 
generalize. (Engberg-Pedersen, 310-11) Upton, again, points out that Aristotle does not here say 





escape the position that the ultimate premises of demonstration, obtained by 
epagôgê and nous, must also be certainly true.
 25
  
 I think Upton puts this point, and the criticism of Engberg-Pedersen’s 
position that it implies, well: 
By his account, E-P [Engberg-Pedersen] implies that more than 
epagoge and nous must come into play in order to achieve such true 
and necessary premises which are the archai epistemes, or that these 
archai cannot be achieved at all. Since he (Aristotle) explicitly takes up 
the question of those states of knowing that are concerned with true, 
universal and necessary propositions (cf. APo. I 33, 88b30ff), and since 
he concludes that knowledge, generated by demonstration or achieved 
by nous—the arche episteme (88b36) and the state of mind that results 
from epagoge—is of true and necessary universal premises, Aristotle 
himself strongly suggests that epagoge and nous are sufficient for 
achieving archai and that indeed archai are achievable. (Upton, 174) 
 
 Further, Upton remarks that the immediate results of epagôgê and nous, 
given Engberg-Pedersen’s description of these, would be what Aristotle calls 
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 See APo. B.19. Aristotle begins this chapter by stating that what follows will make plain how 
we discover the archai of demonstration (99b16-9). Later, after a discussion of how we come to 
know primitives [prota], he offers a summary and says, “Thus it is plain that we must get to know 
the primitives by induction [epagôgêi]; for this is the way in which perception instills the 
universal” (100b3-5, trans. Barnes modified). So, apparently, the “primitives” either are or are 
among or are parts of the archai of demonstration. Later, in regard to the states “by which we 
grasp truth,” the chapter says, “Of the intellectual states by which we grasp truth, some are always 
true and some admit of falsehood  (e.g. opinion and calculation do –whereas understanding [which 
is of demonstrated conclusions] and comprehension [nous,, which is of the archai, starting points, 
of demonstration] are always true); and no kind apart from comprehension [nous] is more exact 
than understanding” (APo., 100b6 -9).  The implication is that at least some products of epagôgê 
and nous, namely archai of demonstration, must be certainly true. This implication is strengthened 
by Ch. A.4, which states that “A demonstration …is a deduction which proceeds from necessities” 
(73a24-5), and then proceeds to offer criteria for determining whether a proposition is necessary. 
Knowledge of the necessary, whether nous or episteme, would, it seems, be certain, and not just 
probabilistic, knowledge, since, if one believes a claim is only probably true, one believes it could 





“opinion” (“doxa”), (Upton, 174).
26
 And it is clear that for Aristotle, mere 
opinions cannot be the ultimate premises of demonstrations.
27
  
 Upton further remarks that in the face of evidence in the Posterior 
Analytics and the Nicomachean Ethics that conflicts with Engberg-Pedersen’s 
view, one would expect Engberg-Pedersen to cite texts that both deal with the 
apprehension of archai and present counter-arguments to the position of the 
Posterior Analytics and the Nicomachean Ethics that support Engberg-Pedersen’s 
view. This is a reasonable expectation. But, as Upton remarks, Engberg-Pedersen 
cites no such texts, evidently because he cannot. For there are no such texts.  
 I thus agree with Upton that we must reject Engberg-Pedersen’s view that 
for Aristotle the immediate results of epagôgê and nous may be either true or 
false. Rejecting that, we must reject the implication that all epagôgê for Aristotle 
is non-inferential. If epagôgê and nous yield true generalizations when the 
epagôgê is an imperfect induction, then there must be an inference from the 
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 See APo. A.33, 88b30-89a4, especially: “Now it is comprehension [nous] and understanding 
[episteme] and opinion [doxa] (and what is called after them) which are true. Hence it remains that opinion 
is concerned with what is true or false but can also be otherwise” (APo., 89a1-4).  
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  This leaves unanswered the question of whether Aristotle thought that nous somehow justifies 
the inference in an epagôgê, and thereby provides the solution to the problem of induction. I will 





IV. Nous is Not Intuition 
 My concern in denying that nous for Aristotle is intuition is not to argue 
that “intuition” is in no sense whatsoever a proper translation of “nous.” It is 
rather to deny the cognitive function that many commentators have taken nous to 
have: to directly grasp the universal in particulars and thereby be a justification 
for the inductive leap. The translation of “nous” as “intuition” typically reflects 
the view that the grasp of principles is a non-discursive intuitive grasp that is not 
troubled by (or involves the intuition as the solution to) the problem of induction.  
 Commentators who take nous as intuition that solves or avoids the 
problem of induction generally base their position on one or both of two general 
considerations. These are as follows. (1) Aristotle is aware of the epistemic frailty 
of induction (epagôgê) in reaching general truths. This suggests that he did not 
think that epagôgê alone could secure the truth of propositional principles of 
demonstration. Given this, it seems reasonable that he would take nous, alone or 
in connection with epagogic discovery, as the means of ascertaining the truth of 
propositional principles.  (2) The genetic account of APo. B.19 describes a 
process, of coming to know principles of demonstration, that is non-discursive. 
Hence, epagôgê as a process of reasoning or argument is not the means of 
coming to know principles. This creates the suggestion that a non-discursive act 




I have already argued, in Ch. 3, against two commentators who take nous 
as the means of coming to know the principles: Evans and Harari. As I indicated 
in Ch. 2, part of the reason that Evans subscribes to this view is the first of the two 
considerations. Harari, however, clearly based hers on the second consideration.
29
  
Recall that my criticisms of Evans and Harari consisted in part in 
resolving the contradictory triad that (a) epagôgê is the means of coming to know 
principles, that (b) epagôgê is a logos, and that (c) nous, not logos, is the means of 
knowing principles. I have argued that it is more plausible to deny (c), if “logos” 
is taken to mean “reasoning,” than (a) or (b). Resolving this contradictory triad 
constitutes a major part of my criticism against commentators who take nous as 
intuition that “just sees” the universal. For if we ascribe to Aristotle (c), where 
“logos” is taken to mean “reasoning,” then there is a strong  suggestion that he 
thinks nous as a non-discursive faculty (such as intuition) somehow allows one to 
“just see” the universal concepts and/or general ultimate premises of 
demonstration, so that there is no unsolved problem of induction.    
For what follows, I will consider and criticize other views that for 
Aristotle nous is intuition that solves or allows one to avoid the problem of 
induction. I will consider views based on the first of the two considerations first.  
 
                                                 
29
  Again, according to Harari, what she calls “inductive perception” is non-discursive, performed 




 Bayer holds that Aristotle is aware of the problem of induction, that for 
Aristotle, epagôgê by itself is “too frail” to obtain principles which are “truer” and 
“more exact” and “better known than” the demonstrated objects of epistêmê 
(Bayer, 126-8).  
Ross holds a similar view (Ross, 37, 47-51). In Ross’ view, good 
Aristotelian epagogic reasoning that is not perfect induction (which is what Ross 
thinks is discussed in APr. B.23) yields a conclusion that is probably, but not 
certainly, true (Ross, 48). Hence, induction (epagôgê) cannot serve as a proof or 
demonstration of a principle of demonstration. In coming to know principles, a 
process of epagôgê in which one perceives particular facts suggests a general 
propositional principle that subsumes those facts. But it is only through an act of 
intuition or insight—nous—that we can be certain of the truth of the principle 
(Ross, 49).  
Finally, Victor Kal holds a similar view.
30
 According to Kal, any epagogic 
argument that is not perfect induction is, for Aristotle, not conclusive (Kal, 27-31, 
110). Kal thinks that for Aristotle, it is sense perception, experience, and intuition 
(nous), not epagôgê, that secures the truth of a principle of demonstration (Kal, 
44-53, 110-1).
31
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  Victor Kal, On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 
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31
  Kal’s basis for this view, in addition to his claim that for Aristotle all induction that is imperfect 




But with my reading of the genetic account, and the putative solution, 
based on the doctrine of natural kinds, to the problem of induction,  it is not 
reasonable that Aristotle thought the epagôgê described in the genetic account 
was too frail. Again, on my reading, the genetic account describes a process of 
grasping universal forms on the basis of sense perceptions of particulars. A 
universal form is grasped when an experience (empeiria) is differentiated in one’s 
mind from other forms. As Aristotle thinks that the form of a thing determines 
what it is (i.e., that the definition of thing reflects its form), grasping a universal 
form allows one grasp with certainty the truth of a definitional propositional 
principle connected with that universal form. In grasping the universal form of 
man, for example, one presumably recognizes that reasoning is a part of that form 
which differentiates it from other forms in one’s mind (such as those of non-
human animals). Hence upon grasping the form, one knows the truth of the 
principle that all (or most) humans reason with certainty.
32
 On this reading, one 
does not have good grounds to take Aristotle to think that epagôgê is too frail to 
secure the truth of propositional principles of demonstration. Thus, on this 
reading, one cannot justifiably cite Aristotle allegedly taking epagôgê to be 
                                                                                                                                     
110) and that the process of coming to know principles described in the genetic account is not 
dialectical or discursive (Kal, 44-52, 110-1). Kal thinks, much like Hamlyn, that the epagôgê 
mentioned in APo. B.19 is a dialectical argument employed by a teacher to produce an initial 
tentative acceptance of a principle by the student (Kal, 51-3, 111), but to be fully certain of the 




  I will discuss Aristotle’s attempted solution to the problem of induction, as it pertains to the 




epistemically frail as evidence that the genetic account introduces nous as 
intuition which allows one to grasp general truths without induction or which 
supplements induction by certifying the truth of the conclusion reached by 
induction. 
We can now turn to the second main consideration for taking nous in the 
genetic account as intuition that solves or allows one to avoid the problem of 
induction. This is the claim that the genetic account of APo. B.19 describes a 
process of coming to know principles that is non-discursive. This is part of the 
reason that Irwin and Kal take nous in the genetic account as intuition (Irwin, 
135-6; Kal, 46, 110). The evidence cited by both Irwin (in Irwin, 125-33) and Kal 
(in Kal, 46-7, 110-111) that principles of demonstration for Aristotle are not 
discursively justified is as follows. APo. A.1 claims that “[a]ll teaching and all 
learning of an intellectual [dianoêtikê] kind proceed from pre-existent knowledge 
[gnôseôs]” (APo., 71a1-2). This appears to introduce the concept of a chain of 
demonstrations. In APo. A.3, Aristotle seems to consider the idea of a chain of 
demonstrations, asking whether such a chain needs to terminate at some 
foundation, or if it can regress infinitely and still constitute demonstration, or if it 
can be circular and still constitute demonstration. Aristotle rejects the second and 






 which is not demonstrated, but is the ultimate basis of 
demonstrations (APo., 72b19-25). The suggestion is that such undemonstrated 
knowledge is foundational and hence acquired through non-discursive means.
34
 
The genetic account of APo. B.19 is evidently about how we acquire this 
undemonstrated knowledge which is the basis of demonstration. Hence, there is 
the suggestion that the genetic account about how we come to acquire this 
knowledge is intended to describe a non-discursive process.  
However, the suggestion that the undemonstrated knowledge mentioned in 
APo. A.3 (and discussed in APo. B.19) is acquired through non-discursive means 
as a result of its being foundational is evidently incorrect. For APo. A.3 considers 
and rejects the possibility of a circular chain of demonstration and of an infinite 
chain of demonstration. Demonstration (apodeixis) for Aristotle is a kind of 
sullogismos (APo., 71b16-34), and, again, as I argue in Ch. 1 and 3, sullogismos is 
one of the two main species of logos, the other being epagôgê. Hence, one cannot 
legitimately infer that the undemonstrated knowledge mentioned in APo. A.3 (and 
discussed in B.19) is non-discursive (i.e., reached and justified by non-discursive 
means). One can only infer that such knowledge is undemonstrated, and the 
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  Here, at APo., 72b19-25 (Ch. A.3), where Aristotle makes this claim, he refers to such 
undemonstrated knowledge with the same term he uses to refer to demonstrated knowledge: 
epistêmê. However, in APo. B.19 at 100b5-17, he seems to modify his position, saying that this 
undemonstrated knowledge is nous and not epistêmê, reserving the term “epistêmê” only for 
demonstrated knowledge.   
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  The general sense of the term “discursive” as used by commentators appears to be “proceeding 





foundation all demonstrated knowledge. As I indicate in my reading of the 
genetic account (and especially in my response to Hamlyn in Ch.2), the account 
indicates that the knowledge (the concepts and certain definitional propositions) at 
the foundation of demonstrated knowledge is acquired through a certain kind of 
reasoning (i.e. is discursively acquired and justified in a certain way): epagôgê 
based on sense perception. 
Further, it is not accurate to say that APo. A.1, which begins with the 
statement that “[a]ll teaching and all learning of an intellectual [dianoêtikê] kind 
proceed from pre-existent knowledge [gnôseôs]” (APo., 71a1-2) is discussing 
only a chain of demonstrations. For very shortly after, the chapter mentions both 
deductive and epagogic reasoning both proceeding from prior knowledge (i.e., 
both being discursive):  
[Z]  
 
Similarly with arguments [tous logous] both deductive [hoi dia 
sullogismôn] and inductive [hoi di’ epagôgês]: they affect their 
teaching through what we already know, the former assuming items 
which we are presumed to grasp, the latter proving something universal 
by way of the fact that the particular cases are plain. (APo., 71a5-9) 
 
Hence, the correct relationship between this part of APo. A.1 and A.3 is evidently 
not that A.1 introduces the concept of a chain of demonstrations and A.3 asks 
whether such a chain must terminate or whether it can be circular or regress 
infinitely. The correct relationship is rather that A.1 introduces the concept of a 




demonstrative reasoning in particular must terminate or not. A.3 answers that it 
must, states some knowledge is undemonstrated, not that some knowledge is non-
discursive. Then, the genetic account of APo B.19, given my reading, describes 
how this undemonstrated knowledge is acquired and justified: through a 
discursive process of epagôgê based on sense perception.
35
 
For part of their evidence that the genetic account of APo. B.19 intends to 
describe a non-discursive process, both Irwin (Irwin, 135-6) and Kal (Kal, 46-7, 
131) refer, in addition, to a part of that chapter which may be taken to imply that 
claim, namely Passage I, which I discuss in Ch. 3: 
[I] 
 
…the principles [archai] of demonstration are more familiar, and all 
understanding [epistêmê] involves an account [esti meta logou]. Hence, 
there will not be understanding of the principles; and since nothing 
apart from comprehension [noun] can be truer than understanding, 
there will be comprehension of the principles. (APo., 100b9-12) 
 
The part of Passage I translated “all understanding (epistêmê) involves an 
account” may alternatively be translated that “all understanding (epistêmê) is with 
reasoning.” The latter translation implies that the principles of demonstration are 
without reasoning, i.e. are not discursively discovered or justified. However, in 
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  Quoting Bolton’s fn. 4 is useful: “J. Barnes (Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (Oxford 1975), 251) 
criticizes Aristotle for invoking [in APo. II. 19] his earlier doctrine from I. 1 about ‘intellectual’ or 
inferential learning. His reason is that Aristotle does not believe that learning of the principles is 
intellectual, that is ‘knowledge of principles is not deduced knowledge’. But Aristotle’s invocation 
of the earlier doctrine shows that he does believe that learning of principles is inferential. The 
inferential process may not be deductive but, according to I. 1, not all intellectual learning is 
deductive. It may also be inductive (71a5-9), which is what Aristotle has in mind here (100b2-4)” 





Ch. 3 on Evans and Harari, I have argued that the latter translation is not a good 
one. My argument was in connection with a contradictory triad that seems to 
appear in the works of Aristotle:    
(d) Epagôgê is the means of coming to know principles (as indicated 
by APo. B.19).  
(e) Epagôgê is a kind of logos (as indicated by various texts). 
(f) Nous, not logos, is the means of coming to know principles (as 
indicated by the passage from EN, 1143a35-b4). 
Again, I had argued that the evidence that Aristotle holds (a) and (b) is very 
strong, but that we can reasonably deny that he holds (c) if “logos” in (c) is taken 
to mean reasoning. As discussed in Ch. 3, if, in the Nicomachean Ethics passage 
on which (c) is based (and in Passage I), we translate inflections of “logos” as 
“account” or “explanatory account” rather than “reasoning,” this is consistent 
with his view of the nature of the “immediate” (amesa) principles of 
demonstration. On that basis we can deny that he holds (c) if “logos” in (c) is 
taken to mean “reasoning,” and thereby resolve the contradictory triad.  
 In addition to the claim that the genetic account of APo. B.19 is supposed 
to describe a non-discursive process of coming to know the principles, Irwin and 
Kal each cite an additional reason for taking nous in that chapter as intuition that 




 Part of Irwin’s reason for taking nous in the genetic account as intuition is 
that induction alone would not explain how the principles of demonstrations could 
be better known in nature (Irwin, 135-6).
36
 My response is that, with my reading 
of the genetic account, a principle like “all (or most) humans reason” will be 
grounded in the subject form, in this case, that of man, and as such, will have the 
underpinning for it being better known in nature. For the processes of 
differentiating form from other forms will allow one to grasp what is distinctive 
and pertains to that form, i.e. what is definitional in connection with that form. 
(Again, for man, presumably rationality is the differentia.) It may require the 
divisional methods in APo. B prior to Ch. 19 to determine that it is definitional 
(i.e., involving a katholou predication as per APo. A.4),  a principle, and hence 
better known in nature. We do not need to appeal to nous as “intuition” to explain 
how Aristotle could think we would know that a principle is a principle and better 
known in nature than what is to be demonstrated. 
 Part of Kal’s reason for taking nous in the genetic account as intuition is 
that he thinks epagôgê for Aristotle is only a dialectical argument (and one that is 
too frail to secure principles), and as such has a certain function in our coming to 
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  Again, APo. A.2 at APo., 71b34-72a6 distinguishes between what is more familiar (or better 
known) to us and what is more familiar (or better known) in nature. The suggestion is as follows. 
What is particular and directly perceivable with our senses, or at least more easily perceivable with 
our senses, is better known to us. However, what is universal (i.e., katholou, and thereby logically 
more basic in demonstrations) is better known in nature. Further, Ch. A.4 requires that a katholou 
predication be essential (i.e., definitional) thereby seeming to further specify what it is for 




know prinicples, but cannot explain how we first become acquire the material 
behind (i.e., the sense empeiriai) and secure a principle. So, Kal thinks, this must 
be explained by sense perception and nous as intuition (Kal, 27-31, 44-53). 
However, as I indicated earlier (in Ch. 3) when arguing that for Aristotle logos is 
the genus of epagôgê, it is not plausible that Aristotle thinks that epagôgê is only 
a dialectical argument. And, in Ch. 4, I indicate how Aristotle could plausibly 
think that non-dialectical epagôgê, based on sense perception, consists in moving 
from sense perception to memory and experience to the universal (and correlative 
propositional principles connected with the universal).  
 While there are passages in the Nicomachean Ethics that suggest that nous 
is a faculty, this is not enough for us to think that it is non-discursive intuition that 
grasps the principles. And, those passages do not imply that nous being a faculty 
is opposed to its being a state. To reiterate my claim from Ch. 3, if we integrate 
those passages with APo. B.19, nous in APo. B.19 is the state (but not the process) 
by which we know principles. It is a state which is innate in the sense of being a 
certain innate faculty (dunamis, potentiality), namely sense perception. As this 
potentiality is actualized, nous comes to consist in actual cognitive content 
(percepts, experiences, and universal principles) and as such becomes a faculty 
that is more advanced (i.e. consists of more than just the faculty of sense 
perception). But nous is not the process by which we know principles. The 




is epagôgê based on sense perception. This is a picture that resolves any conflict 
between the claim of APo. B.19 that nous is the state of knowing the principles 
(which evidently, again, is the answer to the second of the two questions) and the 
passages in the Nicomachean Ethics which imply that nous is a faculty.  
 
 V. Conclusion 
 I have argued in previous chapters against the claim that the genetic 
account of APo. B.19 claims that the sense perception of a single particular is 
enough to grasp the universal it instantiates. We can now also reasonably claim 
that, according to the genetic account, the object of an experience (empeiria) is 
not one but many particulars. Connected with this, my view that according to the 
genetic account, an undifferentiated experience becoming differentiated is what 
allows us to grasp a universal and connected definitional truths, appears to be 
correct. Further, I take the process described by the genetic account to be a 
process of epagôgê based on sense perception. It seems that I have successfully 
defended the claim that the role of the epagôgê is to justify the propositional 
principles, not just to reach them. Finally, it seems that I have also cleared away 
the claim that Aristotle considers in the genetic account nous to be intuition that 
grasps principles without induction or as a supplement to induction that secures 




the genetic account of APo. B.19 is aware of the problem of induction and holds a 





Chapter 6: Other Conceptions of Aristotelian Induction 
 
I. Introduction 
  I have so far presented (in Ch. 4) my reading of the genetic account of 
APo. B.19 and have defended (in Ch. 2, 3, and 5) my reading of the genetic 
account from other readings of that account.  
But before I discuss in detail the implications of my reading of the genetic 
account with regard to whether Aristotle is aware of the problem of induction in 
that account and whether he has an attempted solution to that problem, there are 
two other conceptions of Aristotelian induction I need to consider. These are 
conceptions of Aristotelian induction which conflict with my reading of the 
genetic account of APo. B.19 but which are not themselves based on readings of 
the genetic account. My intent in this chapter is to consider and criticize these 
conceptions of Aristotelian induction. The conceptions I will consider and 
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II. William Whewell’s Conception 
 Whewell in his essay “Criticism of Aristotle’s Account of Induction” 
provides a reading of APr.  B.23. As part of that, he thinks that Aristotle did not 
regard induction as a sort of reasoning. Part of Whewell’s basis for that position is 
an analysis of the “sullogismos ex epagôgês” in APr.  B.23. Recognizing that 
Aristotle bases his claim therein on individual long-lived species (i.e. on C’s), 
Whewell claims Aristotle must have known that at any point in zoological 
discovery, we cannot know how many long-lived species there are (Whewell, 
316). Aristotle would know, Whewell thinks, that we cannot know whether we 
know of all the long-lived species. Thus, according to Whewell, if Aristotle thinks 
that we can be convinced through induction that all C’s are B (i.e. that all 
particular long-lived species are bile-less), it cannot be either that Aristotle 
regarded the induction as a perfect one, nor that Aristotle regarded the induction 
as imperfect but rationally justified. Aristotle must have regarded the induction as 
imperfect, Whewell thinks. But if we ask how he would rationally justify such an 
induction, we have a mistaken assumption behind our question. Since Aristotle 
must have been aware that we cannot know whether we know of all long-lived 
species, for example, he must have been aware that induction is unjustified as 
reasoning. According to Whewell, an inductive truth for Aristotle is an observed 
truth not a reasoned truth. We come to know an inductive truth through sensory 




for Aristotle that are known, but not demonstrated, are more “luminous” than 
demonstrated truths, and are the basis of reasoned, demonstrated truths (Whewell, 
316-7).  
 As corroborating evidence for his position, Whewell points to the fact that 
according to Aristotle’s definition of sullogismos, the conclusion in a sullogismos 
follows of necessity from the premises, but Aristotle makes no such claim of 
necessity for epagôgê, and often presents sullogismos and epagôgê as mutually 
opposed. (That is, Whewell points to the fact that Aristotle held what I have called 
the Necessity Thesis.) Such necessity in sullogismos would make its inference 
justified as reasoning. But, Whewell continues, Aristotle recognized there is no 
such necessity in epagôgê and so he could not have believed that any epagôgê 
(including the epagôgê presented in APr. B.23) is a perfect induction. For in a 
perfect induction, there would be such necessity (Whewell, 316). Epagôgê as 
imperfect induction does stand in contrast to syllogismos precisely because there 




 Whewell translates a crucial part of APr.  B.23 (within the part quoted in 
Ch. 1, Section VIII, from 68b25-9) so that it is consistent with his position that 
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  Clearly, Whewell does think that Aristotle believed that the“sullogismos ex epagôgês” in APr. 
B.23 is reasoning and has an inference that is logically justified. But that is because it, as its name 
indicates, is really a sullogismos from an epagôgê, namely the epagôgê that all long-lived species 





inductive truths for Aristotle are observed rather than reasoned truths. The 
passage in Greek is: “he gar epagôgê dia pantôn” (APr., 68b28-9). Smith’s 
translation of this, reflecting the common reading of APr. B.23 as being about 
perfect induction, is: “for induction is through them all” (APr., 68b28-9). 
Whewell, on the other hand, translates it as: “for Induction is applied to all the 
cases” (APr., 68b28-9, trans. Whewell in Whewell, 312).  
 In response to Whewell, let me first point out a remark at the end of APr. 
B.24 that seems difficult to render in a way that is consistent with his position that 
inductive truths for Aristotle are observed truths and not reasoned truths. The 
remark, part of a contrast between epagôgê and paradeigma, is: “…he [epagôgê] 
…ex hapantôn tôn atomôn to akron edeiknuen huparchein tôi mesôi…” (APr., 
69a17-8) Smith renders this, plausibly, as: “…induction proves the extreme to 
belong to the middle term from all the individuals…” (APr., 69a17-8). (Whewell 
does not address APr. B.24 in his article.) For Whewell to make this passage 
consistent with the view that epagôgê is not reasoning, he would have to render 
“ex hapantôn tôn atomôn” in a way that is substantially different than “from all 
the individuals,” and it does not seem like this could be done while remaining true 
to the Greek. In particular, it does not seem like Whewell can legitimately render 
it as “is applied to all the cases” (as he renders “dia pantôn” at APr., 68b28-9). 
“[E]x hapantôn tôn atomôn,” which, again, is plausibly rendered as “from all the 




 Another consideration against Whewell’s reading is as follows. Whewell 
claims that Aristotle would have recognized epagôgê to be unjustified as 
reasoning, and would thereby consider an epagogic truth to be an observed, rather 
than reasoned, truth. This claim seems to presuppose and rest on Aristotle’s 
recognizing the problem of induction and believing that it cannot be solved. 
Given Whewell’s claim, Aristotle would thus not need to solve the problem of 
induction; epagogic truths, after all, would be observed rather than reasoned 
truths. But what Whewell evidently does not recognize is that this would create 
another problem for Aristotle. The claim in APr. B.23 that all long-lived things 
are bile-less would not be a reasoned truth. In particular, according to Whewell, it 
would not be reached by perfect induction, for according to Whewell, Aristotle 
does not think he can know whether he knows of all long-lived species. And, 
according to Whewell, imperfect induction for Aristotle would not be rationally 
justifiable. So, Whewell thinks, it would be an “observed truth” for Aristotle. But 
how could Aristotle justifiably regard it as an observed truth if, as Whewell 
thinks, Aristotle did not believe he could know whether he has observed all long-
lived species? Similarly, let us return to one of Aristotle’s examples from the 
Rhetoric, discussed in Ch.1, of an inductive claim: that women everywhere can 
correctly settle facts about their children (Rhet., 1398a32-b4). If the truth of this 
claim can be inductively established, and it would thereby be an observed truth 




could have observed all women everywhere (and know that one has). It is 
implausible that he would. This indicates the problem with regarding all epagogic 
truths as observed truths. If Aristotle would have recognized the problem of 
induction, as Whewell’s reading seems to presuppose, then, it seems, he would 
have recognized this problem with regarding all epagogic truths as observed 
truths. Thus, the reason that Whewell thinks that Aristotle would regard epagogic 
truths as observed, rather than reasoned, truths, is one that Aristotle could hardly 
have held and been motivated by. For, it seems, he would have recognized that 
regarding epagogic truths as observed truths only leads to another problem, one 
for which there does not seem to be a solution.  
 There is further evidence that Aristotle would have recognized this 
problem with regarding epagogic truths as observed truths and not reasoned 
truths. This is the fact, discussed in Ch. 1 and 3, that Aristotle evidently regarded 
the genus of both sullogismos and epagôgê to be logos in the sense of “reasoning” 
or “argument.” Recall the quote from APr., 24b18-20 in Ch. 1 that contains 
Aristotle’s definition of sullogismos. According to that definition, the genus of 
sullogismos is evidently logos. Similarly, consider the passage quoted in that 
section from APo., 71a5-9. The clause just before it is: “Similarly with arguments 
[tous logous] both deductive [hoi dia sullogismon] and inductive [hoi di’ 




Aristotle regarded sullogismos and epagôgê as the two main sorts of logos.
3
 The 
passage quoted in Ch.2 from Top. I, 105a10-4 similarly suggests that Aristotle 
regarded sullogismos and epagôgê as the two exhaustive sorts of dialectical logos. 
Finally, the passage quoted in Ch. 1, Section V, from Rhet., 1356a37-b5, suggests 
that Aristotle regarded sullogismos (as enthumema) and epagôgê (as paradeigma) 




III. John McCaskey’s Conception 
 I will turn now to McCaskey’s position, argued for in “Freeing 
Aristotelian Induction From Prior Analytics II.23,” that for Aristotle, all induction 
that is not a kind of deduction is explanatory and not justificatory. Such a position 
conflicts with my position that Aristotle dealt with the problem of induction. For 
if a given induction that is not a kind of deduction is only an explanatory process, 
then it faces no such problem of induction.  
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 That is, Aristotle seems to divide logos into other classes as well, such as demonstrative, 
dialectical, and rhetorical. But none of these classes seem to extend beyond sullogismos and 
epagôgê, (e.g., he does not seem to recognize any dialectical argument that is neither epagogic nor 
deductive). With regard to the issue of whether one is reasoning to or from the more universal, 
epagôgê and sullogismos are the two main sorts of logos. 
  
4
  Further, it is reasonable that in Aristotle’s descriptions and definitions of epagôgê and 
sullogismos, “logos” is translated as “reasoning” or “argument” for such a translation would make 
sense of the strong evidence that for Aristotle epagôgê and sullogismos are the two species of 
logos. Further, given that the root sense in Greek of “logos” seems to be “word” or “speech,” it is 
implausible to translate it as “sense perception,” “observation” or with a term (such as 
“awareness”) denoting a kind of which sense perception would arguably be a species for Aristotle. 
But such a translation of “logos” would be required if we are to make the textual evidence that for 
Aristotle epagôgê is a species of logos consistent with Whewell claim that Aristotle regarded 




McCaskey’s position, like that of Whewell relies on a reading of APr. 
B.23 according to which Aristotle is not taking epagôgê to be perfect induction.
5
 
McCaskey thinks that a careful and proper analysis of APr. B.23 will indicate that 
for Aristotle, “induction” has a primary and secondary sense (McCaskey, 361). 
The proper translation, McCaskey thinks, of “Epagôgê…kai ho ex epagôgês 
sullogismos…” (APr. B.23, 68b15-6) is “Induction, then—that is, a deduction 
from induction…” (McCaskey, 357). Further, if that phrase is coherent, 
McCaskey thinks, “induction” cannot have only one sense, since, if “induction” is 
equated with “deduction from induction” (as that passage appears to do), having 
only one sense creates an infinite regress in regard to what induction is 
(McCaskey, 356, 361-3).
6
 Aristotle has a primary sense of “induction” in mind, 
McCaskey thinks, on the basis of which he uses a secondary sense and gives an 
example of it (in APr. B.23), which is deduction from induction in the primary 
sense (McCaskey, 362-3).   
 For Aristotle, McCaskey thinks, induction in the primary sense consists of 
seeking a certain sort of universal term (and often more than one) to predicate of 
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 Throughout his paper, McCaskey uses “epagôgê” and “induction” interchangeably, but mostly 
uses “induction.” Thus, in presenting his position, I will mostly use “induction,” as he does, for 
epagôgê.   
 
6
  That is, if induction is deduction from induction, then, by substitution, deduction from induction 
would be deduction from deduction from induction, and, by substitution, that would be deduction 
from deduction from deduction from induction, etc.  The result would be that what induction is 
would have to be expressed by an infinitely long phrase.  McCaskey thinks that this problem can 
be avoided if, in the phrase quoted above, the second instance of “induction” is read as having one 





certain particular individuals or kinds. What sort of universal term is this? 
McCaskey thinks that certain examples of induction that Aristotle gives,
7
 and the 
theoretical material in Top. V,
8
 indicate that the universal must be a distinctive 
property—an idion kath’ auto—of the particulars.
9
 Thus, according to McCaskey, 
the conclusion of an induction in the primary sense predicates an idia kath ‘auto 
of certain particulars. For example: we are aware of individual long-lived things 
(i.e. C’s, in the terms of APr. B.23), such as man, horse, and mule.
10
  And: man, 
horse, mule, etc. are bile-less (B). McCaskey thinks that this is an induction in the 
primary sense that tacitly takes place in APr. B.23 before Aristotle offers his 
sullogismos ex epagôgês, his deduction from induction in the primary sense, 
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  McCaskey, for example, cites the example of epagôgê in EE II at 1219a1 that concludes that 
things that have a work or use have a goodness, and that having a goodness is distinctive to things 
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the property with respect to which the alteration takes place is a distinctive property of things 
subject to alteration.  
  
8
  As McCaskey indicates, Top. V is specifically about how to find an idion kath ‘auto—a 
distinctive property—of given individuals (McCaskey, 359).  McCaskey admits that “epagôgê” 
does not appear anywhere in Top. V, but thinks that, nevertheless, induction in the primary sense 
(which consists of reaching idia kath ‘auta) is the implicit subject of the chapter (McCaskey, 371).  
 
9
 McCaskey’s position is that for Aristotle, definition is one way to convey the meaning of a 
universal term. Even though some idia kath ‘auta are not definitional properties, they nonetheless 
can help convey the meaning of a universal term because they are distinguishing of the particulars 
under the terms to which they apply.  (McCaskey, 359)  
 
10
  In my view, the C’s (individual long-lived things) mentioned in APr. B.23 are more reasonably 
individual species rather than ultimate particulars, for, again, Aristotle mentions man, mule, and 
horse as individual long-lived things (APr., 68b20-1), and bases an induction (epagôgê) about all 
long-lived things on these “individual long-lived things” (APr., 68b15-30). McCaskey, however, 
leaves open whether Aristotle intends the individual long-lived things to be individual species or 





which is induction in the secondary sense (McCaskey, 361). It consists of 
predicating a distinctive property, bile-less (B) of all individual long-lived things 
(C’s), i.e. man, mule, horse, etc. (Hence, according to the induction, all and only 
individual long-lived things are bile-less.)   
 McCaskey seeks to justify his position in regard to what induction in the 
primary sense is for Aristotle by arguing that it was essentially Socrates’ view of 
induction. McCaskey bases this argument, first, on the observation that in the 
corpus, Aristotle does not provide any detailed analysis of what “epagôgê” is, 
unlike his treatment of other things (McCaskey, 363). Yet, Aristotle says, what 
kind of thing “epagôgê” is clear (McCaskey, 363).
11
 Thus, McCaskey thinks, 
Aristotle assumes throughout the corpus that his students already know what 
epagôgê is. So, to discover the conception of induction Aristotle had in mind (for 
his primary sense of induction), we should ask: what would be the common 
conception of induction for Athenian students in the fourth century BC? Clearly, 
McCaskey thinks, it would be the Socratic conception. Indeed, Aristotle explicitly 
credits Socrates as introducing inductive reasoning without suggesting that the 
term “induction” (“epagôgê”) is unfamiliar (McCaskey, 363).
12
 
 McCaskey thinks that the similarities between Aristotle’s and Socrates’ 
uses of induction are undeniable. And to Aristotle’s students, Socrates would have 
                                                 
11
  McCaskey’s reference to Aristotle for that statement is to Top. VIII, 157a8.  
 
12





been a figure of the recent past whose conception of induction would have been 
familiar (McCaskey, 364). So, McCaskey concludes, unless we are presented with 
evidence to the contrary, we should assume that Socrates’ conception of induction 
is Aristotle’s conception of induction (in the primary sense), (McCaskey, 364).
13
 
 In regard to what Socrates’ conception of induction is, McCaskey thinks 
that Gregory Vlastos is correct in thinking that induction for Socrates is an 
attempt to elucidate and explain—through the citation of examples—the meaning 
of a universal term rather than to prove a universal proposition by citing particular 
facts (McCaskey, 364). To illustrate his point, McCaskey cites Vlastos’ reference 
to one of Socrates’ uses of induction in Plato’s Ion. In Vlastos’ analysis, Socrates 
seeks to exhibit the meaning of the term “master craftsman.” Socrates does so by 
citing examples of master craftsmen each having a certain property. For example: 
“The pilot is the one who knows best what should be said to the crew of a storm-
tossed ship. …The cowherd is the one who knows best what should be done to 
calm angry cattle” (McCaskey, 364).
14
 From such statements, Socrates gives us a 
conclusion elucidating the meaning of “master craftsman”: “the master of any 
                                                 
13
  It is helpful to bear in mind, with regard to what follows, that Aristotle typically writes of 
defining things (universal kinds in nature), not words. Hence, when mentioning what Aristotle 
might take as the meaning of something (of some natural kind), McCaskey and I intentionally do 
not put the word or phrase denoting that kind in quotes. 
 
14
  This is a part of McCaskey’s quoting of Vlastos’ paraphrasing of Plato’s Ion at 540b-d. 
McCaskey’s reference to Gregory Vlastos is Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), 267-8. Unless otherwise noted, any reference to a work by 





craft ‘is the one who knows best matters falling within its subject-matter’” 
(McCaskey, 365).
15
 In regard to this argument, Vlastos writes: 
In this argument, the conclusion is obviously more general than any of 
the premises. To that extent it is like an inductive argument, but with 
this vast difference that it is not probable inference from what is true of 
some cases to what is true of all cases. …we are not leaving logically 
open the possibility that there might be some craft Ca such that the 
master of some other craft Cb or a layman who is master of neither 
might have knowledge of matters falling in the domain of craft Ca 
which is superior to that of the master of craft Ca. Here the truth of the 
conclusion is built into the meaning of its critical term “master of a 
craft”: anyone who claims to be a master of a given craft but does not 
possess relevant knowledge superior to that of a master of some other 
craft or of no craft at all would be ipso dicto disqualified as a fake. …in 
Socratic epagogic arguments there is “reference to some instances [of a 
general statement] which exhibit the meaning of the statement by 
exemplifying it, rather than prove it; it is really only what logicians call 




According to Vlastos (and McCaskey), a Socratic epagôgê seeks to elucidate the 
definitional meaning of a universal term. It does not seek to prove the 
conclusion—either fully or probabilistically. Why then would we be justified in 
accepting the conclusion as true? The conclusion is true by definition. The subject 
of the conclusion is the universal term whose definitional meaning the epagôgê 
seeks to exhibit and make clear. The predicate is the definition, gathered by the 
epagogic process, of the subject term. As such, the conclusion is true by 
                                                 
15
  The quote by McCaskey is from Vlastos, 268.  
 
16
  Vlastos, unlike McCaskey, objects to calling Socratic epagôgê “induction,” thinking that the 






definition.  As Vlastos indicates, if one were to try to produce a counter-example 
to the conclusion, it would be rejected ipso dicto as a false counter-example (as 
having a subject that is not a member of the subject term of the conclusion by 
definition of that subject term). There is no problem of induction.  
McCaskey thinks Aristotle escapes the problem of induction essentially 
the same way Socrates does.  As induction for Socrates consists of elucidating the 
meaning of a universal term, McCaskey thinks, so it (in the primary sense) does 
for Aristotle. For Aristotle, we elucidate the meaning of a universal kind by 
identifying a distinctive property, an idion kath ‘auto (not necessarily a defining 
property—a ti esti—which is one sort of idion kath ‘auto) of the members of that 
kind. A conclusion for Aristotle, reached by induction in the primary sense, is 
true, not necessarily by definition, but by distinctive property (idion kath’auto) 
meaning. Returning to McCaskey’s example of a tacit induction in the primary 
sense in APr. B.23, when we induce that all C’s (individual long-lived things such 
as man, mule, and horse) are B (bile-less), we arrive at a distinctive property of 
C’s. All and only C’s are B’s. Such an induction explains the meaning of long-
lived things—not the definitional meaning, but a distinctive property meaning. 
What if in the future we encounter a new long-lived thing, but it turns out not to 
be bile-less? Aristotle would think that this is impossible in McCaskey’s view. 
For in inducing that all and only long-lived things (C) are bile-less (B), we have 




to be long-lived: it means for it to be bile-less. Accordingly, any alleged long-
lived thing that is not bile-less would be rejected ipso dicto as being a genuine 
long-lived thing (McCaskey, 363-5). Again, according to McCaskey, Aristotelian 
induction in the primary sense escapes the problem of induction in essentially the 
same way Socratic induction in Vlastos’ view does.  
The relevance of McCaskey’s paper to this section of this chapter is his 
position that induction in the primary sense (i.e., induction that is not a kind of 
deduction) for Aristotle is not intended to be a full or probabilistic proof and that 
accordingly, Aristotle faced no problem of induction. Since my view is that 
Aristotle in the genetic account of APo. B.19 faces the problem of induction, this 
is the main position advanced in McCaskey’s paper to which I object. The other 
position that I object to is the claim that all Aristotelian epagôgê seeks to 
predicate a distinctive property. This conflicts with my reading of the genetic 
account, since in my reading, the epagôgê described can yield a principle in 
which the predicate is not a distinctive property of members of the subject kind, 
such as “all horses are mammals” (assuming that Aristotle thinks that mammal is 
the genus of horse.) 
What follows is my response to McCaskey’s argument for the first 




The main problem in claiming that Aristotelian induction (in the primary 
sense
17
) escapes the problem of induction is that this cannot be  the case if 
induction is the means of discovering a general truth about all or most members of 
a natural kind (whose members are potentially infinite in number). I have argued 
in Ch. 2 on Hamlyn that for Aristotle, all convictions (as distinguished from 
unreasoned beliefs) are reached through epagôgê or sulligismos. A conviction 
about a natural kind, such as man, may be based on sullogismos. For example, the 
conviction that all zebras are bile-less may be deduced from the premises that all 
long-lived things are bile-less, and that all zebras are long-lived. But at bottom, 
such a conviction about a natural kind must be based on epagogically obtained 
premises. In this example, the premises that all long-lived things are bile-less and 
                                                 
17
  Since, according to McCaskey, Aristotelian induction in the secondary sense is a kind of 
deduction (it is the sullogismos ex epagôgês described in APr. B.23), the problem of induction 
could not apply to the inductions in the secondary sense; for Aristotle, they would be subject to 
formal syllogistic rules of inference, and as for every other kind of sullogismos, the conclusion 
would follow of necessity from the premises. APo. B.19 does not make any mention of any 
sullogismos ex epagôgê, only of epagôgê, and the process described is one of moving cognitively 
from the more particular to the more general. It is, as such, epagogic, and not deductive. However, 
since APr. B.23 mentions (at 68b30-7) reaching immediate (amesa) premises—premises that 
could serve as ultimate premises of demonstration—by sullogismos ex epagôgê, it may be that 
Aristotle thinks that some ultimate premises of demonstration are reached this way. But even if 
this is the case, reaching at least some ultimate premises of demonstration this way has to rely at 
bottom on plain, non-deductive epagôgê, the kind evidently described by the genetic account of 
APo. B.19. For it is clear that some of the natural kinds (such as man) that are subjects of ultimate 
premises of demonstration are those with a potentially infinite number of specimens, and, as we 
have seen, Aristotle does not think that the mind can traverse an infinite series. As a result, a 
deductive epagôgê that is a perfect induction would be inapplicable to them. Further, if like 
McCaskey, we do not take the deduction from induction described in APr. B.23 to be (or to be 
based on based on) perfect induction, it would have to rely, at bottom, on plain, non-deductive 
epagôgê, what McCaskey calls Aristotelian induction in the primary sense. Hence, I am only 
concerned here with the problem of induction as it pertains to what McCaskey calls inductions in 





that all zebras are long-lived things would be obtained through epagôgê. And 
epagôgê as the discovery of any general truth about a natural kind, such as 
(presumably) long-lived things, whose members are potentially infinite in number 
is such that (as I indicate in Ch.1) for Aristotle, we clearly cannot survey all (or 
even most of) the members. Given this, the question of what if there is a long-
lived thing (an ultimate particular
18
) that we have not encountered that is bile-less 
remains. In McCaskey’s view, when we induce that all long-lived things are bile-
less, we are giving the meaning of long-lived things and hence any alleged long-
lived thing that is not bile-less would be rejected ipso dicto as genuinely a long-
lived thing. The problem, however, is that even if we take bile-less as a 
(distinctive property) meaning of long-lived thing, how can we establish that by 
induction, given that there is a potentially infinite number of long-lived things (at 
least as far is ultimate particulars that are long-lived things)? At no point in the 
induction can we legitimately just decide that if something not yet encountered is 
not bile-less, it is not long-lived. For if long-lived thing is a natural kind, whether 
something is a member of it is not a matter of human decision but of that thing’s 
nature.  
 Hence, in the discovery of the general “truth” that all long-lived things are 
bile-less (whether or not we think that “truth” gives bile-less as the meaning of 
long-lived thing), we are faced with the problem of induction. This example of the 
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  I make this qualification because Aristotle may think that there are a finite number of long-




discovery of a general “truth” about a natural kind indicates, in pattern, why, for 
Aristotle, the epagogic discovery of any general truth of a natural kind with a 
potentially infinite number of members would involve the problem of induction.  
 In cases where an induction is connected with a class of things which is a 
not natural kind, but one that is a matter of human stipulation or convention, then 
the problem of induction can be escaped in the way that McCaskey describes. If 
the class of long-lived things, for example, is not a natural kind, if something’s 
being a long-lived thing is just a matter of human stipulation or convention, then 
in our “induction” that that all long-lived things are bile-less, we might at a 
certain point decide to call only bile-less things long-lived things. Hence, we 
could reject, ipso dicto, the possibility of a long-lived thing that is not bile-less. 
But, it is not plausible that the epagogic process of discovery (of concepts and 




                                                 
19
  It is clear that for Aristotle, the principles which are ultimate premises of demonstration must 
reflect natural kinds. For it is evidently Aristotle’s view that a syllogistic deduction that is 
demonstrative must relate three terms in a way that is isomorphic to the way they are connected or 
disconnected to each other in nature. A clear piece of evidence for this is APo. A.20-21, where 
Aristotle argues against the possibility of infinitely many middle terms in a demonstration (and 
hence an infinitely long demonstration). This can only make sense if middle terms (and as a result, 
terms in general, since an extreme in one deduction can be a middle in another) each reflect a term 
(a kind) in nature, and, in nature, there are explanatory terms between some pairs of terms, but not 
others (which are related immediately).  But a demonstration relating three terms in a way that is 
isomorphic to how they are related in nature cannot be accomplished if the terms do not even 
reflect kinds in nature, i.e. if a term subsumes some particulars which a putatively corresponding 
natural kind does not and/or if the term does not subsume some particulars which the natural kind 
does. And since the ultimate premises of a demonstration are parts of the demonstration, we 
should take Aristotle to believe at least that any legitimate epagôgê to reach ultimate premises of 




 Further, Aristotle might think that some epagôgai are as McCaskey 
describes. These would be epagôgai whose purpose is to remind a person about or 
make explicit a general truth already discovered. If a person has already 
discovered the general “truth” that all long-lived things are bile-less, but has 
forgotten that he or she has discovered it, then the citing of examples might help 
remind the person. Since the person has already discovered the “truth” and he or 
she is only being reminded of it, the person could reject the possibility of any 
long-lived thing that is not bile-less. If bile-less, as a result of the discovery, is 
taken as a distinctive property meaning of long-lived thing, then the person may 
reject ipso dicto the possibility of a long-lived thing that is not bile-less. Similarly, 
if a person has already discovered that all long-lived things are bile-less, but holds 
this “conclusion” only implicitly, then an epagôgê citing examples of long-lived 
things, each being bile-less, may help the person to grasp the conclusion 
explicitly. As the person already holds the conclusion implicitly, he or she may 
reject the possibility of a long-lived thing that is not bile-less. And if bile-less is 
taken as a distinctive property meaning of long-lived thing, the person may reject 
ipso dicto the possibility of a long-lived thing that is not bile-less. 







 But the point remains that for Aristotle, induction as the discovery of a 
general truth “all S is P” connected with the natural kinds S and P (where S has a 
potentially infinite number of members), one faces the problem of induction. One 
cannot reject ipso dicto the possibility that there is an S not yet encountered that is 




 The second problem I have with McCaskey’s conception of Aristotelian 
epagôgê is the view that all Aristotelian epagôgai are intended to predicate a 
distinctive property (idion kath’ auto) of the subject kind.
21
 This conflicts with my 
reading of the genetic account, since on my reading, the epagôgê described can 
                                                 
20
  It appears that the same general point would apply to Socratic induction—if Socrates believed 
that general truths about members of natural kinds are discovered by induction. Socrates may not 
have believed that. Assuming Socrates held that kinds are natural, he might have believed that the 
function of induction is to remind a person of or make explicit to a person a definitional truth he or 
she already knows. If that is the case, then it seems that Vlastos is right about Socratic induction 
that there is no problem of induction involved.    
 
21
  For McCaskey, Aristotelian inductions in the secondary sense also predicate a distinctive 
property.  Again, according to McCaskey, Aristotelian induction in the secondary sense is the 
“deduction from induction” (“sullogismos ex epagogês”) discussed in APr. B.23 (McCaskey, 362-
3). According to McCaskey, after Aristotle in that chapter tacitly performs an induction in the 
primary sense that all and only individual long-lived things (C) are bile-less (B), Aristotle is ready 
to perform his induction in the secondary sense, his “deduction from induction.” The deduction 
from induction involves the term A, which designates, not individual long-lived things like C, but 
the property long-lived. Accordingly, the “deduction from induction” is as follows. Each 
individual long-lived thing (C) is long-lived (A). All bile-less things (B) are individual long-lived 
things (C). (This premise is secured by the induction in the primary sense.) Thus, all bile-less 
things (B) are long-lived (A). What does a “deduction from induction” accomplish cognitively, 
given that we already know from induction in the primary sense that all bile-less things (B) are 
individual long-lived things (C)? According to McCaskey,  a “deduction from induction,” i.e. 
induction in the secondary sense, has the function of dropping any reference to particulars, so that 
one has a relation only between two universals (in this case, the universal long-lived (A) holding 
of the whole of the universal bile-less (B)), (McCaskey, 361). But the crucial point here is that for 
McCaskey, Aristotelian induction in the secondary sense also consists in predicating a distinctive 




yield a principle in which the predicate is not a distinctive property of members of 
the subject kind, such as “all horses are mammals.” (I am assuming here that 
Aristotle thinks that mammal is the immediate genus of horse.)  
There are several pieces of evidence against this view. First, as McCaskey 
recognizes (McCaskey, 371), Top. V, which prescribes rules for finding the idion 
kath’ auto of things of a kind, does not anywhere use the term “epagôgê” (or any 
inflection of “epagôgê”). This, of course, does not mean that in Top. V, Aristotle 
is not prescribing rules for an epagogic process. But if, as McCaskey thinks, that 
all Aristotelian epagôgê consists in seeking to predicate a distinctive property, 
that seeking to predicate a distinctive property of a set of particulars is 
Aristotelian epagôgê (McCaskey, 370), then it seems that epagôgê (or, given that 
the Topics is on dialectic, dialectical epagôgê) is the subject of Top. V. If so, it 
seems that we should expect Top. V to explicitly mention epagôgê, even to state 
that epagôgê (or dialectical epagôgê) is the subject, as the Analytics at the 
beginning state that demonstration (i.e., apodeixis, a kind of sullogismos) is their 
subject (APr., 24a10-3). But Top. V does not explicitly mention epagôgê.  
 Second, recall that APo. A.4 lays down certain requirements that a 
predication in an ultimate premise of demonstration must meet. The predication 
must be “katholou,” which, according to the chapter, consists of the predication 
holding “of every case” (“kata pantos”) of the subject (APo., 73a27-b33) and its 




predication holds “in itself” if (a) the predicated term is in the account of the 
“what it is” (i.e., the definition) of the subject (APo., 73a35-7) or if (b) the subject 
term is in the account of the what it is (the definition) of the predicate (APo., 
73a37-b5). Given these requirements, and assuming mammal is the immediate 
genus of horse, the proposition that all horses are mammals would satisfy the 
requirements. As such, the proposition would be a principle, an ultimate premise 
of demonstration. And as I have argued (especially in response to Hamlyn in 
Ch.2), according to the genetic account, epagôgê based on sense perception is 
how we come to know principles. Hence, according to the genetic account we 
would come to know a principle such as the putative principle that all horses are 
mammals—one whose predicate is not a distinctive property of members of the 
subject kind—by epagôgê.    
 Third, recall my argument in Ch. 2 against Hamlyn that for Aristotle, any 
conviction (as distinguished from an unreasoned belief) is obtained by either 
epagôgê or sullogismos. I had argued that it is plausible only that for Aristotle the 
common conviction that all horses have four legs—a conviction that many 
children living during Aristotle’s time would have had—would be reached by 
epagôgê—by observing particular horses and generalizing. Yet having four legs, 
(i.e. being a quadruped) is very clearly not a distinctive property of horses.  
 Finally, recall the description of a dialectical epagôgê in the Topics as one 




…we need to distinguish how many kinds of dialectical argument 
[logôn] there are. One kind is induction [epagôgê], another is deduction 
[sullogismos]. Now, what a deduction is was explained earlier. 
Induction, however, is proceeding from particulars up to a universal. 
(Top. I, 105a10-4, italics in original) 
   
This passage appears to be definitional with regard to epagôgê since its 
description of an epagôgê is said to follow an explanation of what sullogismos is. 
Yet the passage does not indicate that in an epagôgê one must seek to predicate a 
property, of the particulars, that is distinctive to them.
22
  
 A process of reasoning that consists of predicating a distinctive property 
of certain particulars evidently would for Aristotle be an epagôgê. For such a 
process would be one of reasoning from the particular to the universal. And I have 
argued in Ch. 1 that Aristotle holds the Direction Thesis with regard to epagôgê, 
i.e. that he considers epagôgê to be reasoning from the particular to the universal. 
But Aristotle evidently does not, as McCaskey thinks, consider all epagôgê to 
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  In Ch. 1, I provide this along with other passages that Aristotle holds the Direction Thesis with 
regard to epagôgê—that he thinks that epagôgê consists of reasoning from the particular to the 
universal. It is significant that in none of those descriptions of epagôgê does Aristotle mention that 
for the epagôgê to be legitimate, the property predicated of the particulars must be distinctive to 
those particulars. For if according to Aristotle, all epagôgê seeks to make such a predication, we 





William Whewell’s conception of Aristotelian induction is not based on a 
reading of the genetic account of APo. B.19, but conflicts with my view of what 
occurs in that account. According to Whewell’s conception, an inductive truth for 
Aristotle is an observed or perceived truth and not a reasoned one. Whewell 
thinks this is the case mainly because he thinks Aristotle was aware of the 
problem of induction and did not think it could be solved, i.e. did not think that an 
inductive truth is rationally justified. This conflicts with my position that Aristotle 
in the genetic account is aware of the problem of induction and attempts to solve 
it. However, Whewell’s conception of Aristotelian induction evidently is not 
correct, as indicated especially by that fact that Aristotle evidently considered 
epagôgê and sullogismos as the two main species of logos.   
McCaskey’s conception of Aristotelian induction is also not based on a 
reading of the genetic account of APo. B.19. But, like Whewell’s conception, 
McCaskey’s conflicts with my view of what occurs in that account. According to 
McCaskey’s conception, all epagôgê for Aristotle consists of predicating a 
distinctive property of the subject. This conflicts with my reading of the genetic 
account, according to which propositional principles that do not predicate a 
distinctive property of the subject can be reached. Further, according to 
McCaskey’s conception, for all Aristotelian epagôgê that is not deduction (i.e., a 




induction. For the induction seeks to make clear the meaning of a universal term, 
which is subject of the conclusion of the induction. The predicate of the 
conclusion is the distinctive property meaning of the subject term. Any alleged 
instance of the subject term that does not share the predicated property would be 
rejected ipso dicto, by the distinct-property meaning of the subject term, as a 
genuine instance of the subject term. This conflicts with my view that Aristotle in 
the genetic account does face the problem of induction.    
The evidence, however indicates that, while Aristotle would consider the 
process of seeking to predicate of all particulars of a kind a distinct property to be 
an epagôgê, he does not consider all epagôgê to be such a process. Further, if 
inductive discovery of general truths reflecting natural kinds is involved in the 
genetic account (as it evidently is), and at least some of these kinds have a 
potentially infinite number of members and given Aristotle’s view that a mind 
cannot traverse an infinite series, then, by the nature of such inductive discovery, 




Chapter 7: Conclusion: Aristotle’s Attempted Solution  
 
I. Introduction 
 Having provided and defended my reading of the genetic account of APo. 
B.19, my main concern in this chapter is to explicitly identify the implications of 
that reading with regard to the question of whether, in the genetic account, 
Aristotle is aware of the problem of induction and what (if anything) is his 
attempted solution to it.  
 In Section II, I will provide a summary of the results of the previous 
chapters of this work. In Section III, I will seek to answer explicitly the questions, 
based on my reading of the genetic account, of whether Aristotle in the account is 
aware of the problem of induction and what his attempted solution is. In Section 
IV, I will consider and respond to certain objections. Finally, in Section V, I will 
present my conclusion. 
 
II. Summary of Results 
 In Ch. 1, I defined a certain sense of “induction.” The sense is that of (i) 
reasoning from propositions (the premises) that are more particular to a 
proposition (the conclusion) that is more universal, (ii) in cases where the 
premises all predicate a certain property of particular instances or species of the 




subject, and (iii) where one does not have such premises in regard to all of the 
particular instances or species in case the conclusion is universally quantified, or 
one has premises for less than most of the particular instances or species in case 
the conclusion is quantified with “most.” The term “perfect induction” is often 
used to refer to an enumerative induction in which the inducer knowingly 
enumerates all instances or species subsumed by the subject of the conclusion. 
Since in the sense of “induction” I have defined, the inducer does not enumerate 
all the instances or species (and in the case that the conclusion is quantified with 
“most,” the inducer enumerates less than most of the instances or species), I refer 
to “induction” in the sense I have defined as “imperfect inductive generalization.” 
As I indicated the “problem of induction” that I am concerned with in connection 
with the genetic account of APo. B.19 is the problem of how one can justify the 
inference to the conclusion in an imperfect inductive generalization, given that it 
is imperfect.  
 Moreover, in Ch. 1, I provided evidence that at least some epagôgê for 
Aristotle is imperfect inductive generalization. I showed that part of the evidence 
is that Aristotle held the Direction Thesis in regard to epagôgê, which is that 
epagôgê (unlike sullogismos) is reasoning from the more particular to the more 
universal. Further, part of the evidence is that Aristotle held the Necessity Thesis 
in regard to epagôgê, which is that in an epagôgê (in contrast to sullogismos), it is 




 In Ch. 2, I argued against Hamlyn’s reading of the genetic account. As 
part of my argument against Hamlyn, I provided evidence that the genetic account 
is not about the acquisition of concepts alone nor about the acquisition of 
propositional truths alone. Rather, it is about coming to know principles (archai) 
of demonstration, which include concepts, and certain definitional propositional 
truths connected with the concepts acquired. Part of my argument against Hamlyn 
consisted in arguing against his claim that the genetic account is not concerned 
with the justification of principles; I provided evidence that it is. Another part of 
my argument consisted in arguing against his claim that according to the genetic 
account, the sense perception of one particular is sufficient to grasp a universal 
instantiating it. The conclusion of my argument against Hamlyn was that, contrary 
to Hamlyn, the genetic account is evidently a description of the epagôgê 
mentioned at the end of the account. I was hence able to provide strong evidence 
that, for the two questions Aristotle asks near the beginning of APo. B.19 (i.e. the 
questions of how we come to know the principles and what the knowing state is), 
Aristotle’s answers are: epagôgê based on sense perception and nous, 
respectively.  
 In Ch. 3, I argued against Evans’ and Harari’s readings of the genetic 
account, insofar as their readings conflict with mine. As I did against Hamlyn, I 
argued against both Evans and Harari that according to the genetic account, the 




universal truth in the case of Evans, a universal concept in the case of Harari). 
Evans provided some evidence from outside the genetic account that for Aristotle, 
the sense perception of just one particular fact is sufficient to grasp and secure 
(through nous as intuition) a universal truth. But I have showen that for Aristotle, 
such legitimate induction from a single instance is evidently the exception rather 
than the rule. As I had indicated that according to the genetic account many 
particulars of a kind evidently must be retained in memory to form an experience 
(empeiria), and that a universal and a propositional principle is grasped from the 
experience, we can allow that Aristotle thinks there are exceptional cases where 
one can securely induce a universal truth from the sense perception of one 
particular fact. With regard to Harari, I argued against her reading of the genetic 
account as solely about the acquisition of principles that are concepts (not 
propositions), defending my view that the account is about the acquisition of both 
concepts and certain propositional truths connected with the concepts.  
 With regard to both Evans and Harari, I argued against the claim that nous 
in the genetic account is intuition that allows one to veridically grasp principles. 
Part of my argument against both consisted in seeking to resolve a contradictory 







(g) Epagôgê is the means of coming to know principles (as indicated 
by APo. B.19).  
(h) Epagôgê is a kind of logos (as indicated by various texts). 
(i) Nous, not logos, is the means of coming to know principles (as 
indicated by the passage from EN, 1143a35-b4). 
I had argued that there is strong evidence that Aristotle holds (a) and (b), but that 
we can reasonably deny that he held (c) if we take “logos” in (c) to mean 
reasoning. (I argued that for the textual evidence that seems to indicate that he 
held (c), we can and should translate “logos” as “account” or “explanatory 
account.”) Hence, I defended my view that for the two questions that Aristotle 
asks near the beginning of APo. B.19 (i.e. how we come to know the principles 
and what the knowing state is), nous is not part of his answer to the first question, 
but is the answer to the second. Aristotle’s answer to the first, again, is evidently 
epagôgê based on sense perception.  
 Having cleared away Hamlyn’s, Evans’ and Harari’s readings of the 
genetic account of APo. B.19, in Ch. 4, I provided my own reading, with some 
initial evidence. According to my own reading, (a) the genetic account does not 
claim that the sense perception of a single particular is enough to grasp the 
universal it instantiates. Rather, (b) according to the account, many percepts, i.e. 
many particulars, of a kind are retained in memory, and their association with one 




experiences are the “undifferentiated items” that the account mentions; they are 
undifferentiated from other forms in one’s mind, and their becoming 
differentiated consists in the universal form shared by all the particulars 
comprising the experience becoming distinct and thereby salient. This is the grasp 
of the universal (such as man), and this allows one to grasp certain definitional 
truths connected with the universal (such as “all (or most) humans reason”). (d) 
This gives a picture of the genetic account as a description of the epagôgê 
mentioned at the end of the account, which is how one comes to know, i.e. 
reaches and secures, the principles of demonstration. And (e) nous, discussed after 
the genetic account, is best viewed as the state of knowing the principles (i.e. as 
the answer to the second question near the beginning of APo. B.19), not as 
intuition that allows one to grasp the universal (i.e. as part of the answer to the 
first question near the beginning of the chapter).  
 In Ch. 5, I defended four crucial theses on my reading of the genetic 
account. I had already defended my claim that (a) the genetic account does not 
claim that the sense perception of a single particular is enough to grasp the 
universal it instantiates. In Ch. 5, I defend my claim that (b) according to the 
account, many percepts, i.e. many particulars, of a kind are retained in memory, 
and their association with one another on the basis of similarity forms an 
experience (empeiria). The object of an experience, contrary to Bayer, is 




evidently not that an “undifferentiated item” (and an “experience”) is a mental 
compound to be analyzed into parts, but that it is an experience consisting of 
many particulars of the same kind retained in memory. (c) Such an experience 
becoming differentiated from other forms in one’s mind is the universal form 
shared by all the particulars comprising the experience becoming distinct (and 
thereby salient) from other forms in one’s mind. This is the grasp of the universal.  
 Further, contrary to Engberg-Pedersen, the role of epagôgê in the genetic 
account is evidently not merely to generalize from cases, but (d) to allow one to 
reach and justify the principles of demonstration. Moreover, I had earlier argued 
that (e) nous in the genetic account should not be taken as intuition that allows 
one to grasp the universal and thereby solves (or allows one to avoid) the problem 
of induction. In Ch. 5, I defend this claim further against Bayer, Ross, Irwin, and 
Kal.  
 In Ch. 6, I argue against two conceptions of Aristotelian induction that 
conflict with my reading of the genetic account of APo. B.19 but which are not 
based on readings of the genetic account. I argue against Whewell that inductive 
truths for Aristotle are not merely perceived or observed truths, but reasoned 
truths, induction (epagôgê) being one of the two main species of reasoning 
(logos). And, I argue against two of McCaskey’s positions. I argue against his 
position that all inductions (epagôgai) for Aristotle involve predicating a 




support this claim. And, I argue against McCaskey’s position that induction for 
Aristotle that is not a kind of deduction does not involve any problem of 
induction. I argue that any epagôgê in the discovery of a general truth about 
members of a natural kind that are potentially infinite in number by nature 
involves the problem of induction. Since the process of epagôgê described in the 
genetic account is, in part, for discovering general truths about members of 
natural kinds, and since at least some natural kinds for Aristotle have a potentially 
infinite number of members, at least some of the epagôgai for reaching principles 
in the way described by the genetic account involve the problem of induction.    
 
III. The Problem of Induction and the Attempted Solution 
 Recall the two questions I asked in the Introduction to this work: (1) In the 
genetic account of APo. B.19, is Aristotle aware of the problem of induction? (2) 
What, if anything, is his attempted solution to the problem? We can now turn to 
consider how my reading of the genetic account provides an answer to each of 
these two questions.  
 Let us consider examples of inductions as described by the genetic 
account on my reading. Consider two contiguous passages (that I discussed in Ch. 








Given that perception is present in them, in some animals the percepts 
are retained and in others they are not. If they are not, then the animal 
has no knowledge [gnôsis] when it is not perceiving (either in general 
or with regard to items which are not retained). But some can still hold 
percepts in their soul after perceiving them. When this occurs often, 
there is then a further difference: some animals come to have an 






[a] Thus from perception there comes memory [mnêmê], as we call it, 
and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same 
item) experience [empeiria]; for [b] memories which are many in 
number form a single experience. [c] And from experience, or from all 
the universal [tou katholou] which has come to rest in the soul (the one 
apart from the many, i.e. whatever is one and the same in all these 
items), there comes a principle [archê] of skill [technês] or 
understanding [epistêmês]—[d] of skill if it deals with how things come 
about, of understanding if it deals with how things are. (APo., 100a3-9) 
 
 Again, we begin with sense perceptions of particulars. Percepts, particular 
forms that are perceived, are retained in memory. The percepts are of many 
particulars of a kind, and as a result of their similarity, are associated with one 
another to form an experience (empeiria).  
 One example of the process described would be a child perceiving, and 
retaining percepts of, humans. A child would perceive Socrates, and in particular, 
many attributes about him: he moves on two legs, he reasons,
1
 etc. The child 
                                                 
1
  The child would not directly perceive Callias reasoning, but it is reasonable to think that for 
Aristotle the child would perceive signs of Callias, etc., reasoning, especially considering that 




would retain the perceived particular form of Socrates as a percept. A similar 
process would occur with regard to Callias. The child would perceive that Callias 
is tall, that he moves on two legs, that he reasons, etc. And the child retains the 
perceived particular form of Callias as a percept. The child similarly perceives 
and retains percepts of many other humans. Because of the similarity of the 
percepts, they are associated with one another in the child’s mind, forming a 
single experience (empeiria).  
 Note first that the cognitive content provided by the percepts in the child’s 
mind is not only of particular things but also of particular facts. Again, the 
particular forms retained comprise particular facts, such as the facts that Socrates 
moves on two legs, Socrates reasons, that Callias is pale, that Callias is tall, and 
that Callias reasons, etc. Hence, the propositions that would express the facts are 
implicit in the child’s mind (and depending on the child’s age, education, etc., 
some or all of the propositions may be explicitly grasped).
2
 As we will see later, 
                                                                                                                                     
Greeks believed that there was a very close connection between the two. And, arguably, a child 
can perceive Callias et al speaking. 
  
2
  Since the genetic account of APo. B. 19 is clearly in part about the acquisition of concepts, it 
evidently is intended to describe a process that is common to humans, not just to scientists (i.e., to 
those seeking epistêmê). This is further suggested by the statement in the account that “…the soul 
is such as to be capable of undergoing this” (APo., 100a13-4). Aristotle seems to think that 
ordinary processes of concept acquisition and ampliative induction provide much of the 
foundation for epistêmê. It may, however, be the case that for some cases, a deliberate process of 
concept acquisition and induction is needed. Such may be the case, for example, for a potential 
cosmologist to form the concept planet and reach the putative principle that all the planets are near 




some of these propositions will serve as premises for an “induction” in the sense I 
have defined.  
 Passage T says that “some animals [presumably humans] come to have an 
account [logon] based on the retention of these items [i.e. percepts]…” On my 
reading, again, the account is a propositional principle of demonstration. Further, 
recall that on my reading, Passage U fills in some of the steps from the retention 
of the percepts to the grasping of an account. Statement Ua-b says that memories 
which are many in number and in connection with a single item (on my reading, 
retained percepts of many particulars of a single kind) form a single experience 
(empeiria). So far, in the child’s mind, we have percepts of many particular 
humans forming a single experience. Next, Passage U (statement Uc) says: “And 
from experience, or from all the universal [tou katholou] which has come to rest 
in the soul (the one apart from the many, i.e. whatever is one and the same in all 
these items), there comes a principle [archê] of skill [technês] or understanding 
[epistêmês].” On my reading, this indicates that a universal is grasped from an 
experience, and from the universal, a propositional principle (“archê”), the 
“account” (“logon”) mentioned by Passage T, is grasped. The universal, 
according to statement Uc is “the one apart from the many, i.e. whatever is one 
and the same in all these items [i.e., the particular percepts].”   This “one apart 
from the many,” or “whatever is one and the same” in all the particular percepts 




the percepts. So, from the experience comprised of percepts of many particular 
humans, the child will grasp the universal form common to all humans, the form 
of man. But how exactly is this done? This is indicated by Passage C: 
[C] 
 
[a] When one of the undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the soul; [b] for although [c] the 
particular is perceived, [d] the perception is of the universal,—[e] e.g. 





 Again, the “undifferentiated items” (adiaphora), on my reading are 
experiences that are undifferentiated from other forms in the child’s mind. The 
experience comprising percepts of many humans is, at this stage, undifferentiated. 
Although the percepts are associated with one another as a result of similarity, 
there still is not a clear difference between the all of the percepts of the 
experience, and percepts of other things (likely, other animals). At a certain point, 
the child recognizes that the particular forms of humans are all different from 
other forms, not only in shape, but also in the fact that speech or reasoning (logos) 
is part of what all the humans of whom percepts are retained have in common. At 
this point the child has grasped the universal form of all humans, the form man, a 
primitive universal, i.e. infimae species. As statement Ca says, “[w]hen one of the 
                                                 
3
  “[T]he particular is perceived” replaces Barnes’ “you perceive particulars,” and “the perception 
is of the universal” replaces Barnes’ “perception is of universals.” This is done to make the 





undifferentiated items [adiaphorôn] makes a stand, there is a primitive universal 
in the soul…”  
 Aristotle is aware that there is an epistemic gap between particulars and 
universals. But particular forms instantiate universal forms, and in this sense, a 
particular perceived form represents the universal species of the particular, so that 
the universal is, not the object, but in a sense the subject of sense perception. As 
such many perceived particular forms of instances of a given kind provide one 
with the data needed to grasp the universal form. As clause Cb-e tries to explain, 
“…for although the particular is perceived, the perception is of the universal,--e.g. 
of man, not of Callias the man.” 
 Such is how, on my reading of the genetic account, the child is able to 
grasp the universal man from retained perceptions of Callias, Socrates, etc.  
 But how does the child, from this, grasp a propositional principle 
connected to man? Passage U says that the principle—on my reading a 
propositional principle—comes from the grasp of the universal. Recall that the 
cognitive content provided to the child by the percepts of particular humans 
includes facts—such as the fact that Socrates reasons, Callias reasons, etc. When 
the child has retained such percepts as part of an experience, but has not yet 




for the implicit conclusion that all (or most) humans reason.
4
 This would be an 
imperfect inductive generalization, and “induction” in the sense that I had defined 
in Ch. 1. For since according to Aristotle the species man has a potentially infinite 
number of specimens and the mind cannot survey infinitely many things, the child 
could not possibly ever survey and retain percepts of all (or even most of) the 
specimens.  
 However, if the child draws the inductive conclusion at this point, i.e., 
before grasping the universal form of man, the conclusion would not be secure. 
What if there are many, perhaps a majority of, humans, whom the child has not 
perceived and whom do not reason? The problem of induction, with regard to the 
induction that all (or most) humans reason, is, at this stage, unsolvable.
5
 
 Passage U, again, indicates that it is from the grasp of the universal that 
one grasps the (propositional) principle. And that is what is required for the child 
to securely induce the principle that all (or most) humans reason: the child must 
grasp the universal form man.  
 Once the experience subsuming percepts of many particular humans is 
differentiated from other forms in the child’s mind, the form shared by all the 
                                                 
4
  Again, “all (or most)” in my expressions of putative Aristotelian principles is intended to leave 
open whether the principle is quantified with “all” or “most.”  Aristotle thinks some principles are 
only “for the most part” rather than “always” and this may mean that the former are quantified 
with “most” rather than universally. See Ch. 1, fn. 8.   
 
5
  A more basic problem is that the child at the stage described would not have the concept of man, 
so the conclusion that all (or most) humans reason could only be drawn inarticulately and vaguely, 




particulars of the experience, the distinct universal form, which includes 
reasoning, is grasped. At this point the inductive conclusion that all (or most) 
humans reason would be secure. For it is a conclusion that would reflect the 
distinctive universal form of man.
6
  
 Again, in this example of the process described by my reading of the 
genetic account, there is an “imperfect inductive generalization,” and “induction” 
in the sense I defined in Ch. 1.
7
 It is an imperfect inductive generalization in a 
case where the number of specimens of the subject kind of the conclusion—
man—is potentially infinite. Given the evidence I presented in Ch. 1 that Aristotle 
does not think a mind can traverse an infinite series, the inducer accordingly 
cannot possibly perceive all, or even most, of them. Further, recall that Aristotle, 
evidently, holds the Necessity Thesis with regard to epagôgê, that in an epagôgê 
(unlike in a sullogismos), the conclusion does not necessarily follow of necessity 
from the premises. And in this case, the conclusion that “all (or most) humans 
reason” does not follow of necessity from the finite, very limited (relative to the 
entire species of man) set of premises that Socrates reasons, Callias reasons, etc.  
                                                 
6
  As I argued in Ch. 3 in response to Evans, there may be exceptional cases where one can reach a 




  Again, the premises of the induction, and perhaps even the conclusion, might be only implicit in 
the mind of a child, and even for an adult, the premises in an induction described by my reading of 
the genetic account might be only implicit. But this does not preclude it from being an “induction” 




 The first question posed in the Introduction to this work, again, was: is 
Aristotle in the genetic account aware of the problem of induction? The 
considerations above provide strong evidence that Aristotle is in the genetic 
account aware of the problem of induction.  
This evidence is bolstered by my reading of Passage C. On my reading of 
the genetic account, the inductive conclusion is secured when the universal form 
is grasped, since the conclusion reflects the universal form. And my reading of 
clause Cb-e as an explanation of how we can grasp the universal from sense 
perceptions of particulars indicates that Aristotle is aware that there is an 
epistemic gap between the sense perception of particulars and the grasp of the 
universal. Since, as I have indicated, part of the cognitive content provided by the 
particular percepts retained is propositional, and grasped with the universal (such 
as man) is correlative definitional proposition (such as “all (or most) humans 
reason”), that clause suggests that he was also aware of the gap between the grasp 
of particular facts (such as the facts that Socrates reasons, Callias reasons, etc.) 
and a general fact (such as the fact that all (or most) humans reason, a fact that 
subsumes those particular facts).  
 Consider again that in the example above, the inductive generalization that 
all (or most) humans reason is secured by the child’s grasping the universal form 
of man, of grasping that reasoning is part of that distinctive universal form. This 




does Aristotle in the genetic account have an attempted solution to the problem of 
induction? The answer is the he evidently does.
8, 9 
 Consider another example of the process. If we assume that for Aristotle 
four-legged is part of the definition (part of the differentia) of horse, there is a 
similar process in the child securing the principle that all (or most) horses have 
four legs. The child would perceive particular horses, and the perceived particular 
forms (percepts) of many horses would be retained in the child’s memory. Since 
the particular forms are similar, they would be associated with one another in the 
child’s mind, forming an experience (empeiria). Part of the cognitive content 
provided by each retained percepts is facts, such as: this thing has four legs; this 
other thing has four legs; etc. These facts, as we will see, are implicit premises 
behind the inductive conclusion to be reached. The experience is at first 
undifferentiated in the mind of the child from other forms (likely, those of other 
animals). But at a certain point, the experience becomes differentiated from other 
forms in the child’s mind, so that the distinctive form common to all the 
                                                 
8
  Of course, Aristotle’s attempted solution in the genetic account, as I read it, to the problem of 
induction, is not one of simple enumeration. It is not a matter of enumerating a certain number of 
instances, as it depends on grasping the form of the subject kind of the conclusion, and that is not 
tied to perceiving any particular number of instances. This, however, does not alter the fact that it 
is an attempted solution to the problem of induction.  
  
9
  The claim that Aristotle, in the genetic account, thinks there is a solution to the problem of 
induction does conflict with the fact that he holds the Necessity Thesis with regard to epagôgê and 
sullogismos, as I argue in Ch. 1. For if an epagôgê that is an imperfect inductive generalization—
such the one used to reach the principle that all (or most) humans reason—is viewed as securing 
its conclusion, what secures the conclusion is the grasp of the form of its subject kind—not the 
fact that the conclusion follows of necessity from the premises. In such an epagôgê, the conclusion 




particulars comprising the experience, is grasped by the child. This is the grasp of 
the universal horse. At this point, the child can securely grasp the conclusion that 
all (or most) horses have four legs, for this conclusion reflects the form of horse 
that the child has grasped. Again, this is an example of an imperfect inductive 
generalization. As with the first example above, for Aristotle, the number of 
specimens of the subject kind of the conclusion would be potentially infinite. And 
again, he thinks that a mind cannot survey infinitely many things. And in this 
epagôgê, as with the first, the conclusion does not follow of necessity from the 
premises. This indicates, again, that Aristotle in the genetic account is aware of 
the problem of induction. The child, by grasping the form of horse, can securely 
reach an inductive conclusion that reflects it, i.e. that all (or most) horses have 
four legs.  
 Let us consider another kind of example. After having grasped several 
species of animal, such as man, horse, dog, bird, etc., a person can grasp the 
universal animal, and a connected propositional principle, such as all (or most) 
animals have sense perception. For statement Bc (which is a part of Passage B, 
discussed in Ch. 2, 4, and 5), which comes right after Passage C, indicates, on my 










[c] Next, a stand is made among these items, until something partless 
and universal makes a stand. E.g. such-and-such an animal makes a 
stand, until animal does; and with animal a stand is made in the same 
way. (APo., 100b1-3)  
 
“These items” evidently refers to items like man, horse, bird, etc. When a person 
grasps each of those universal forms, he grasps of each that sense perception is 
part of the universal form. When the person has grasped several such universal 
forms, at a certain point they become distinct from certain other universal forms 
(presumably, forms such as bush, tree, etc.). What is distinct about them is that 
they have sense perception.
10
 At this point, the person can securely grasp the 
inductive conclusion that all (or most) animals have sense perception.
11
  
 With this regard to this induction, it is unclear that it necessarily would be 
an imperfect inductive generalization. It may be the case that Aristotle thinks 
there are finitely many species of animals, and that we can enumerate all of the 
species, while knowing that we are. But even if this induction from species for 
Aristotle could be a perfect induction, it would not change the fact, as the first two 
                                                 
10
  The percepts retained in memory to reach the truths about infimae species (i.e., all (or most) 
humans perceive; all (or most) dogs perceive; etc.) would, strictly speaking, not be individual 
animals perceiving but individual animals’ overt signs of perceiving, such as a bird, for example, 
repeatedly landing without crashing into the ground. This, however, does not appear to make any 
significant difference to the process as I have described it.   
   
11
  The qualification “or most” here has to be understood as qualifying animals, not kinds of 
animals.  For, as I discuss in Ch. 2 on Hamlyn, Aristotle near the beginning of the genetic account 
and in On the Soul indicates that animals have sense perception. It is unlikely that Aristotle thinks 




examples indicate, that there are inductions described by the genetic account as I 
read it that would be imperfect inductive generalizations.
12
 
 Aristotle evidently has an attempted solution in the genetic account of 
APo. B.19 to the problem of induction. It is an attempted solution that depends on 
his doctrine of natural kinds, of real universals (i.e., those with an extra-mental 
existence) that are immanent in material particulars. In an imperfect inductive 
generalization used in reaching a definitional propositional principle connected 
with a universal, it is the grasp of the universal form that secures the propositional 
principle. The resulting picture is that, because Aristotle is making use of his 
doctrine of universal forms, which (if granted) seems to provide a simple solution 
to the problem of induction, Aristotle is aware, in the genetic account, of the 
problem of induction, but unlike Sextus Empiricus or David Hume, does not think 
it is a big problem.
13, 14
  
                                                 
12
  It should be noted that the definitional truths connected with a given universal that I describe 
being reached through imperfect inductive generalization are all presented as predicating, of the 
members of the universal, the differentia or part of the differentia of the universal. To reach a 
definitional truth connected with a given universal that predicates, of the universal, the genus of 
the universal, one would first have to grasp the universal that is the genus. Thus, assuming 
mammal is the genus of man, one is likely to grasp the universal man first, in part because the 
genus mammal is wider than man. One would need to grasp the universal mammal as well before 
one can securely induce the definitional principle that all humans are mammals.   
 
13
  This, perhaps, is part of the reason that Aristotle does not discuss the problem very explicitly or 
in much detail.   
 
14
  Recall that part of the reason that Evans, Bayer, and Kal take nous in the genetic account to be 
intuition that grasps the universal kind and/or proposition is that they held, each in his own way, 
that epagôgê is too epistemically frail to secure principles that make up the foundation of 
epistêmê. I had stated earlier in connection with these commentators that the soundness of such a 





 I will consider and respond to five objections to my view of what 
Aristotle’s attempted solution in the genetic account to the problem of induction 
is.   
 The first objection is that the putative solution does not specify when an 
inductive generalization is justified, i.e. after how many perceived cases one can 
legitimately generalize.  
This objection assumes that Aristotle’s putative solution is a matter of 
simple enumeration. But as my reading of the genetic account indicates, the 
putative solution is not a matter of simple enumeration, but of the natural 
universal form becoming differentiated in the soul of the inducer. 
 At this point, one might modify the objection and object that the putative 
solution leaves unanswered the question of at what point, in principle, the 
universal form becomes differentiated in the mind. The answer being sought can 
be expressed in the form: the universal form shared by all of the particulars 
comprising an experience (empeiria) becomes differentiated from other forms in 
the inducer’s mind when X is satisfied, where X is a condition explanatory of 
                                                                                                                                     
that we can read the account in a way according to which the epagôgê is not viewed as frail. In Ch. 
5, with regard to Bayer and Kal, I stated that it is implicit in my reading of the genetic account that 
the epagôgê is not so frail. We can now state more confidently that we can and should read the 
genetic account in such a way that, according to it, the epagôgê used to reach and justify principles 
is not frail. Thus, it seems that the claim, in support of taking nous as intuition that grasps the 
universal kind and/or proposition, made by Evans, Bayer, and Kal, that the epagôgê mentioned in 




(and thus, not identical to) the case that universal form is differentiated. It is true 
that the attempted solution to the problem of induction is not, and does not 
provide, an answer to that question. But it does not seem that Aristotle would 
think that having an answer to that question is essential to solving the problem. 
For again, as I have argued, the genetic account should be read as claiming that at 
a certain point, the form common to all of the particulars comprising an 
experience becomes differentiated from other forms in one’s mind. But while we 
should read the genetic account as claiming this, it does not try to give any 
explanatory condition with regard to when that point is reached. The picture, 
rather, is that at some point one does in fact grasp the universal form. At that 
point, whatever that point is, one securely grasps the truth of certain 
generalizations pertaining to that form.
15
    
 A second objection is that the putative solution to the problem of induction 
is not a good one because it allows the possibility of making false generalizations. 
Imagine a person, for example, who has seen only white swans (and so has 
formed an experience of percepts of only white swans). When the form of swan is 
differentiated from other forms in the soul and thereby “makes a stand,” the 
person might believe, in effect, that all swans are white, that whiteness is part of 
the form swan. Yet the generalization that all swans are white is false.  
                                                 
15
  Further, Aristotle’s statement in APo. B.19 at 100a14, after the epagogic process indicated by 
the genetic account had been described once, that “…the soul is such as to be capable of 





 For my response to this objection, recall that principles which are ultimate 
premises of demonstration are to be essential predications, i.e. definitional 
truths.
16
 These are the principles to which the problem of induction in the genetic 
account of APo. B.19 is relevant.
17
 Accordingly, when a universal form of an 
undifferentiated experience becomes differentiated, the truth of propositional 
principles whose subject or predicate is part or all of the differentia of the 
universal grasped would also be grasped.
18
 Accordingly, for swans, it seems that a 
proposition that Aristotle would consider a true principle would be that all (most) 
swans have this (i.e. swan-like) shape. A person with the experience of swans 
would, presumably, have percepts of other white things in memory, including 
things that are very similar to swans (i.e. that are in fact birds other than swans). 
So while such a person might erroneously conclude that all swans are white, the 
conclusion is not a definitional proposition, and as such is not an ultimate premise 
                                                 
16
  The main chapter indicating this is APo. A.4.  
 
17
  It does not seem that Aristotle would consider the acquisition of most other kinds of principles 
to be problematic at all. The knowledge that a thing exists would, it seems, be a matter of sense 
perception (if the thing is a particular), or concept acquisition (if the thing is a universal), and 
these cognitive actions are stages in the process described by the genetic account. Supposing a 
thing, such as a point or line in theoretical geometry, to exist would, it seems, be matter of simple 
stipulation. It is not clear whether Aristotle thinks that the genetic account also describes how we 
come to know “common axioms” such as the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle, 
though it seems that the process described by the account would presuppose some kind of 
awareness of those laws. This leaves, it seems, only coming to know the truth of definitional 
propositional principles as subject, in the genetic account, to the problem of induction.  
 
18
  Apparently, one cannot grasp a definitional principle making use of the genus of a concept until 
one grasps the genus. So, for example, upon grasping man, one could not grasp that all men are 







 Such inductions of definitional propositions (presupposing the 
existence and awareness of the relevant universal form) are more plausibly 
infallible.  
 In connection with this, we should note that much APo. B prior to B.19 
discusses definitions. Ch. B.13, in particular, appears to prescribe a method of 
division for reaching a definition. It seems that, given my reading of the genetic 
account of B.19, part of the purpose of Ch. B.13 (and Top. VI, which prescribes 
dialectical methods for testing proposed definitions) is to distinguish definitional 
propositions from those which are not. This, presumably, would help one 
distinguish generalizations reached by epagôgê that are definitional from those 
that are not.
20, 21
   
 A third objection is that on my reading of the genetic account, Aristotle’s 
account of concept acquisition and attempted solution to the problem of induction 
both depend on the doctrine of natural kinds. And it seems to beg the question 
with regard to that doctrine. That doctrine, apparently, can be expressed in the 
form of the general proposition that all or most particulars by their nature belong 
                                                 
19
  It is thus reasonable to think that Aristotle would consider a non-definitional proposition like 
“all/most swans are white” as subject to demonstration if it can be demonstrated.  
 
20




  Hence, on my reading of the genetic account of APo. B.19, the epagôgê described is intended to 
securely justify definitional principles, but is not necessarily intended allow one to distinguish 
definitional principles from other generalizations one has reached by epagôgê. To do this, it seems 




to kinds. Aristotle’s attempted solution, in the genetic account as I have read it, to 
the problem of induction depends on his doctrine of natural kinds. But it seems 
that induction is needed to justify that doctrine itself.   
We, however, do not have to interpret Aristotle’s attempted solution to the 
problem of induction in a way that makes the attempted solution question-
begging. A more plausible (i.e., charitable) interpretation, in connection with my 
reading of the genetic account, is that Aristotle thinks that the same processes 
(sense perception, memory, etc.) that lead to the grasp of a universal form (such 
as man) are the processes that, after the first few times they are used, establish 
that universal forms (and thus natural kinds) exist. On this interpretation, one need 
not justify by induction, and in advance of any induction about members of any 
particular natural kind, the claim that all or most particulars naturally belong to 
kinds. Put differently, if natural kinds in fact exist (and Aristotle thinks they do) 
and we can in fact grasp their universal forms (and Aristotle thinks we can), then 
we do not need to know the theory of how epagôgê is justified in order to 
successfully employ epagôgê to come to know universals and certain connected 
definitional truths. As one uses epagôgê to grasp universals, one will grasp that 
natural kinds exist. Aristotle himself would, presumably, think that he learned of 
the existence of natural kinds in this way.
22
  
                                                 
22
  Aristotle was likely introduced by Plato to the idea that particulars instantiate real universals, 
but to justify the claim that real universals, immanent in material particulars, exist, it seems that we 




 A fourth objection to this account of concept acquisition and the resulting 
attempted solution to the problem of induction is that the process described in the 
genetic account by which one allegedly grasps a universal form (i.e., establishes 
that a given universal form exists) depends on similarities between particular 
forms instantiating the universal, and their differences from particular forms not 
instantiating the universal. But Aristotle does not give and justify any clear, 
objective criteria for what counts as similarity among two or more particular 
forms sufficient for them to be subsumed by the same universal form. Nor does he 
give and justify any clear, objective criteria for what counts as difference between 
two particular forms sufficient for them to be subsumed by two different universal 
forms. Without such criteria, Aristotle has not justified the claim that, when an 
experience is differentiated from other things in the soul, the existence of a 
universal natural kind, rather than an artificial collection of particulars with a 
vague “family resemblance” to one another, has been established. As a result, his 
putative solution to the problem of induction cannot properly rely on his doctrine 
of natural kinds. 
 With regard to this objection, it seems that this is a problem that Aristotle 
himself did not see. As a former student of Plato of nearly twenty years, Aristotle 
shares a certain crucial doctrine with Plato: that universals have a real (i.e., an 
extra-mental) existence. While Aristotle questions and criticizes Plato’s view that 






 it seems that he never seriously questions or recognizes any 
fundamental problem with realism about universals.
24
 So while, as I indicated 
above, we do not have to interpret Aristotle as begging the question with regard to 
his view of the existence of natural kinds as behind a solution to the problem of 
induction, it appears that he simply did not recognize the philosophical problems 
with the view that universal natural kinds, determined by the forms of material 
particulars, exist. Hence, I maintain that while this objection contains a good 
criticism of Aristotle, it is not a good criticism of my reading of Aristotle.    
 Finally, there is an objection that is related to the last. Recall that I 
indicated in Ch. 1 that according to Aristotle, the predication in some principles 
(archai) holds only “for the most part.” I stated that in order to accommodate the 
interpretation of this claim according to which “for the most part” principles are 
propositional principles which (among other things) are quantified with “most” 
rather than universally, I would consider inductions with conclusions quantified 
with “most.” (See Ch. 1, fn. 8.) Accordingly, I often begin my expressions of 
putative Aristotelian definitional principles with “all (or most)” or the equivalent.  
 With this in mind, one may object that if some propositional principles are 
quantified with “most,” some members of natural kinds must not fully share the 
                                                 
23
  See, for example, APo., 85a33ff, Met., 1029a24ff, and EN, 1096a13-1097a13.  
 
24
  Apparently, certain Hellenistic philosophers were the first to explicitly reject the existence of 
real universals, whether Platonic or Aristotelian (as in the case of the Stoics), or otherwise 




universal form of the kind. There may be a few injured individual animals, for 
example, without sense perception, or a few humans without any rationality, or a 
few horses without four legs. If so, there is no way to objectively decide whether 
such a “deviant” individual is really a deviant member of the kind from whose 
form it seems to have to a large extent but from which it deviates to some extent, 
or whether it is not a member of that kind. As a result, in determining what 
ultimate particulars should be grouped together in a kind, it seems that we are left 
with much subjective discretion. If so, Aristotle’s kinds can hardly be described as 
natural kinds. If that is the case, then he does not really have a doctrine of natural 
kinds to rely upon in his attempt, as I describe it, to solve the problem of 
induction.  
 The evidence in Aristotle’s works (some of which I cite in Ch. 4, Section 
II and Ch. 6, Section III) does indicate that he accepts the doctrine of natural 
kinds. But, as I indicated with regard to the last objection, it seems that he did not 
recognize any fundamental philosophical problems with his doctrine of natural 
kinds. Allowing a few members of a given natural kind to deviate to some extent 
from the universal form of the kind, while not giving any objective criteria for 
what counts as a member of a kind, is a reflection of the deeper problem with 
Aristotle’s doctrine of natural kinds. Without any objective criteria for what 
counts as similarity sufficient to place a particular in the same kind as another, or 




another, we are left with much subjective discretion with regard to classifications 
of particulars. This is a problem with Aristotle’s doctrine of natural kinds. But, 
again, I maintain that given that he held the doctrine of natural kinds determined 
by the forms of things, this objection contains a good criticism of Aristotle, but 
not a good criticism of my reading of Aristotle.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 Aristotle, in the genetic account of APo. B.19 is evidently aware of the 
problem of induction. Further, in that account, he evidently has an attempted 
solution to it, based on his doctrine of natural kinds. It appears that the attempted 
solution, based on the grasp of a universal form, seemed simple to him. As a 
result, it seems that while he is aware, in the account, of the problem, unlike 
Sextus Empiricus or David Hume, for example, he does not consider it to be a big 
problem. And while there are problems with his attempted solution, since it rests 
on a doctrine of natural kinds that does not seem to be justifiable, I maintain that 
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The following abbreviations of titles of Aristotle’s works are used throughout this 
work. 
 
Work Title       Abbreviation 
Categories       Cat. 
Eudemian Ethics      EE 
Generation of Animals     GA 
Metaphysics       Met. 
Nicomachean Ethics      EN 
On the Heavens (De Caelo)     DC 
On Interpretation (De Interpretatione)   DI 
On the Soul (De Anima)     DA 
Physics       Phys. 
Posterior Analytics      APo. 
Prior Analytics      APr. 
Rhetoric       Rhet. 




   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
